Institut de Stratégie Comparée

Seapower in the Mediterranean during the XVIII^th and the XIX^th century played an important role in European affairs even if the decisive theatre was now in Atlantic. The period saw the triumph of Great Britain which eventually obtained sea supremacy as part – but also as one of the causes – of global hegemony. This success was permitted by an exceptional conjunction of economic power, diplomacy and strategy. Naval power was but a component whose efficiency was maximal only when it was fully integrated in a coherent policy. Our Mediterranean case is but an illustration of Raymond Aron’s maxim :  » With the military, you can’t do everything, but without it you can do nothing « .

In the nineteenth century, the Mediterranean Sea is a united theatre of operation. This unification is permitted by two factors, such as in the XVII^th century : a technical one, the progressive introduction of steamship⁴³, which allows long cruises all around the year ; a political one, with the decay of Ottoman Empire : the Eastern part of the Mediterranean basin is no longer closed to the Christians, who are now able to launch major expeditions against Egypt (1801), in Greece (1827) and in the Black Sea (1855-1856).

Other difference with the XVIII^th there is no great war at sea in the Mediterranean between 1815 and 1914. The only notable naval events are the destruction of the Turkish fleet by a combined British-French-Russian fleet at Navarino (1827), an episode of gunboat diplomacy which degenerates in battle⁴⁴ and the battle of Lissa (1866) between Austrian and Italian fleets which is not a great affair by the number of the ships involved, no by its strategical effects but has a great tactical impact by the weapon used (the ram). By contrast, throughout the century, these is an intensive use of naval diplomacy, these is an intensive use of naval diplomacy, linked to the Eastern Question⁴⁵. The survival of the Ottoman Empire until 1914 will be due more to the diplomatic game between the great powers, and to the will of the hegemonic one more than to its own forces.

British hegemony : diplomacy and strategy

After 1815, British sea control has become hegemonic. The global superiority of Great Britain is undisputed and she is reinforced by local superiority. There is a Mediterranean squadron which is based on Malta and which may receive fairly quickly reinforcements from the home fleet. Nevertheless, it would be erroneous to see this period as one of quiet hegemony with a naval instrument so strong that Great Britain no longer needs to use diplomatic alliances. The diplomatic game of the XVIII^th century will be pursued but with less difficulties thanks to the naval and economic superiority. These alliances will perform remarkably well throughout the century.

The first potential ennemy is France. After the Vienna treaty, French naval power is destroyed and will never recover. But during the Monarchie de Juillet (1830-1848), King Louis-Philippe begins a policy of naval restoration⁴⁶ and colonial expansion. The axis of his Mediterranean policy is the support of the Pasha of Egypt Mehemet Ali. Lord Palmerston has a nightmare : that Mehemet succeeds in creating « an Independent state consisting of Syria, Egypt and Arabia. Once this was accomplished, then Tunis and Tripoli would be pressed into the same system and France (which occupied Algiers in 1830) would become practically mistress of the Mediterranean » ⁴⁷. It is to prevent this possibility that British diplomacy organizes a coalition with Russia (tsar Nicholas I^er dislikes Louis-Philippe), Prussia and Austria. On the verge of war, Louis-Philippe refuses the perspective of war and retreats (1840).

This crisis is a good example of the British power which is sufficient to deter French government to push ahead his ambitions, and of British diplomatic skilfulness, with the alliance of Russia which is already in competition with England on the Eastern Question. But it shows also the limitations of peacetime British naval power. The Turkish Sultan asked for British naval assistance against Mehemet Ali as soon as 1831, but England was very slow to answer. It was not until 1839 that the Mediterranean fleet was seriously reinforced and this delay was beneficial for Russia which succeeded in obtaining paramount influence over the Porte by the treaty of Unkiar Skelessi (1833). This failure was not due to incompetence or blindness but simply to the weakness of the Royal Navy :  » With only 14 line-of-battle ships in commission and 2 others international crisis brewing – Portugal and Holland were the critical areas – Britain was physically incapable of responding at once to the Sultan’s appeal « ⁴⁸. Franco-Egyptian fleet outclassed the Mediterranean fleet, but Louis-Philippe understood well that this local superiority would be only temporary and that France would be finally defeated if Great Britain did put in action her global power.

What is truly remarkable in the British conduct is that after succeeding in obtaining the support of Russia against France, she succeeds 15 years later in obtaining French support against Russia. The Crimean War breaks the Russian movement in direction of the Mediterranean and the Near East for 2 decades. It is only after having denounced the limitation clause of the Paris treaty after the French defeat against Germany (1871) that Russia tries to start again her diplomatic progression in the Balkans but the initial success is cancelled by the coalition of Germany and Britain which nullifies the San Stefano treaty (1878). Like in the XVIII^th century, we see that seapower is part of global power and that strategy is part of policy alongside with diplomacy. During the XIX^th century, Britain has the most powerful naval instrument but it has also the most skilful and coherent diplomacy.

France and Great Britain in the end of the nineteenth century : two geopolitical conceptions

The last part of the XIX^th century will see a strategic revolution with the opening of the Suez canal. The impact of this event is enormous. Mediterranean ceases to be a landlocked sea to become the vital link with the vital part of the British empire, the Indian ocean. Consequently, British will try to keep the control of the canal and they will succeed in 1881-1882 thanks to an incredible blunder of French diplomacy⁴⁹. Great Britain maintains the economic profits of the canal to the French owned Compagnie universelle du Canal de Suez, but she has the strategic control of the canal and she reinforces her network by taking Cyprus in 1879 which will be a compensation for the Ionian Islands abandonned in the preceding decade (in fact, Cyprus will be as deceiving as were the Ionian Islands ; it has not a good harbour and it will be of doubtful utility⁵⁰). The Prime minister Disraeli says at the Parliament :  » When we take Cyprus, we don’t make a Mediterranean act but really an Indian act « ⁵¹. The English view is an « external » and horizontal one : Mediterranean is a maritime route marked out by Gibraltar, Malta, Cyprus, Alexandria (and beyond Mediterranean Aden) to the Indian Ocean.

On the other side, the French view is an « internal » and vertical one. French Mediterranean is limited to the Western basin, to the route between Toulon and Algiers, after 1881 between Toulon and Bizerta which must become a great naval base at the turning point of the two parts of the Mediterranean (but the harbour is poor and too vulnerable). Appears then a strategical triangle which will become a reality only in the 1930’s with the building of Mers el-Kébir. But this geographical base is not sufficient to give seapower to France due to the lack of an effective navy. The Second Empire (1852-1870) made a great effort to build a strong and modern fleet⁵², but all this was destroyed by the defeat against Prussia (1871) and then by the technical and doctrinal disorder which prevails with the Jeune École during the two last decades of the century⁵³.

The new Mediterranean Game

But, in the end of the nineteenth century, the time of Anglo-French rivalry and Anglo-Russian rivalry is coming to an end. There are two political transformations which creates a new balance of power in the region⁵⁴.

The first is extra-Mediterranean. The new threat is coming from Germany, land power which wants to become a seapower⁵⁵. Even if they have difficulties to understand the new game, if they have again colonial rivalries (the Fashoda incident), France and Britain are moving progressively to the Entente cordiale.

The agreements of 1904 mark the settlement of old and recurrent problems and open the way to a strategic cooperation which will be finalized by the exchange of letters between Sir Edward Grey and Ambassador Cambon on November 23^th, 1912, and by the naval convention of February 10^th, 1913. Similarly the Anglo-Russian rivalry in Asia is settled by the agreement of July 31^th, 1907, which opens the way to a naval convention in 1914. The Royal Navy is able to concentrate her forces in the North Sea against the Germain growing naval threat. This concentration is imposed by Lord Fisher ; it allows Great Britain to keep naval superiority in metropolitan waters. But the price is the end of British hegemony in Mediterranean when dependency of the British economy towards the Mediterranean sea route has never been so high : « by 1911 the Black Sea accounted for one third of Britain’s annual food imports and when the traffic from the Suez Canal was included, nearly half of all her food supply passed through the Mediterranean »⁵⁶. The Mediterranean Fleet, which was the strongest component of the Royal Navy with an average of ten first-class battleships in the first years of the century, a maximum of fourteen in 1902, declines progressively : 8 battleships in 1904, 6 in 1907 ; in the 1912 reorganization, the number of battleships in reduced to 4, based at Gibraltar, with only a cruiser squadron kept in Malta; Foreign Office protests and a compromise is found : a squadron of 4 battlecruisers will be based in Malta ; in fact, the first battlecruiser arrives only in November 1912, two others in August 1913. The Mediterranean Sea is now the domain of the French Armée navale. The concentration begun in 1907 is achieved in 1911-1912.

But the French navy is in relative decline : second naval power in 1898, she is only the fifth some years later, her ships are out classed by foreign shipbuilding. The Mediterranean concentration is a response to thise decline and to the inability to compete with the Hochseeflotte. But such is the French decay that the Armée navale is just able to balance the joint Italian and Austrian navies. The irruption of the German Mittlemeer Division (with the superb battlecruiser Goeben) introduces a new complication. Moreover, the strategic vision of the French leadership remains limited to the Western and Central Mediterranean : for the Army, the priority is the transfer of XIX^th corps from North Africa to metropolitan France ; for the Navy, the obsession is the Cencentration in Malta for the decisive battle which, according to the doctrine, must occurs at the outbreak of the hostilities.

But there is also a Mediterranean transformation which is the growth of regional navies. The process it at work during the second part of the nineteenth century, at least since the Austro-Italian War which saw the victory of the Austrian’s Fleet of Admiral Tegethoff against the Italian Fleet of Admiral Persano at Lissa (1866) the united kingdom of Italy builds a navy to consolidate its status of great power and to counter balance the Austrian fleet in the Adriatic⁵⁷. The Austro-Hungarians build a navy first for political reasons⁵⁸.

Thus the Triple Alliance is no longer a land coalition, its naval component is growing : the naval convention signed on December 5^th, 1900 was an unrealistic one and remained dormant : after the redeployment of the Royal Navy, which gives to the Italian navy the second rank among the Mediterranean navies, and the growth of Austrian navy (with the building of the Viribus-Unitis dreadnoughts) a new convention is concluded in Vienna in juin 1913. But the official cooperation is hampered by the distrust between the Italians and the Austrians. Italian policy oscillates between the Triple Alliance and attempts of rapprochement with France, made by the secret agreements of 1902 (negotiated by the French Foreign Affairs ministry, but not known by the Conseil supérieur de la Marine !)⁵⁹, but permanently compromized by Italian susceptibility and by incidents (as during the Libyan War, 1911).

Austria and Italy are not alone. The last decade of the century is caracterized by the beginning of a naval arms race. Spain builds dreadnoughts and France, anxious to prevent the risk of another ennemy on her boundaries, reaches an agreement in October 1904 and July 1907 on the respective interests in Morocco. Greece and Turkey are engaged in a competition which will have a tremendous impact on the First World War : the seizure of the nearly completed dreadnought Sultan Osman by the British will prompt the arrival of German battleship Goeben at Constantinople and the entry of Turkey in war alongside with Germany.

Notes:

⁴³ Michel Mollat, Les origines de la navigation à vapeur, Paris, Presses universitaires de France, 1980.

⁴⁴ Cf. James Cable, The Political Influence of Naval Force in History, London, Macmillan, 1998, pp. 58-59.

⁴⁵ John B. Hattendorf, « The Bombardment of Acre. A Case Study in the Use of Naval Force for Deterrence », in II^e Journées franco-anglaises d’histoire de la Marine, Les empires en guerre et paix 1793-1860, Vincennes, Service historique de la Marine, 1990.

⁴⁶ C.I. Hamilton, Anglo-French Naval Rivalry 1830-1840, Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1990.

⁴⁷ Gerald S. Graham, The Politics of Naval Supremacy, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1965, p. 69.

⁴⁸ Gerald S. Graham, op. cit., p. 71.

⁴⁹ Pierre Guillen, L’expansion 1881-1898, Paris, Imprimerie nationale, Politique étrangère de la France, 1984.

⁵⁰ Louis Durteste, « Quelques aspects de la politique britannique en Méditerranée 1815-1939 », in Christiane Villain-Gandossi, Louis Durteste & S. Busuttil, Méditerranée, mer ouverte, Malte, Fondation internationale, 1997, tome II, p. 536.

⁵¹ Quoted in H. Hummel and W. Siewert, La Méditerranée, Paris, Payot, 1939, p. 221.

⁵² Michèle Battesti, La marine de Napoléon III, Vincennes, Service Historique de la Marine, 1998.

⁵³ Theodore Ropp, edited by Stephen S. Roberts, The Development of a Modern Navy. French Naval Policy 1871-1904, Annapolis, Naval Institute Press, 1987.

⁵⁴ The classic work is Paul G. Halpern, The Mediterranean Naval Situation 1908-1914, Cambridge, Harward University Press, 1971.

⁵⁵ Cf. François-Emmanuel Brézet, Une flotte contre l’Angleterre, Paris, Librairie de l’Inde, 1998.

⁵⁶ Paul G. Halpern, op. cit., p. 1.

⁵⁷ Ezio Ferrante, « La pensée navale italienne de la bataille de Lissa à la Grande Guerre », in Hervé Coutau-Bégarie (ed), L’évolution de la pensée navale III, Paris, FEDN, 1993.

⁵⁸ Olivier Chaline et Nicolas Vannieuwenhuyze, « La pensée navale autrichienne (1885-1914). Première approche », in Hervé Coutau-Bégarie (ed), L’évolution de la pensée navale VI, Paris, ISC-Economica, 1997.

⁵⁹ Pierre Milza, Français et Italiens à la fin du XIX^e siècle, Rome-Paris, École française de Rome, 1986.

The wars of the French Revolution and Empire will be continuously an unequal struggle. French navy is completely disorganized by the revolutionary storm. Nevertheless, the naval history of the wars during this time is interesting because it shows the versatility of seapower. It is clear that the French navy is unable to fight in line with the Royal Navy. The battle of the Nile (Aboukir) and Trafalgar are the peaks of a long series of defeats. Nevertheless, the French navy is able to initiate large operations such as the Bruix campaign in the Mediterranean in 1799 (which will be unsuccessful). Britain has the command of the sea but Admiral Nelson is unable to intercept the convoy of the army of Egypt and the destruction of the French fleet in the mouth of the Nile (Aboukir) battle of will occur after a long chase.

Britain mounts a network of insular positions³⁶, including Corsica for a few months (1794-1796), Minorca from 1798 to 1802, but have to rely first on Spanish and Napolitan alliance. When the Spanish alliance ceases to exist after the San Ildefonso treaty (1796), the Royal Navy, in spite of the weakness of the french navy, is obliged to evacuate the Western Mediterranean due to logistical reasons and this move will prompt the quick withdrawal of Austria from the war.

The Royal Navy returns soon and this record will contribute to her will to keep at any price, after the peace of Amiens (1802), the island of Malta taken in 1800 which will become, with Gibraltar, the cornerstone of British maritime hegemony in the Mediterranean during the XIX^th century. In 1815, she will add the Ionian islands with the strategic point of Corfu, so coveted by Napoleon but also by the Russian newcomer with the fleet of Uschakov and Seniavin which operated from the islands for some years until the Tilsitt treaty³⁷.

During the Revolution and the Napoleonic wars, Britain succeeds for the first time in establishing a permanent blockade : close blockade against Brest³⁸ ; distant blockade as preferred by Nelson to allow the escape of the ennemy, preserving the possibility of a decisive battle. The morale and material superiority of the Royal Navy after Trafalgar is so great that the French navy will not even try to to go to sea and remains in her bases. Napoleon builds a lot of warships but it is not truly a navy so great is the lack of morale, training and doctrine. British warships can make a constant harassment of the European coast. After Trafalgar, Britain is able « through her predominant naval strength, to thwart Napoléon’s Continental system in these seas, by encouraging large scale smuggling on the southern fringe of his empire, by blockading French ports in Italy and Dalmatia, interrupting the supply of food and naval stores to them and to French controlled dockyards, while establishing her own bases at Malta and after 1803 at Lissa (modern Vis) and defeating a French force which tried to take it in 1811 and by supporting anti-French guerilla activity in Calabria, Dalmatia and Morea »³⁹. But this action has limited effects. French economy is oriented towards the continent, the budget is supplied by the contributions of the defeated countries ; until 1813, the economic situation of France is fairly good⁴⁰. The strategy of peripherical actions never obtains decisive results and conjunct operations (South Italy 1806) are as unsuccessful in the Mediterranean as they are elsewhere (Toulon, 1793, is a success, at least a tactical success, only by the virtue of civil war in France).

Seapower played a decisive role in the result but it was unable to create it by itself. As says John B. Hattendorf : « The ministry in London did not design its naval strategy in the Mediterranean to strike a mortal blow at France, but to maintain Britain’s ability to control and to limit French moves, while crippling blows were struck elsewhere« ⁴¹. The command of the sea gives to the coalition a great freedom of action and limits the possibilities of the French. It will be decisive in the long term and without it Napoleon would not have been defeated. But it is not accurate to say that Trafalgar was the mortal blow. The collapse of the French Empire occurs a decade later and only after the disaster of the retreat from Russia. The seapower is able to impulse coalitions and to prevent hegemony on the continent only if it can cooperate with land associates against the hegemonic pretendent⁴². Once again, it must be remembered that seapower is truly effective only when it is part of global power.

Notes:

³⁶ Brian Lavery, « The British Navy and its Bases 1793-1815 » in III^e Journées franco-britanniques d’histoire de la marine, Français et Anglais en Méditerranée 1789-1930, Vincennes, Service historique de la Marine, 1992.

³⁷ Norman E. Saül, Russia and the Mediterranean 1797-1807, Chicago, Chicago University Press, 1970.

³⁸ A.N. Ryan, « The Royal Navy and the Blockade of Brest 1689-1805 : Theory and Practice », in Martine Acerra, José Merino, Jean Meyer, Les marines de guerre européennes XVII^e-XVIII^e siècles, Paris, Presses de l’Université de Paris-Sorbonne, 1985.

³⁹ Patricia K. Crimmin, « Great Britain and France in the Levant 1793-1827 : from Naval Conflict to Cooperation », in II^e Journées franco-anglaises d’histoire de la Marine, Les empires en guerre et paix, Vincennes, Service historique de la Marine, 1990, p. 79.

⁴⁰ This point is emphasised by Admiral Castex in Théories stratégiques, Paris, ISC-Économica, 1997, tome I. Same conclusion in François Crouzet, op. cit., p. 237.

⁴¹ John B. Hattendorf, « Sea Power as Control : Britain’s Defensive Naval Strategy in the Mediterranean 1793-1815 », in III^e Journées franco-britanniques d’histoire de la Marine, Français et Anglais en Méditerranée 1793-1830, Vincennes, Service historique de la Marine, 1992, p. 216-217.

⁴² Michael Howard, « The British Way of Warfare Reconsidered », in Michael Howard, Restraints on War, London, Temple, 1982.

Dominant historiography tends to consider modern history through Anglo-French antagonism. Other countries are implicitely disqualified as non-significant. It is perhaps true of the Italian states, whom navies are virtually non-existant, even if the kingdom of Naples tries to build a navy in the second half of the XVIII century. Austria has no navy, except o brief attempt during the reign of Charles VI, without posterity : in 1739, the fleet was disbanded and her ships were sold to the Republic of Venice²⁹. The Venetian seapower is declining, even if it has jumps as late as 1780³⁰, it is now a second rank power. Malta is now an emposion, which tries to preserve its independence between France and Naples³¹, with some records of its ancient glory such as the great cruise of the marquess de Chambray (« the Red of Malta ») in 1732³².

But it is not the case of Spain. The image given by Anglo-Saxon historians suggested a chronic decline from the loss of Gibraltar until Trafalgar. Spanish historians called it « la leyenda negra de la Armada española³³. Recent research corrects this view : during the XVIII^th century « Spain again became if briefly, a dynamic seapower »³⁴. Under kings Felipe V (1700-1746) and Carlos III (1759-1788) and a great minister, the marquess de Enseñada , the shipbuilding is of high quality, there are able leaders³⁵, as the admiral José de Mazarredo, one of the finest seamen of his time, or Luis Córdoba y Córdoba who captures two British convoys (79 merchant ships taken) during the American Independance War. The Spanish navy is able to recapture Minorca (recovered by the British at the treaty of Paris at the end of the Seven Year’s War) in 1782. But, after the failure of the expedition of Sicily (1718), Mediterranean area is not the center of gravity of Spanish strategy : the main problem is the line of communication across the Atlantic with the empire of America. The decline will ocurr in the last decade of the century mainly for political reasons.

Notes:

²⁹ Jean Bérenger, « Les Habsbourg et la mer au XVIII^e siècle, in État, Marine et Société. Mélanges offerts à Jean Meyer, Paris, Presses de l’Université Paris-Sorbonne, 1995.

³⁰ Jan Glete, op. cit.

³¹ Alain Blondy, « Malte, enjeu diplomatique européen au XVIII^e siècle », in Christiane Villain-Gandossi, Louis Durteste & S. Busutill, Méditerranée mer ouverte, Malte, Fondation internationale, tome I, 1997.

³² André Plaisse, « La grande croisière du bailly de Chambray contre les Turcs en 1732 », in Marins et Océans III, 1992.

³³ Cf. Lowel Newton, « La leyenda negra y la historia de la fuerza naval española : algunos comentarios », Archivo Hispalense, 1973.

³⁴ John D. Harbon, Trafalgar and the Spanish Navy, Annapolis, Naval Institute Press, 1988.

³⁵ José Merino, La armada española en el siglo XVIII, Madrid, Fundacíon universitaria espanola, 1981.

The French case

In this new context, the idea of command of the Mediterranean sea appears. In France, Colbert builds its naval policy around this idea. In 1679, he writes to the général des galères :  » Considérez s’il vous plaît quelle gloire le Roy et vous recevrez d’être entièrement maître de la Méditerranée et de n’avoir jamais aucune puissance dans cette mer qui puisse ni égaler ni balancer celle du Roy.  » In his instructions to his son and successor, Seignelay, he repeats that the minister must  » penser continuellement aux moyens de rendre le Roy maître de la Méditerranée « ¹⁶. His « grand dessein » receives a beginning of execution with the Sicily campaign where Vivonne and Duquesne are victorious at Stromboli, Augusta and Palermo (1676) but the tactical command of the sea obtained after these victories cannot be strategically exploited : France is too heavily engaged on the northeastern front and she is unable to provide troups to submit Sicily. The island is to be finally evacuated and the campain ends without result.

The effort of Louis XIV and Colbert and latter’s son Seignelay to build a strong navy is well-known¹⁷. The results are very impressive : a nearly ruined navy becomes in two decades the first in Europe and she competes more than honorably with the Anglo-Dutch coalition notably during the Nine Years’ War. But the main strategical theater is in the Channel¹⁸, the Mediterranean being a secondary theater. The main base is Brest even if Toulon receives important equipments (and many more projects)¹⁹. Toulon is still active in the first years of the War of the Spanish Succession (1701-1714)²⁰. There is only one battle-in-line, Velez-Malaga, 1704, but both fleets are engaged in the support of armies operations in Catalonia. In october 1707, soon after the siege of Toulon, the well-know Duguay-Trouin and Forbin surprise an English convoy at Cape Lizard et capture it almost entirely : 4 warships and 60 merchant vessels. This coup d’éclat, somewhat forgotten by contemporary naval historians, has a great impact on the war in Spain : it is a severe blow for the Imperial army in Catalonia and contributes to the victory of Felipe V. French fleet also supports the sieges of Gibraltar and Nice²¹. But this naval effort collapses after 1706 for a lot of reasons : priority must be given to the Army to repel the invasion ; Toulon is besieged by the allies and suffers heavy casualties (1707) and, first of all in the longue durée, British having seized the splendid position of Gibraltar will constantly threaten the relations between Brest and Toulon.

France will not establish a durable seapower in the Mediterranean. She will try periodically to compete with England but cannot impose its domination at sea. The « grand dessein » of Louis XIV and Colbert is abandoned by their successors. The Regency will accept a second rank at sea and Louis XV will not rebuild seriously the navy. After the great disasters of the Seven Years’ War, (which occurs more in the Atlantic than in the Mediterranean) Choiseul tries to reconstitute the French naval power. Its aim is to have a navy reaching two thirds of the Royal Navy, with the hope that Spanish and Napolitan navies will give the complement to match the British superiority²². His policy will be validated during the American Independence War. It is during the last decades of the Ancient Regime that an efficient navy is able to match the Royal Navy. France has not a naval power in relation with its military power. Its maritime trade suffers heavily during the War Seven Year’s, but during the War of Austrian Succession and the American Independence War the navy was able to organise an effective convoy system²³.

The British Command of Sea ?

If XVIII^th century’s France is not a seapower, may we say that England is a seapower in the Mediterranean during the XVIII^th century ? The answer seems evident. The XVIII^th century is the period of English ascendancy at sea. She has no longer rivals, her maritime trade is flourishing and her navy is able to compete with any ennemy and to deter some reluctant countries. In Mediterranean, the Royal Navy relies on the strategic base of Gibraltar seized in 1704 (and kept after the inconclusive battle of Velez-Malaga, August 24^th, 1704) and during the first part of the century on the advanced post of Minorca seized in 1708 and she maintains a permanent squadron in the Mediterranean. As noted by Jeremy Black, British naval presence in the Mediterranean during the XVIII^th century marks the beginning of naval diplomacy : it  » led some admirals, such as Byng in the late 1710 and Mathews in the 1740, wielding proconsular power, negotiating with foreign rulers, dictating to british diplomats  » it was able to convoy troups, to mount amphibious operations and to intimidate Naples into neutrality in 1742²⁴.

But this is not without difficulties. During the Nine Years’ War, England engages privateers in Mediterranean (1695), which means that she has not sea control. The use of Gibraltar is the condition of exercising seapower in the Mediterranean but during the wars, the pressure on the reef is so great that a good part of the navy’s capabilities must be diverted to resupply the garrison. When the base is supposed to sustain the fleet, it is in fact sometimes the fleet which sustains the base. Consequently, the capabilities may be to weak to effectively dominate the Western Mediterranean in case of conflict or simply to protect the British trade. After the success of Gibraltar (March, 19 1705, five French ships of the line sunck and the siege of Gibraltar left off), the Royal Navy is unable to launch the attack against Cadiz feared by the French and the Spaniards²⁵. And if French trade suffers heavily, British trade receives severe blows, from French privateers, but also from Tourville’s fleet (capture of the Smyrna convoy off Cape St-Vincent, June 1693 : 80 merchantmen seized). For a long time, British admirals are not very lucky in the Mediterranean. In 1704, the battle of Velez-Malaga is inconclusive and would have ended in disaster if the Earl of Toulouse had chosen to pursue the fight (British ships had no more munitions). Similarly, during the War of the Austrian Succession, in 1744, the blockade of the Spanish fleet initiated by admiral Mathew ends in failure after the battle of Cape Sicié ; he is court-martialed. In 1756, at the battle of Port Mahon (May 20^th, 1756). Admiral John Byng is unable to repel the French fleet of La Galissonière and to prevent the fall of Minorca ; he is court-martialed and shot after an unfairtrial. The Royal Navy will take a revenge 3 years later in the battle of Lagos which sees the destruction of French Mediterranean squadron, but strategically, the result is ambiguous : British will be unable to recover Minorca and the shortage of bases will be fatal during the American Independance War.

We may then conclude that the Royal Navy has sea control in Mediterranean throughout the century. British trade is active, less sensitive to the shock of wars than the French²⁶, thanks to a efficient system of convoys²⁷ and this combination of commercial and naval preeminence characterises seapower. But this seapower is not synonymous of hegemony. Britain has a good instrument but it is insufficient to match the coalition of Mediterranean powers. Britain has to rely on French alliance against Spain during the Regency (the Spanish fleet is destroyed at the battle of Cape Passaro, August 11^th, 1718, while supporting operations in Sicily²⁸), on Spanish alliance against France during the first years of the Revolution, but when she is confronted to the coalition of Mediterranean powers against her, she is unable to retain strategic sea control as it is verified during the American Independence War or for some months in 1797-1798. The British case in Mediterranean during the XVIII^th century remains us that seapower is not necessarily absolute and does not mean sea supremacy.

Notes:

¹⁶ Quoted in Gaston Zeller, La Mediterranée et ses problèmes aux XVI^e et XVII^e siècles, Les Cours de Sorbonne-CDU, s.d., p. 206.

¹⁷ Daniel Dessert, La Royale. Vaisseaux et marins du Roi-Soleil, Paris, Fayard, 1996.

¹⁸ Jean Meyer, Béveziers 1690. La France prend le contrôle de la Manche, Paris, Économica, 1993.

¹⁹ Jean Peter, Vauban et Toulon, Histoire de la construction d’un port arsenal sous Louis XIV, Paris, ISC/Économica, 1994.

²⁰ Jean Peter, Le port et l’arsenal de Toulon sous Louis XIV, Paris, ISC-Economica, 1995.

²¹ Jean Peter, Les artilleurs de la marine sous Louis XIV, Paris, ISC-Économica, 1995.

²² H.M. Scott, « The Importance of Bourbon Naval Reconstruction to the Strategy of Choiseul after the Seven Year’ War », International History Review, 1979-1.

²³ Hervé Coutau-Bégarie, « Quelques observations sur les aspects tactiques et stratégiques de la guerre sur mer au XVIII^e siècle », Revue d’histoire maritime, 1997, n° 1.

²⁴ Jeremy Black, « Introduction », in Jeremy Black and Philipp Woodfine (eds.), The British Navy and the Use of Naval Power in the XVIII^th Century, Leicester, Leicester University Press, 1988, pp. 10-11.

²⁵ Jean Peter, Les artilleurs de la marine sous Louix XIV; op. cit., p. 114.

²⁶ François Crouzet, De la supériorité de l’Angleterre sur la France, Paris, Perrin, 1985, p. 25.

²⁷ Alan Pearsall, « The Royal Navy and the Protection of Trade in the Eighteenth Century », in Journées franco-britanniques d’histoire de la Marine, Guerres et paix 1660-1815, Vincennes, Service historique de la Marine, 1987.

²⁸ John B. Hattendorf, « Admiral Sir George Byng and the Cape Passaro Incident 1718. A Case Study in the Use of the Royal Navy as a Deterrent », in Journées franco-britanniques d’histoire de la Marine, Guerres et paix 1660-1815, Vincennes, Service historique de la Marine, 1987.