Chapter Eight. America’s Failure to Commemorate the Lafayette Aviators

Despite the fact that the Lafayette Escadrille and the Lafayette Flying Corps’ men were America’s first combat aviators, the USAF’s and American history have negligently ignored them.  As Charles Dolan put it, “The Lafayette Flying Corps, including the Lafayette Escadrille N-124, was and is the beginning and the backbone of the USAF, and not one word of its wonderful contribution exists.” 1 The Lafayette’s history was lost over time, and the lack of available USAF history on the subject has hampered the remembrance of America’s famed aviators.  To add to Charles Dolan’s sentiment, Lieutenant Colonel Bruce Freeman of the USAF, who studied the problem of the lack of the Escadrille’s lineage, adds, “More importantly, the first American fighter squadron ever committed to combat no longer exists!” 2

Although the first statement by Charles Dolan is only partially true, the latter statement is completely correct.  How can it be that America’s first combat aviators have not been properly held up for recognition and as examples for the rest of the USAF? In this author’s research through the aviation collections, research centers, and museums that exist in the United States, he came to a definite conclusion – none of the Lafayette Escadrille material is centrally located or sorted, and no organization has attempted to mass and gather the existing Lafayette material to one locale in order to tell the Lafayette’s story to the American public. 

The Lafayette Escadrille and the USAS History of World War I 

Serious attempts were made by the USAS during and after World War I to appropriately document the official history of its units and history.  “General Order Number 31,” from General Headquarters, AEF, dated February 16, 1918, “required all major subordinate AEF organizations to establish and supervise a historical section that would collect data and keep a war diary.” The Chief of Staff of the Air Service sent telegrams on November 19, 1918, to every Air Service Organization, directing each to prepare a history and to forward it to the Information Sections. But as Colonel Edgar S. Gorrell, the AEF Assistant Chief of Staff and the man appointed to oversee the official history of the USAS, noted, “the Zone of Action has no further interest in the war – getting home was their main priority.  Writing history does not appeal to them.” 3

The Lafayette Escadrille was officially reconstituted as the 103rd Aero Pursuit Squadron, and though the number of the unit had changed, the “Screaming Sioux Warrior” was still used as the unit insignia.  Historical responsibility of the Lafayette Escadrille transferred to the 103rd as well; it was responsible for the unit’s history. 

The 103rd did include the Lafayette Escadrille history as part of its own, but understandably the unit was more interested with its own exploits and contributions to the war effort and this is readily apparent in a review of the 103rd squadron history. 4 Fortunately for those interested, the Journale des marches et operations, Escadrille 124, Volumes One and Two, exist to this day in good condition at the National Air and Space Museum, and are available for private viewing.  These were kept and updated by squadron members and certified by Thenault, and although the log starts in late August 1916, it is complete through February 1918.  Besides this, no official history was kept during the war.  The Journale reads like a daily flight log, so it does not cover in detail all of the squadron’s activities.  Understandably, the unit was in combat operations and it is fortunate that Thenault decided to keep any log at all. 5

After the war, the 103rd was consolidated with the 94th Aero Pursuit Squadron in 1924.  The 94th is still an active duty USAF unit flying in the USAF’s 1st Fighter Wing based at Langley, Virginia. Technically, the lineage of the Escadrille had passed on to the 94th Aero Pursuit Squadron. 6

Per war department Circular 25, dated April 8, 1924, “the 103rd Aero Squadron was reconstituted and consolidated into, and as part of the 94th Aero Pursuit Squadron.” 7 According to the Air Force Historical Research Agency (AFHRA) at Maxwell Air Force Base, in a letter to Lieutenant Colonel Bruce Freeman, the “history and honors of the 103rd Aero Pursuit Squadron, and thus the Lafayette Escadrille, are perpetuated by the 94th Tactical Fighter Squadron (TFS). 8

Yet according to researchers familiar with the subject, this had not been done.  The 94th TFS has not integrated its history with the 103rd.  First of all, the “Hat in the Ring” symbol used by the 94th was originally a personal insignia used by James Norman Hall of the Lafayette Escadrille, a full year before the 94th APS would adopt this insignia.  Then, on the subject of victories, an official unit history was released in 1976 at Langley Air Force Base, Virginia, claiming that ‘the 94th “Hat in the Ring” Squadron scored the first air superiority victory in the history of the USAF.” 9 But the 103rd already had seven confirmed “all –American” kills as well as twelve “probables” between February 18, 1918, and two months later when the 94th claimed its first kill.  The 40 American kills achieved by the N-124 are not mentioned either. 10

Talks and efforts to reestablish the 103rd in honor of the Lafayette Escadrille have met with no success.  The USAF has offered an official explanation in a document entitled “Explanation as to why the 103rd cannot be Resuscitated.” Namely, that it is nearly impossible to bring back a unit once it has been decommissioned; indeed there are no precedents to do so.  Also, the 103rd designation falls into a numbering system dedicated to the Air Mobility Command and the National Guard system; there is a unit that currently carries the 103-designation.  In brief, the USAF has no interest in resurrecting the 103rd. 11

But where did the Lafayette Escadrille fit into the USAS’s picture of World War I history as a whole? In The U. S. Air Service in World War I, which was completed by USAS historians and produced in four volumes, the Lafayette Escadrille is only mentioned on four occasions in a series that span 2,319 pages.  The few references are at least favorable, to include the following,

“When the Lafayette escadrille was called to help as in 94th and 95th Aero Pursuit Squadrons it worked very well.  The work was greatly appreciated, and the Lafayette Escadrille, who had experienced men, were assigned to new squadrons.  The presence of the pilots at the front, accounted greatly in taking the other pilots across the big transition from school flying to fighting.” 12 

The other references mention the Lafayette Escadrille in passing, and there is only one paragraph of eight lines dedicated to the Lafayette Escadrille’s transition to the 103rd. 13 Nothing is noted of the Lafayette Escadrille’s wartime accomplishments.  The lack of references to the unit is astounding, considering that the unit had been in continuous combat for close to 23 months – the USAS’s next longest squadron in continuous combat in World War I was the 103rd, which fought for nine months. 

Gorrell’s History of the American Expeditionary Forces Air Service, 1917-1919, which is maintained by the U. S. National Archives, has a slightly more extensive coverage of the Lafayette Escadrille.  The short unit history it uses was written by Major Dr. Edmund Gros USAS, who although writing a balanced, apt history, neglects to go into details and tells the story more from an administrator’s point of view (which he was) than from a pilot’s point of view. Gorrell’s history does not contain an official unit record of accomplishments, nor does it go into great detail.  Furthermore, only 27 pages are dedicated to the Lafayette Escadrille in a series that contains 282 bound volumes of tens of thousands of pages. 14

No Home for the Lafayette Men in the United States 

There are no exclusive monuments in the United States dedicated to the Lafayette Escadrille or the Lafayette Flying Corps.  There are several statues, monuments, and plaques dedicated to individual members of the Escadrille or the Corps, but all of them except for one exception, were locally funded and supported.  None of these are dedicated as a direct result of the U. S. Government or the USAF.

The existing monuments erected in the memory of the individuals of the Lafayette Escadrille are few and scattered.  Kiffin Yates Rockwell has a few monuments and plaques erected in his memory.  At Lee’s Chapel in Lexington, Virginia, there is a plaque dedicated to Kiffin on the wall.  There also exists a North Carolina State Historical Marker at the corner of Merrimen Avenue and Hillside Street in Ashburn, North Carolina, honoring Kiffin and his home. 15

Of course, Kiffin’s rival in the Escadrille, Norman Prince, is buried and memorialized at the National Cathedral in Washington, D. C.  James Rogers McConnell and Andrew Courtney Campbell are honored well at the University of Virginia, in Charlottesville, Virginia.  McConnell has a street named after him, has a statue in the form of Icarus erected to him on the grounds, and has a plaque in his honor in the school chapel.  Campbell also has a plaque dedicated to him and a building in his honor. 16 There is also an obelisk erected in McConnell’s memoriam in his hometown of Carthage, North Carolina. 17 The rest of the small plaques and monuments erected to individual members remain similarly dispersed and obscure. 

A plaque exists at the USAF Academy Football Stadium in Colorado Springs, Colorado, dedicated to the pilots who died for France in 1914-1918, but no men are mentioned individually.  To this author’s knowledge there are no other officially U. S. Government sponsored monuments or plaques. 18

These scattered monuments do not honor the unit and they do nothing to promote the unit’s history.  To illustrate the point, the author stood outside of the University of Virginia Alderman Library, where the Icarus-shaped statue to James Rogers McConnell, stands prominently, and surveyed 100 students on the identity of the monument and whom it was erected to.  Out of the 100 surveyed, only 25 students knew whom the statue represented, and the majority of this 25 were graduate students who either worked at the library or did research regularly at the library.  Only two undergraduate students knew that it was dedicated to James Rogers McConnell.  Only a fraction of the 25 knew what the Lafayette Escadrille was (five).  To make sure that this was not just an isolated incident, the author went back through University of Virginia student campus publications and discovered that in the past decades, there were movements aboard campus to have the statue completely removed from grounds due to its reputed ugliness.  It took editorials and research from other students to remind the statue-haters that it represented one of their famous own, and that it was a memorial to a fallen war hero.  The students who wanted the statue removed had not known that, and they subsequently backed down. 19

There exists no monument dedicated to the Escadrille’s great ace – Lufbery.  There is no marker for his birthplace.  No flying fields are named after him, no statues are erected to him.  The only thing that keeps his name and record alive are the history books that speak of him. 20 

No museum in the Unites States has a dedicated exhibit in honor to the Lafayette Escadrille or Corps, private or public, and this includes the National Air and Space Museum.  Although there are many exhibits dedicated to early flight in America and to World War I, the American combat aviators of the Lafayette remain conspicuously absent, or are mentioned merely in passing. With no central location dedicated to their homage, with no central repository of information and knowledge of the Lafayette Escadrille and the Flying Corps, it is no surprise that the men have slipped into obscurity. 

The USAF has not done a satisfactory job of documenting the Lafayette Escadrille and Lafayette Flying Corps contributions either.  The AFHRA contains over 80 million pages in its central archives, yet the lack of primary source material and general material on the Lafayette Escadrille is surprising.  21 The USAF Museum in Dayton, Ohio, which bills itself as the “World’s Largest and Oldest Aviation Museum,” has only one museum display case dedicated to the Lafayette aviators.  Furthermore, in the Museum’s official Internet website, several of the Lafayette Escadrille’s men’s names are spelled incorrectly and there are errors in the unit history.  22                   

The USAF’s History and Museum Program’s Fiftieth Anniversary Commemorative Edition, A Concise History of the U. S. Air Force, has only two sentences dedicated to the Lafayette Escadrille.  In these two lines, the book erroneously states that Norman Prince was the founder, had five official victories, and that he transferred to the USAS, when, in fact, he was killed in combat before the USAS ever entered France.  The Concise History also lists April 14, 1918, as the first official American victory, claimed by the 94th, which denies the Lafayette Escadrille’s and 103rd’s claims. 23       

In France, the Memory Lives on 

If there is one body of people that has not forgotten the Lafayette Escadrille, it is the French.  The one-armed French General Henri Gourand captured the French sentiment in this phrase, 

“When men who have no obligation to fight, who could not possibly be criticized if they did not fight – yet nevertheless decide upon their own individual initiative to risk their lives in defense of a cause they hold dear – then we are in the presence of true heroes.” 24 

In fact, the Lafayette Escadrille still exists.  In 1920, the French designated the 7th squadron of the 35th Aviation Regiment as the re-born Lafayette Escadrille in memory of the men who came to help France in her hour of need.  The purpose was to perpetuate the name and serve as a reminder of the “best example of Franco-American friendship since the American Revolution.” 25 The unit was re-designated as the 2/5 Groupe de Chasse and served in Casablanca during Word War II, and became the most famous escadrille in the war. 26

The unit instilled some new traditions, but it always kept the insignia of the Lafayette Escadrille, the Sioux Warrior.  A review though the squadron history demonstrated in pamphlets and documents shows that the French pilots have done their best to keep alive an American “cowboy” spirit by instituting rites and passages involving Sioux and Indian dress. 27

The unit holds reunions every year to commemorate the Lafayette traditions and all former members are invited to attend.  The surviving members, while they were alive, were often invited, Charles Dolan was the last survivor to attend. 28

The memory of the dead is not forgotten either.  There is a plaque to Kiffin Yates Rockwell which marks where he fell in the French countryside. 29 In the town of Luxeuil there is also a special plaque next to his grave in the town cemetery.  In Luxeuil’s town square, there is a plaque dedicated to all of the men of the Lafayette Escadrille, thanking them for their contribution to France.   And there is a plaque on one of the sides of the hotels, denoting where the men used to stay. 30 And there is a plaque and unit memorabilia at the Luxeuil air base where the current Lafayette Escadrille was based. 31

There is a monument erected in memory of James Rogers McConnell in Fleury-le-martel where he fell, which was dedicated on June 24, 2000. 32 Ronald Hoskier has a square named after him in D’Etalon. 33 Many of the men are honored in the Pantheon, a celebrated hall of fame of France’s immortal heroes.  Here the visitor can see the name of the men who fell for France and who were awarded the Legion of Honor: Charles J. Biddle, Victor Campbell, Raoul Lufbery, Norman Prince, David Putnam, Kiffin Rockwell, Robert Soubiran, and William Thaw are some of the men listed in this special sanctuary. 34

France was also quick to recognize the Lafayette aviators’ efforts during the war.  Marshall Petain gave the Lafayette Escadrille two unit citations, the first on August 17, 1917, and the second on October 22, 1918. 35 The unit was also awarded the fourragere of the Croix de Guerre, which was only awarded to 26 units during the war. 36 A special brevet was authorized and given to the Lafayette Flying Corps pilots by the Minister of War in 1918. 37 Marshall Foch awarded the aviators another citation November 7, 1919. 38 

The American Government has never officially recognized the Lafayette Escadrille or the Lafayette Flying Corps with a special citation or award.

* * *

That France remembers the Lafayette aviators better than the Americans speaks volumes about the Lafayette’s state of affairs in America.   One could perhaps say that the French have more reason to thank the American aviators.  But the truth is that America has failed to commemorate the Lafayette men.  

  

  1. Lettre, date 19 septembre 1970, Charles Dolan à M. Q. Beam.  Charles Dolan Collection.
  2. Freeman, Bruce M., The Lafayette Escadrille: Preserving her Heritage (University of Nebraska, 2000), p. 2.
  3. Gorrell, Edgar S., Gorrell’s History of the AEF Air Service (USAF Information Circular, 1921), p. 2. 
  4. 103rd Aero Pursuit Squadron Logbook.
  5. Journal: Escadrille N° 124.
  6. Freeman, The Lafayette Escadrille.
  7. Ibid.
  8. Ibid.
  9. Ibid.
  10. Ibid.
  11. Ibid.
  12. The USAS in World War I, Vol. I, p. 285.
  13. Ibid., p. 288.
  14. Gorrell’s History.
  15. Rockwell, Interview: Paul Rockwell, p. 27.
  16. Visite d’auteur.
  17. Archives du NASM, Smithsonian Institution.
  18. Lettre, date juin 1963, de Austen Crehore.  Austen Crehore Collection.
  19. The Cavalier Daily, date 2 novemmbre 1995, et The University Journal, date 10 novembre 1982.
  20. Flammer, The Vivid Air, p. 187.
  21. Air Force History and Museums Programs Brochure, 2001.
  22. Visite d’auteur.
  23. McFarland, Stephen L., A Concise History of the U. S. Air Force (Air Force History and Museums Program, 1997), p. 7.
  24. Mason, Lafayette Escadrille, p. 105.
  25. Flammer, Vivid Air, p. 198.
  26. Entrevue avec M. Jean Gisclon.
  27. Publication de l’Escadrille Lafayette 2/5.
  28. Entrevue avec M. Gisclon.
  29. Flying for France vidéo.
  30. Visite d’auteur.
  31. Ibid.
  32. James R. McConnell Collection.
  33. Gordon, The Lafayette Flying Corps, P. 138.
  34. La Cohorte, N° 99 et visite du Pantheon par l’auteur.
  35. Parsons, I Flew, p. 296.
  36. Ibid., p. 314.
  37. Gros, A Brief History, p. 17.
  38. Battle Creek Airshow brochure, Charles Dolan Collection.
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Chapter Seven. The Legacy of the Lafayette Aviators

The Lafayette Escadrille Memorial dedication ceremony on July 4, 1928, drew 10,000 spectators; an additional 10,000 visitors came the following month. 1 By July 1929, the Memorial was averaging over 3,600 a month. 2 As a matter of record, the Lafayette Escadrille official tally of visitors for its first year of existence was as follows:

1928

September: 6,112

October: 3,252

November: 2,280

December: 2,013

1929

January: 1,207

February: 817

March: 3,757

April: 4,320

May: 5,328

June: 5,383

July: 5,242

Total: 39,711 3  

These numbers are very respectable and represent a steady flow of visitors the first twelve months of the Memorial’s existence.  However, in the later years the number of visitors had dropped precipitously.  Other than the occasional Memorial Day ceremony or other official occasion, the Memorial is neglected.  “One bugler and three other people,” were the head counts, said one of the Foundation Members of the Lafayette Escadrille. 4 The Lafayette Memorial Foundation reported that the number of visitors have dropped to less than three hundred a year, to include all ceremonies and tattoos.  The analogy of the forgotten Memorial once again comes to mind. 

* * *

Of the Lafayette Escadrille, Paul Rockwell once wrote,

“No novel of war or of exotic adventure can compare in interest with the plain, true story of the little group of American citizens who volunteered to fight for France in the early days of the World War.  Fiction writers have imagined nothing more thrilling and more splendidly heroic than the deeds of some of these men, nor can picture anything greater or more stirring than moments that came to them; words cannot describe fatigue and hardships, and suffering more bitter than they at times knew.” 5 

The story of the Lafayette Aviators is an amazing one, but has their glory faded? As one historian lamented, “Their fame slowly vanished and one of the greatest American stories of dedication to liberty and moral courage has been buried in obscurity.” 6

It is evident that the Lafayette men experienced a measure of fame and recognition immediately after the war, as evidenced by the number of visitors to the Memorial in 1928.  But what led to their fame vanishing and their story becoming obscure? It turns out the Lafayette aviators were in a large part responsible for not protecting their own legacy.    

After the War

The disillusionment and despair that post World War I Europe and the world would suffer created a backlash of all things associated with war; this permeated societies and cultures between the two great wars.  People wanted to forget the horror of the trenches and the millions lost.    

There were no mechanisms in place to support the retuning soldiers as exist today.  The notion of “post-traumatic syndrome” did not exist, and soldiers were just expected to pick up from where they had left off.  There were no support groups, no veteran’s administrations, no way for these men to come back and live normal lives in the community.  For men who had fought and flown for four long years, the return to a normal life was something difficult to grasp.  For the men of the Lafayette Escadrille, there was nothing to return to in America.  “How could one patrol day after day over the hellish inferno of Verdun or the Somme and then return untouched by that experience? It would permeate, taint, and penetrate one’s life and dreams to the end,” a survivor of the Escadrille once said. 7 Many aviators correctly believed the air industry would bloom, and that perhaps their future lay in aviation.  But there were thousands of pilots, and the jobs did not exist.  “Stay there! Don’t come back! There’s nothing here, at least you have a job!” was one pilot’s advice to his comrades still stationed in post war France. 8 However, the men could not stay in the service; like all countries, the great U. S. mobilization was over, and the great armies would be stood down.

If the legacy of the squadron of the Lafayette Escadrille was to live up to the image that the survivors wanted, it was going to be largely up to them to foster and preserve it.  However, the survivors of the Lafayette Escadrille, many mired in a post-war funk, failed in this endeavor, mostly through a lack of effort and coordination.  Also, when the unit had been disbanded and its members shuffled to other units, only a few went on to the 103rd Aero Pursuit Squadron.  The lack of cohesion of Escadrille members, stemming from the breakup of the squadron in February 1918, proved costly to the Lafayette Escadrille.  The broken contacts between men continued long after the war.  The men briefly united in 1928 for the Memorial dedication, but this reunification did not provide the impetus needed, mostly due to the acrimony and hard feelings involved with Lafayette Escadrille and Layette Flying Corps differences.  It was not until many years later that the survivors of the Lafayette Escadrille reunited, their number less than ten.  But the effort was too little and too late, led by men that were not long for this earth.

“The Ringers”  

Lacking cohesion and spirit between the wars, members did little to bolster their reputation or history.  Except for L’Association du Memorial de l’Escadrille Lafayette founded in 1923, and the subsequent Lafayette Memorial Foundation founded in 1930, no associations, organizations, or groups existed to protect or unite the Lafayette Escadrille men after the war. 

Despite the lack of cohesion, the members of the Lafayette Escadrille and the Lafayette Flying Corps looked on in derision, bewilderment, and disgust as a growing list of “ringers,” or poseurs, claimed membership in the Lafayette Escadrille.  This list of men pretending as if they had served with the Lafayette Escadrille grew to number of 4,000 people — a one hundred-fold increase over the original Escadrille membership numbers. 9

Some of the problem stemmed from the confusion of the differences between the Lafayette Escadrille and the Lafayette Flying Corps.  Some equated anyone as having served in the flying war as being a member.  Some of this confusion was understandable since the men of the Lafayette Escadrille and Flying Corps themselves were not exactly sure who fit in their ranks, as witnessed by the problems of the honor roll for the Memorial.  What was not excusable was the longer list of congressmen, artists, authors, hobos, con artists, flim-flam men, and those from all walks of life who had no business claiming to be members of the great Escadrille.  Even the renown author William Faulkner at times claimed membership in the unit, saying that he had flown for the famous unit, when in reality he had joined the Canadian Air Force and never left Canada. 10      

Some of the ringers were harmless; others caused great harm.  One man claimed to be none other than Andrew Courtney Campbell, back from the dead.  The real Campbell had been shot down and died behind enemy lines, so his body was never recovered.  This ringer used this bit of knowledge to successfully run a scam; he claimed that he was shot down and taken prisoner by the Germans; however, due to his injuries he had suffered amnesia.  He was released by the Germans and wandered around Europe before finally realizing who he really was.  He used this scam for financial gain, and was even to be married to a woman of good family when his whole scheme came undone.  Members of the Lafayette Escadrille, led by Paul Rockwell, hunted this fraud down and exposed him.  Part of the testimony used against him was by the very German who had shot down Campbell during the war.  The German officer followed Campbell’s plane down and verified who the pilot was he had killed, a not uncommon practice. 11

Another man under indictment for a variety of crimes, claimed, as a defense in a court of law, that he was a member of the famed Lafayette Escadrille.  He stated that his war record was impeccable, that he had been wounded, and that he was the infamous pilot who had flown through the Arc de Triomphe in 1919.  The court, without verifying the claims, believed him and took it on good faith that no one would lie about such a thing.  The man was acquitted of 28 of the 29 counts leveled against him. He was not exposed until late after his trial. 12

Paul Rockwell, Charles Dolan, Harold Willis, and Edwin Parsons did their best through the years to expose the charlatans as they came out, but it was a frustrating and difficult endeavor.  The biggest problem was that their actions were reactive, and by the time the fraud had been exposed, usually the damage to the name of the Lafayette Escadrille had already been done.  Undoubtedly, the proliferation of ringers and poseurs caused the name of the Lafayette Escadrille to be cheapened while damaging the reputation of the Lafayette heroes overall.   

The Lafayette Escadrille Ne’er-do-wells  

The Lafayette Escadrille did not need ringers to sully its name when several of its own members were causing problems.  Rockwell and others spent much time defending the unit’s reputation from actual members of the Lafayette Escadrille and the Lafayette Flying Corps. 

Bert Hall was heard from again, much as he predicted.  Since he left the unit he had pursued an interesting career punctuated by crime, fraud, and jail time.  He wrote a piece called The Issues that was published by a magazine; in it he described the Lafayette Escadrille members as swindlers, embezzlers, and miscreants.  The sordid piece painted the men of the unit as a bunch of misfits, and it caused uproar amongst the former Escadrille members; but it was too late, more damage was done.  Paul Rockwell was still visibly upset about it forty years later in an Oral History Program interview sponsored by the USAF.  He was still enraged and said that Hall had done irreparable damage to the unit’s reputation.  Ironically, perhaps predictably, Hall was caught in a swindling and embezzlement scheme of his own.  He traveled to China on numerous occasions, and under the guise of using his influence back in the United States to start an arms shipment scheme to a Chinese warlord, he managed to have the gullible warlord give him several hundred thousand dollars.  When the due shipment did not arrive, the Chinese Warlord raised enough flack to have Hall arrested and prosecuted.  He served two and half years of prison time.  He truly represented the worst of the Lafayette Escadrille. 13 

Other Lafayette Flying Corpsmen had brushes with the law as well, giving the unit more notoriety.  One man named Edgar Bouligny shot and killed his wife.  Another man named William Frey was a deserter from the French, and was forced to live his life on the lam.  A few committed suicide.  Some were committed to mental institutions.  Others would be marked as alcoholic ne’er-do-wells — broke, drunk and failures. 14

Lafayette Escadrille-inspired Adventures Between the Wars   

The Lafayette aviator legacy had some positive impact because there were attempts to establish Lafayette Escadrille-like volunteer squadrons between the world wars.  In each of these instances, the Lafayette Escadrille was specifically mentioned as an inspiration.  Some of them became famous; others were even less well known than the Escadrille.  

In 1919, Poland, a newly created country, had to fight for its independence against invading Russian Bolsheviks.  An American Pole from Chicago named Merian C. Cooper requested and received approval from the Polish Government to form what was called the “Kosciuszko Squadron.” Named in honor of the Polish officer who had fought for the Americans during the Revolutionary War, it was a 17-plane unit that flew for Poland, consisting entirely of Americans. 15 

Long before America entered the war with Germany in World War II, American volunteers were flying with the Royal Air Force (RAF).  They were called the RAF Eagles, and they were inspired largely by the Lafayette Escadrille.  In China, the Flying Tigers were formed by General Chennault, and received tacit approval and support by the American Government to fight the Japanese in defense of the Burma Road.  The Lafayette Escadrille was also cited as a role model;  its fame would eventually eclipse the Lafayette Escadrille’s. 16   

Two simultaneous, independent efforts to reform the actual Lafayette Escadrille were raised at the beginning of World War II in 1939, to reform the actual Lafayette Escadrille.  One effort was led by a soldier of fortune named Charles Sweeny and former Lafayette pilot Edwin Parsons; Paul Rockwell and Harold B. Willis led the other effort.  Both operated and planned in much secrecy; however, both were terminated for different reasons.  Parsons’ adventure actually had men signed up and on their way to training in France when the FBI stopped and arrested them, disbanding the fledging unit.  No charges were filed.  Paul Rockwell and Willis had made it to Paris and were in the planning and recruitment phase when the Germans overran Paris, effectively ending their plans. 17 Had these last two Lafayette Escadrille experiments succeeded, they would have perhaps proved a boon to the original Lafayette Escadrille members, and their legacy would have resurfaced.  

Hollywood

In 1958, a former Lafayette Flying Corps man named William W. Wellman made a movie about the Lafayette Escadrille.  Unfortunately, the chance to resurrect the epic tale of true heroism and valor of the Lafayette Escadrille was ruined by Wellman’s creation, a terrible, reckless, unfaithful movie.  Hopes that the movie would bring the Lafayette Escadrille a much-needed boost in fame evaporated when leaks before the release proclaimed it a dud.  

Wellman, had flown with SPA -87 from December 1917 to March 1918.  It was hoped that with Wellman at the helm, Hollywood would make a great war-movie that could honor the Escadrille; he promised as much to Paul Rockwell.  Wellman had already directed a movie in 1926, an aviation classic called Wings, for which he had won an Oscar.  As the movie was being made, the Hollywood press touted him as one of the original Lafayette Escadrille members, a claim he did not refute, which raised the suspicion and ire of the true members.18

When word leaked out from a starlet that Wellman was making a “dirty” movie, the men of the Lafayette prepared to fight back.  Wellman had promised them that the movie would be a true story, but it could not have been further from the truth.  The movie was an abomination.  The title character was a spoiled, rich kid from Boston, who had gotten in serious trouble with the law, and so had fled to France.  He joined the Lafayette Escadrille, struck an officer, deserted the unit, killed a “poilu” for his uniform to help his escape, went to Paris and became a pimp, and  on and on.  The aviation scenes were well received, but that was about all that was worthwhile in the movie.  The men of the Lafayette Escadrille were stunned and ashamed that people would think they were associated with such a bad crowd. 19

The movie premiered in Washington, North Carolina, on February 28, 1958; the home town of James H. Baugham, one of the Lafayette Flying Corps.  The Governor of North Carolina declared the day as “Lafayette Escadrille Day.” The producers invited all of the living Escadrille men, but all declined except one.  Charles Dolan made an official response on behalf of the unit: “The remaining survivors of the Lafayette Escadrille N-124 are opposed to the exploitation of this unit by Mr. Wellman and associates, solely for their financial benefit.” At least the movie was banned from playing in France at the time.  It was not a commercial success, and even Mr. Wellman ended up distancing himself from the production.

Unfortunately, the damage was done.  The Lafayette name was dragged through the mud.  This film is still shown today on television and it is available on video; the interest in the movie is largely due to it being one of Clint Eastwood’s earliest performances as a bit character.  People who know nothing of the unit will watch this movie and fall to the false notion that the Escadrille men were a bunch of mercenaries and misfits. 20

Societies, Associations, and Orders of the Lafayette  

On February 1, 1928, a booklet was published that listed the addresses and names of the surviving members of the Lafayette Escadrille and Flying Corps at the time.  This book was put together for the express intent of presenting it to the men at the Lafayette Escadrille Memorial dedication.  This effort was one of the only attempts ever made between the wars by members of the Lafayette Escadrille or Lafayette Flying Corps to establish some sort of a “survivor’s group.”  Besides the Lafayette Escadrille Foundation, who had made the lists for the booklet, no societies, associations, groups, companies, brotherhoods, or orders dedicated to the perseverance of the Lafayette Escadrille history existed. 21

It is not until 1939, that the men of the Lafayette finally established the “Lafayette Escadrille Corporation” in order to protect the good name of the unit.  This was forced upon them when they found out that a bar at the 1939 World’s Fair in New York, was going to exploit their name to sell beer.  The Corporation effectively gave the Escadrille men the rights to the name.  After this effort, the men disappeared into the shadows. 22  

The first official reunion of just the Lafayette Escadrille members would not take place until June 3, 1960, in Ashburn, North Carolina, at Paul Rockwell’s home.  Sadly, there were only eight surviving members at the time of this official reunion.  Six men traveled to attend it, one could not due to his health, and one, labeled as Mr. ‘X’ in some history texts to protect his privacy, would not come to the reunion due to his shame. (The author believes that Mr. “X” is the infamous Rumsey who had the dubious distinction of having set fire to his own plane). 23 [Another member still alive at the time but unknown to the men of the reunion was Eugene Bullard in Chicago.]

At the reunion, the remaining men created the Lafayette Escadrille N-124 Society.  According to a pamphlet made for the society, the “following principles shall form the basis of the Lafayette Escadrille N-124 Society:”

n      An incessant attention to preserve inviolate the good name and fame of the Escadrille, with prompt and public protest when an attempt is made to exploit that name for personal or commercial gain.

n      To watch over the crypt and its well-being.

n      And to pass on the legacy to the eldest family male once death takes a survivor. 24 

The idea, although splendid, was too late.  By 1967, there would only be three members at the last reunion, and at this stage in their lives, they were too few and too old to stem the tide of history.  The Lafayette Escadrille N-124 Society’s promise to pass the legacy of the unit onto the eldest male was not followed and the society would cease to exist when the last remaining survivor passed away.  

Nevertheless, after the initial reunion in 1960, a flurry of Lafayette Escadrille and Flying Corps societies and organizations appeared; as if close to death the men suddenly realized the threat to their legacy.  After the Lafayette Escadrille N-124 Society was established, the men passed out official certificates to all remaining members.  An “Order of the Lafayette, Incorporated,” was established soon after. The purpose of the Order was to serve as a non-profit, hereditary organization much like that of the “Society of the Cincinnati,” an American military society dedicated to honoring her veterans.  On one formal Order of the Lafayette occasion, held at the Waldorf-Astoria in New York City, over 2,000 guests, many of which were rich and famous people, to include former Presidents of the United States, honored the men of the Lafayette. 25 Later in their lives, there was talk of forming a “Lafayette Escadrille Historical Association” (in a letter to Charles Dolan on April 17, 1970), but it was apparently never instituted. 26 And as late as 1979, Charles Dolan speaks of an “L’Escadrille Lafayette and Lafayette Flying Corps Association” that existed, although its mandate and mission are unclear. 27

Charles Dolan, the last survivor of the Lafayette Escadrille died in 1981.  With him passed the torch of the Escadrille.  He was one of the major protagonists behind whatever successful legacy the Lafayette enjoyed, and he had a great part to play in the above listed associations, societies, and orders.  To read his correspondence collection is to see that he was one of the true believers in keeping alive the history of the unit.  True to the end, he would show his spunk and determination by visiting the Lafayette Escadrille Memorial one more time on November 10, 1981, the American Veteran’s Day celebration and the French Victory Day celebration; the French were also celebrating the 65th Anniversary of the Lafayette Escadrille.  Dolan, though feeble and sick, made the trip.  He died in December 1981.  It was fitting that he would see the Memorial as the last survivor, having been the Escadrille’s biggest proponent in its later years. 

The Legacy of the Original Thirty-Eight

The legacy of the original 38 Americans of the Lafayette Escadrille was one of overall woe.  History had not been kind to these men who were once blessed with youth, who once basked in the glow of fame, who once led the way for American combat aviators.  In a brief synopsis, this is what happened to them all, listed in order of their enlistment in the unit.

Chapman, Victor: Killed in action, June 23, 1916.

McConnell, James Rogers: Killed in action, March 19, 1917.

Prince, Norman: Killed in action, October 15, 1916.

Rockwell, Kiffin Yates: Killed in action, September 23, 1916.

Thaw, William: Died at 40 years of age from pneumonia; April 22, 1934; alcoholic.

Cowdin, Elliot: Itinerant, jack-of-all-trades, never settled down; died from cancer in January 1933.

Hall, Bert Weston: Rogue, ne’er-do-well.  Died December 1948, massive heart attack led to car crash.

Lufbery, Raoul: Killed in action, May 1, 1918.

Balsley, Clyde: Severely wounded in combat, never fully recovered from wounds, died               

early at 48 years old, heart gave out, July 1942.

Johnson, Chouteau: Died of throat cancer in 1939.

Rumsey, Lawrence: Mister “X”, alcoholic, died 80 years old in May 1967, never worked, became a recluse.

Hill, Dudley: Died at 57 years of age from heart attack; normal, quiet life.

Masson, Didier: Hotel manager, died at age 64, June 1950.

Pavelka, Paul: Killed by horse falling on him in Balkans on November 12, 1917.

Rockwell, Rob: Successful life in military aviation, promoted to colonel.  Died in January 1958 from heart attack 

Haviland, Willis:  Promoted to commander in the Navy, but died early at 54 years old of cancer in November 1944.

Prince, Frederick: Overlooked by his father, died in October 1962, self-made man.

Soubiran, Robert: Died at age 62 in February 1949, jack-of-all-trades, never really settled down.

Hoskier, Ronald: Killed in action, April 23, 1917.

Genet, Edmond: Killed in action, April 16, 1917.  

Parsons, Edwin: Died 75 years old in May 1968; became an admiral in the Navy.

Bigelow, Stephen: Died at age 44, in 1939, from alcoholism and tuberculosis.

Lovell, Walter: Died at age 53 in September 1937, from brain abscess.

Hinkle, Edward: Died at age 90 in January 1967; good life.

Willis, Harold: Died at age 73 of cancer in 1962; good life.

Marr, Kenneth: Died at age 78 in December 1963; good life.

Dugan, William: Died early of illness at age 34 in September 1922.

Hewitt, Thomas: Died early of alcoholism at 41 years of age in May 1936.

Campbell, Andrew: Killed in action, October 1, 1917.

Bridgman, Ray: Died at age 56, committed suicide in November 1951.

Dolan, Charles: Last survivor, colonel in the USAF, good life, died 1981.

Drexel, John: Died at age 66 in March 1958, from heart attack; rich family, good life. 

Jones, Henry: Died at age 79 in March 1972; good life.

Hall, James Norman: Died at age 64; famous author, died from heart attack in July 1951.

MacMonagle, Douglas: Killed in action, September 24, 1917.

Peterson, David: Killed in training accident after war at age 24 in March 1919.

Doolittle, James: Killed in training accident during the war at age 24 in July 1918.

Ford, Christopher: Died of cancer at age 52, in April 1945. 28 

Of the original 38, nine were killed in action; two more would eventually die from their wounds.  One died from a horse fall.  Two died in training accidents.  Ten died early in their lives from alcoholism and/or disease and other ailments.  One committed suicide.  A few lived their lives as do-nothings, ne’er-do-wells, and rogues; a few could never find a good job, had trouble adjusting after the war, and were shells of their former selves. Only one quarter had what could be called a full, rewarding, post war life.  Of this one quarter, none would become senators, congressmen, presidents, or very famous men, although a few had brushes with greatness.  For most of these men, the Lafayette Escadrille would be the highlight of their lives.  The lack of a strong, healthy legacy, which was not bolstered by any famous men, did not help America remember their once famous aviators.     

Too little, Too Late

There was a time when the Lafayette Escadrille was America’s favorite son.  However, post war detractors caused the men’s reputation and history to slip.  Their efforts were always applauded, but they also gained an unsavory reputation of being men with “unbalanced temperaments,” and as being adventurers, mercenaries, and even “American privateers.” 29 Undoubtedly, “the ringers,” the untoward actions of some of the men, and botched enterprises like the Lafayette Escadrille movie caused them untold damage.

 

  1. Lettre, date 4 septembre 1928, Lewis Crenshaw à M. Bigelow.  Blérancourt.
  2. Lettre, date 1 août 1929, Lewis Crenshaw à M. Bartlett.  Blérancourt.
  3. Archives de la Fondation du Mémorial de l’Escadrille Lafayette, dossier des chiffres de visiteurs, Blérancourt.
  4. Citation du membre de la Fondation du Mémorial.
  5. Whitehouse, Lafayette Escadrille, p. 315.
  6.  Flammer, Philip M., « The Summer of the Lafayette Escadrille.” Air Power Historian, 1967, p. 78.
  7. Gordon, Pilot Biographies.
  8. Whitehouse, Lafayette Escadrille, p. 312.
  9.  Flammer, Vivid Air, p. 187-190.
  10.  Ibid.
  11.  Ibid.
  12.  Ibid.
  13.  Sources divers.
  14.  Gordon, Lafayette Flying Corps.  
  15.  Seagrave, Sterling, Soldiers of Fortune (Virginia, Time-Life Books, 1981), p. 35.
  16.  Ford, Flying Tigers, et Caine, Philip D. Eagles of the RAF (Washington, D.C., NDU Press, 1991).
  17.  Flammer, Vivid Air, p. 192.
  18.  Ibid., p. 194.
  19.  Ibid., p. 195.
  20.  Ibid., p. 196 et l’auteur qui a regardé la vidéo.
  21.  Brochure pour l’inauguration du Mémorial de l’Escadrille Lafayette, 1 février 1928, NASMA.
  22. Flammer, Vivid Air, p. 189 et Charles Dolan Collection.
  23. Flammer, « The Summer of the Lafayette Escadrille.” Air Power Historian, 1967, p. 81.
  24. Lafayette Escadrille N-124 Society Charter.  Charles Dolan Collection.  USAF Academy.
  25. Lettre, date inconnu, Austen Crehore à Charles Dolan.  Charles Dolan Collection.
  26. Invitation à cérémonie, date 21 septembre 1966.  Charles Dolan Collection.
  27. Charles Dolan Collection.
  28. Ibid.
  29. Sources divers.
  1. Robins, American Angels, p. 40.
Publié dans Uncategorized | Commentaires fermés sur Chapter Seven. The Legacy of the Lafayette Aviators

Chapter Six. Dissension in the Ranks

Every unit has its personalities, quirks, competition, politics, and issues; the Lafayette Escadrille would be no different.  The original band of thirty-eight volunteers came from all walks of life: they were college students, the scions of famous American families, jacks of all trades, former military men, and taxi drivers.  The mix of personalities added to the unit’s glamour and all-American spirit, and it endeared the men to the adoring public even more.  But as the pressures and stress of combat fatigued the men, the mix of forceful personalities started to create divisive problems.  Rivalries developed, some of which became open and nasty.  Some of the men were accused of being shirkers and cowardly.  A general lack of unit discipline on the ground and in the air would cause problems with the law and, in some cases, cost pilots their lives.  Drinking became an issue for some of the men and would ruin their lives.  As competition increased for glory and acclaim, men questioned each other’s intentions and alleged hidden agendas.  Many of the men got along with each other or kept to themselves; but the ones who clashed caused schisms and internecine squabbling that would taint the Lafayette Escadrille’s legacy.

* * *

The mark of great units is their teamwork and selflessness.  The Lafayette Escadrille suffered from a rash of discipline problems and, more importantly, from dissension that would cause the unit great pain and unravel its cohesion.  Some of these problems would fester and spill over into the squadron’s post-war lives – some transgressions and rivalries were never put to rest, and were eventually taken to the grave.  Even though the unit would survive this turmoil, this dissension and discord could not help but taint the squadron’s legacy.

Lack of Discipline in the Ranks 

Captain Thenault described his charges’ cocky attitude in the following sentence, in which he mimicked their attitude, “We are here, we are daredevils, and we don’t need French discipline!” 1 These men had the best of worlds as far as the military was concerned.  They were able to fly airplanes; they were able to wear any uniforms they wanted (and some of them were quite colorful); they were paid handsomely in comparison with their French comrades by an independent, outside source; they were volunteers, so they knew they did not have to be there; and they were led by French officers who lacked the will power and the means to discipline them except in the most extreme circumstances.  

Although Captain Thenault could be a harsh disciplinarian when forced, he viewed his “task as easy”: I had simply to treat everyone fairly and without favor.” 2 However, the men looked to two others as their real commanding officers, Lieutenant Alfred de Laage de Meux, the French second-in-command of the Lafayette Escadrille, and Lieutenant William “Bill” Thaw, who was considered the leader of the Americans.  In fact, the latter that would command the unit for one month in combat while Thenault took a month of sick leave.  De Laage spoke perfect English, which helped immensely, and he took a great personal interest in the men, especially the new arrivals.  As he told Edwin Parsons upon his arrival to the unit,

“I only ask that you fly well, that you fight hard and that you act as a man.  I demand that you obey, explicitly and without hesitation, any orders I give when I am leading combat patrols…and I expect that you share the responsibility for the upholding the good name of the squadron, and we shall get along quite well.”³  

As for Thaw, the welfare of his pilots was always first and foremost in his mind, whether he was acting as a go-between or as the commanding officer of the unit.  He was only twenty-one years old when he joined the unit, but the men took to him immediately.  He was one of the original, founding members of the Escadrille, and he flew often and hard; they respected him immensely. 4

This was not to say that the men of the Lafayette escadrille necessarily listened to these three men.  Discipline problems on the ground and in the air seemed to have occurred quite regularly.  According to a letter by a surprised, and rather annoyed, pilot named James Rogers McConnell on July 2, 1916, “the Escadrille has a rotten reputation in Paris for drinking.” 5   Arrests, desertions, absences without leave, and other transgressions of the law took place and occurred more than should have been expected from an “elite unit.”  Listening to authority was an issue for most of these men, who knew they were the toast of the town and untouchable.  As one Canadian pilot who had partied with the Lafayette Escadrille at its aerodrome noted,

“From the point of view of discipline, the situation was practically impossible for the French.  Imagine a body of financially well-off Americans – basking in the knowledge that they were volunteers from a neutral country – who habitually played no-limit poker, who imported unlimited booze and food and who comprised a body of men far superior educationally and possessing a far greater experience of the world than their French companions in arms – a French commander would have experienced great difficulty controlling such a body of men if they had been French citizens and fully subject to French Army regulations.  Although the early members of the Escadrille comprised pilots of high potential in every way…their French commander seemed hapless to cope with such independent, high-spirited men.  Moreover, the French Army authorities, not unnaturally, were very anxious to sustain sympathetic responses in the United States.  The General result was that the American pilots enjoyed a wide measure of freedom of action.” 6

And although the men listened or pretended to listen to Captain Thenault, and although they respected Lieutenant deLaage, they could be very severe to anyone they did not like.  Lieutenant de Maison Rouge, the man who replaced deLaage after the latter crashed a plane on takeoff and killed himself, never enjoyed the respect from any of the men. He was a disciplined, much more formal man than deLaage, something the Lafayette Escadrille men did not wish to bother themselves with.  They were quite brutal to him. 7

* * *

The transgressions in discipline varied greatly — from disobeying direct orders in the air, which could lead to deadly results, to serious problems with the civil authorities on the ground. 

A continual source of frustration to the flight commanders of the Lafayette Escadrille was the direct disobedience of orders to remain tightly grouped while in formation and not to break formation to pursue individual combat unless the flight commander so directed.  Leaving on one’s own could prove very dangerous because it set the pilot up, especially a new one, for airborne ruses and traps laid by the Germans.  Indeed, a few of the pilots’ deaths in the Lafayette escadrille were directly attributable to this penchant for breaking ranks in order to pursue combat versus one or multiple aircraft.  Victor Chapman, for one, perished in this manner. 8 Captain Thenault remembers one such incident after he had specifically told his men to remain tightly grouped while in the air, and to wait for his command to attack.

“Soudain, tres loin dans l’est, vers Etain, j’apercus une douzaine de biplaces allemands, survolant leurs propres lignes, et a si faible altitude qu’ils avaient l’air de moutons puissant les prairies vertes, au-deal de la zone ravage par les canons.

Ils etaient trop bas, trop nombreux et trop loin pour que nous risquions une attaque, surtout au cours d’une premiere sortie, d’autant plus qu’ils se tenaient au dessus des positions allemandes.  Mes pilotes n’avaient pas encore pu se familiariser suffisament avec un ennemi qui n’etait certain point meprisable.  Lorsqu’on survole, a basse altitude, en monoplace, en territorie ennemi, il faut toujours craindre l’attaque qui peut venir d’en haut, contre laquelle on est a peu pres sans defense, et qui peut nous oblige a atterir.

Telles etaient mes pensees, lorqu’un pilote, j’ignore encore lequel, piques comme un bolide dans la direction desboches.  Etait-ce de Laage? Etait-ce unautre? Je n’ai jamais pu le asavoir.” 9

According to Thenault, the flight went onto fight the Germans in order to save their comrade.  It quickly became every man for himself, since the Germans were too numerous and had indeed set up a trap from above.  The results were not fatal in this instance, but too often they were.  It is also inexcusable that Captain Thenault did not discipline the man that went astray.  It is certain that he knew who it was because a post-flight debrief would have revealed the culprit.  Captain Thenault was very diplomatic in his memoir and went to length to protect men’s names; but as the squadron commander, he was the one responsible for setting the tone of discipline. 

Breakdowns of discipline on the ground were just as bad, and suggested that the unit was out of control.  Lufbery was arrested in Chartres after severely beating a station attendant.  The attendant had been trying to do his job and asked Lufbery for his identity papers and his ticket, since he was on the train’s first class platform.  He touched Lufbery, who took this as an insult. Lufbery punched him, knocking out six teeth. 10 From jail, Lufbery sent a telegram, “Suis retenu dans un local disciplinaire place de Chartres.” 11 Only Thenault’s intervention saved Lufbery.    

Bert Hall was almost charged as a deserter by Captain Thenault for being gone too long on permission.12 Some of the men would illegally hunt in the woods outside of the aerodrome which was forbidden at the front.  The hunters, chased by the gendarmes, would hide in the squadron bar or in their beds, having others vouch for their innocence. 13

Similar stories abounded about the Lafayette Flying Corps as well.  One man named Eugene Bullard badly beat a superior French officer in the street; although it was questionable as to who started the fight, Bullard was later cleared. 14 Another pilot, Arthur Atten, would be charged as impersonating a French officer. 15 And pilot William Frey was charged as a deserter and never returned to his unit. 16

     Sometimes the less severe breaches of discipline would approach the comical.  One aviator named Harold Willis was shot down and taken prisoner in his green-striped pajamas; in a hurry to launch, he had not felt like putting his uniform on that day.  With no rank and no uniform, he impersonated being an officer; he got away with it until the Germans found out who he really was.  His Escadrille buddies had even helped him by flying over a German aerodrome, dropping a bundle with a uniform with fake officer insignia sown on to it with a note explaining that it was to be forwarded to their embarrassed, hapless comrade.  They had assumed that he would use such a ruse. 17

* * *

One sure sign of an elite unit is that their breaches of discipline are not taken lightly.  There is nothing more frustrating for a unit than to lose personnel and equipment due to poor discipline or recklessness.

Andrew Courtney Campbell was respected by his fellow Lafayette pilots as a skillful and courageous fighter, but his recklessness in the air was also well known and he gave more than one pilot in the Escadrille problems.  When the Lafayette Escadrille was stationed at Senard aerodrome, approximately 60 aircraft based at the field had to share the single long runway for take off and landing operations.  Orders had been given to taxi all the way down to the end of the runway instead of turning off the runway early since that action would not allow for sufficient separation between aircraft landing and taking off.  One day, however, when Campbell brought his aircraft down after a mission and elected to turnoff early in order to return directly to the unit’s parking spaces and ramp.  Knowingly disobeying a standing safety order, Campbell slowed his aircraft just enough to swing his Spad around to taxi off.  A pilot of a large Sopwith landing behind him had no chance to slow his aircraft down in time and plowed it into the side of Campbell’s.  The propeller of the Sopwith chopped into Campbell’s Spad, eating up the fabric and turning the wing into splinters, eventually stopping just a foot from Campbell’s head.  The aircraft bowled over and shattered into a thousand, unrecognizable pieces, fouling the runway.  Campbell exited from the aircraft and surveyed the damage, then lit a cigarette and proceeded to walk away nonchalantly from the aircraft as if nothing had happened.  Captain Thenault who had witnessed the whole thing was beside himself with anger. He could barely contain his rage as he confronted Campbell on his way to the bar. Whatever Campbell said to Thenault apparently calmed him down, for Campbell would go undisciplined for the transgression. 18

Campbell also had a reputation for being a nuisance in the air, especially during patrols when he would maddeningly get as close as he could to others in formation until he had to be waved off.  Even then, he would come right back, annoying some so much that they could not concentrate on flying.  No amount of pre-flight counseling or threatening could deter him, and he would do it every flight.  Eventually, Campbell took it too far one day and almost caused a serious incident.  He was on patrol with Lieutenant Maison Rouge and decided to top his usual antics.  He proceed to fly directly over Maison Rouge’s aircraft, bringing the wheels and fixed landing gear dangerously close to Maison Rouge’s upper wing, in an apparent attempt to bounce up and down on the latter’s aircraft.  To Maison Rouge’s bewilderment, and to Campbell’s surprise, he went too far and managed to get his wheels firmly stuck into the fabric of Maison Rouge’s upper wing.  The unfunny antic became much worse as both realized they were stuck fast together; all attempts to pull away from either aircraft failed to work.  Since the pilots could not see each other they could not communicate and there was no recourse available to them since aviators at this time did not carry parachutes.  Finally, in a desperate attempt, Campbell pulled his aircraft up with brute force and ripped away from Maison Rouge’s plane, tearing apart his upper wing.  Maison Rouge, the second-in-command, was livid; he was able to land his plane but it would have to be junked.  Campbell smiled as if nothing had happened, and for some unknown reason, he again went unpunished. 19

When Captain Thenault was driven to punish a man he could do so, but sometimes his choice of punishment was questionable.  One pilot who had a known case of the nerves crashed an aircraft on landing into a ditch that had been briefed as a known obstacle to avoid by the men.  Captain Thenault was so enraged by this that he bewilderingly punished the man by ordering him to return to another base and to ferry back another airplane; why the man was not grounded as punishment is a mystery.  The shaken man did as ordered, and upon return to the airfield crashed the second plane into the exact same ditch, just a few meters away from the scene of the other crash.  Captain Thenault was incredulous, and finally grounded the man.  He was asked to leave the unit shortly afterwards. 20

It was not only the Americans that were causing problems and acting reckless.  Lieutenant DeLaage was killed performing a stunt on take off in a brand new Spad.  The plane’s motor stalled 200 feet above the airfield, after he had taken off too steeply, and he spun into the ground and died instantly in front of his squadron mates. 21 

* * *

Some of the pilots dangerously pushed the limits of alcohol and flying.  “They were a pretty hard drinking kind, some of them,” Parsons noted. 22 And pilot Edmund Genet wrote the following in his diary entry of February 25, 1917,

It was a mighty difficult and quite improbable proposition to keep entirely away from drink with the Escadrille.  If one goes into town any day with one of the fellows it’s impossible from going in and drinking without absolutely being discourteous and incompatible.” 23    

Some pilots took drinking to the extreme.  Lawrence Rumsey was a heavy drinker and it caused him problems.  He was often drunk and unable to fly, spending many of his days hung over.  He repeatedly pushed the limit between drinking and flying, but the final straw happened when he was supposed take part in a squadron mass movement and transfer of aircraft from Luxeuil to Cachy.  The squadron was to take off early in the morning and rendezvous as a whole overhead the aerodrome before proceeding in formation to Cachy.  Rumsey had noticeably taken too much to drink the night before and his fellow squadron mates discouraged him from flying the next morning.  He climbed into his aircraft anyway.  The squadron reunited over the field and noticed Rumsey was missing; they decided he had taken caution and not flown, so they pushed off, proceeding in formation to Cachy.  Later on, after no sign of Rumsey, the unit started to worry.  That evening, Captain Thenault received a phone call from the personnel at Delonge airfield, not too distant from their present location.  Captain Thenault was asked if he had a pilot named Rumsey, which he responded to in the affirmative.  Although Rumsey was alive, they said, there was an apparent “incident.” It turned out that Rumsey had actually taken off with the others in the morning, but had drunkenly missed the rendezvous and so had proceeded on his own.  He had gotten lost and landed at an unknown airfield (Delonge), which was directly opposite the field at Cachy but yet still far behind friendly lines.  Rumsey was convinced he had landed at a German airfield, and as he had been taught to do in such a situation, set his aircraft on fire in order not to compromise the plane.  The French airfield authorities had watched with amazement as the American plane burned for no apparent reason.  This was even too much for Captain Thenault.  Rumsey was asked to leave the unit immediately; he was separated from the military service and returned to the United States. 24

There was a much sadder alcohol-related event that occurred in the Escadrille.  Douglas MacMonagle and Carl Dolan had been in Paris on liberty on September 23, 1917.  Very drunk after a bout of day-long drinking, Dolan escorted MacMonagle back to the train in order to return to Senard.  Dolan had a hard time managing MacMonagle who was trying to escape at each stop on the long train ride home.  Upon their return to base, after a nightlong train ride, MacMonagle escaped from Dolan and went to wake Captain Thenault out of bed.  Thenault, enraged that MacMonagle was drunk, and that he had thrown him out of bed, ordered him out on the first patrol of the morning, less than an hour away.  Thenault in his rage was violating his own standing order that no man should fly the day he returned from liberty in order to avoid such drunken flying incidents.  The men were supposed to get one day of repos before resuming flight operations.  Despite Dolan’s entreaties, MacMonagle suited up for the first flight as ordered.  He took off on patrol at first light.  He was shot down shortly afterwards, receiving a bullet in the back of the head.  To add to the severity of the situation, MacMonagle’s mother was due to arrive to the Front that very day to visit her boy.  She was met at the train station, told what had happened, and attended his funeral with his grief-stricken squadron mates shortly thereafter. 25

* * *

When the Lafayette men transitioned to the USAS, they would be forced to follow the strict discipline that they once had so flouted with the French.  They would no longer be the Prima Donnas, but ordinary pilots like all the others, subject to the same rules and court martial discipline.  The special treatment would end.      

These examples of breaches of discipline do not necessarily condemn all of the men of the Escadrille, but they demonstrate that there were problems with the unit.  Discipline is, of course, key to all military organizations.  The lack of discipline of the members of the Lafayette Escadrille, suggest that there were other problems existing within the unit.  

Distrust in the Ranks 

When the guns of August erupted in 1914, many believed that the war would end quickly.  But the war neglected the general’s timetables and dragged on for years.  For the pilots in the air services, the stress of flying day after day with no end in sight would prove very strenuous, and many suffered from combat fatigue.  Besides the strain of being pioneers in a new dimension, the men of the Lafayette Escadrille were constantly at the Front in combat, with no break or with little respite.  The men were allowed to occasionally return to Paris for some rest and relaxation, but they always had to return to the grind of day after day flying. Sometimes these men flew three or four times a day in search of the enemy.  Some dealt with this stress better than others.  Some had serious problems with the stress, and though some could hide the fear and fatigue, others were not as successful. Unfortunately, the latter overtly exhibited their fear, and began to become imaginative in their efforts to not fly or fight.  This caused serious problems within the Lafayette Escadrille, and some of the men were kicked out of the unit, creating animosity that would never mend.

* * *

Fear can have a serious detrimental effect on the dynamics of a unit.  No one wants to fly with someone who will duck out of a fight, and every pilot needs to know that his wingman will be there no matter what happens.  In the heat of combat, the load needs to be shared as well; if men are not flying due to fear, others are forced to carry their burden, adding to the stress of all. There were five or six men of the original 38, nearly one sixth of the unit, who had such problems.  These men were ill regarded by the Lafayette Escadrille; they did not like to think that their unit was weak, and they especially hated having these men as representatives of the United States acting cowardly in front of the French and other Allies.  These men were notorious and readily identifiable.  Bert Weston Hall and Elliot Cowdin were two of the original members who fit this bill.  Chouteau Johnson was another early member of the Escadrille, and Hewitt, Rumsey, and Drexel rounded out the rest. 

Bert Weston Hall was considered by far the most notorious member of the Escadrille, a man who was “regarded with suspicion” from the start and who was known as an outright liar. 26 He had a mysterious career before the war as a jack-of-all-trades; his origins were murky since he constantly changed his story.  When the war broke out in Europe, he had left his job in Paris as a taxi driver in order to join the French Foreign Legion, and by all accounts performed well.  He befriended William Thaw and Kiffin Rockwell in the Legion, and when they went off to join the French Air Service, he managed to go as well, claiming that he had had prior flying time.  Upon his arrival to flight school he kept up the charade, until his instructors insisted he demonstrate his flying skills.  He climbed into a training aircraft and proceeded to roll down the runway until he crashed into the side of a barn, ruining the plane.  Flabbergasted, the French instructors accused him of never having flown before, and Hall confessed.  They were so enamored with his bravery, however, that they allowed him to keep flying.  There was still enough suspicion surrounding his persona that the French assigned two counterintelligence men to pose as pilots in order to follow him through training.  The two undercover agents even bunked next to him.  27

Bert Hall was picked as one of the seven original members of the Lafayette Escadrille and helped initiate the unit.  He flew his share of flights, even allegedly getting the squadron’s second kill.  But, as Paul Ayres Rockwell, Kiffin Rockwell’s brother recounts,

“He didn’t fly for very long.  The first months he did a good deal of flying.  But after Victor Chapman was killed, he was often very ill.  He couldn’t go out on patrol.  I remember he had one of his teeth pulled out, one after another, so he could get off flying for a day or two.  He had his teeth pulled out! When he found out it was a serious game, he lost his heart for it.” 28

 

Amongst the aviators of the Escadrille, Bert Hall was a constant source of irritation.  His basic problem was that he had an abrasive, almost repulsive personality that made him something of a misfit amongst his mostly cultured colleagues. 29 To add to his personality problems, Hall became a shirker and a coward unable to pull his weight.  This really bothered the men of the Lafayette Escadrille and it brought down their collective morale.  

James Rogers McConnell reported that he “predicted that Hall follow in the footsteps of Cowdin (another shirker) and take “the cure” (a euphemism for a recuperative prolonged leave or release from service) but it’s hard to say. As we all know he’s an awful liar and hot air artist, and every time he sees a fire on the ground he comes racing back to report bringing down a Boche.” 31 McConnell also reports how “Hall was so long overdue (from a permission) that Captain Thenault insisted on reporting him as a deserter. He’s back now, with a yarn about chasing a spy for four days.” 32

Finally the men of the Layette Escadrille could take it no more; Bert Hall was “asked to leave.” This was a fairly rare event and one that must have been embarrassing for the unit to have to endure, but by all accounts it was necessary.  As Bert Hall left he shook his fist at the men of the Lafayette escadrille, “You’ll hear from me yet!” Hall went on to join another Escadrille where he allegedly shot down another plane, but he must have had enough of war because he was released from service.  Ostensibly, this was so he could pursue other adventures.  He would go off around the world fighting for the Russians and the Chinese, become a hero many times over and receive decorations from all of the countries he fought for — or so he said.  The two books that he wrote, En l’Air and One Man’s War, are tall tales full of fabrications.  They are generally regarded as unreliable.  He went onto Hollywood to be an advisor for aviation movies; he wrote a bunch of fanciful articles regarding his exploits that the Lafayette men later had to debunk; and he involved himself in various scams and schemes, all of which brought great discredit to the Lafayette Escadrille.  He eventually was caught in one of his embezzlement scams and had to serve two and a half years in prison for making off with substantial amount money from a Chinese general, an event that almost caused an international scene.  All of this caused untold damage to the reputation of the Lafayette Escadrille.  To top it off, three women claiming to be Bart Hall’s wife showed up on the day of the dedication of the Lafayette Escadrille Memorial. 

Elliot Cowdin was another poor representative of the Lafayette Escadrille.  Cowdin had served with another French escadrille before joining the Lafayette Escadrille.  While thrice cited as “excellent, brave, (and) devoted,” he was no such thing.  His squadron mates were not of the same accord. 33 Paul Rockwell, the eventual official historian of the Lafayette Escadrille, stated that “some of his fellow pilots that I have spoken to said he always played up to his commanding officers and obtained citation for work he had not done and medals he had not gained, by buying champagne for his captains.  They told me that most of his flying was done in bars.” 34 He had penchant for taking long and not always authorized leaves, most of them were due to his “nerves” which were frayed from combat patrols.  On June 21, 1916, just over two months after the Lafayette Escadrille had been founded, McConnell wrote to Paul Rockwell a letter stating that “Cowdin’s trying for a month’s leave.  Strain too great for his delicate nerves.” 35 Even more shocking, but demonstrating the vitriol that Cowdin produced in his squadron mates, McConnell wrote another letter to Paul Rockwell, dated June 25, 1916, commenting on pilot Chapman’s death, “If it only could have been someone else – Cowdin, for instance, or any like him.” 36 These are rather hateful thoughts for anyone to discuss, and doubly so when wished upon a squadron mate. 

One of those prolonged, unauthorized absences by Cowdin brought about his expulsion from the unit.  Captain Thenault wanted to charge him as a deserter, but did not want the bad publicity, so he ordered him “released due to ill health.”  In Lafayette pilots James Norman Hall’s and Charles Nordhoff’s The Lafayette Flying Corps, which is regarded as the most authoritative first person histories of the men that flew for France, the euphemism “released due to ill health” was explained as a catchall phrase used to protect the reputation of the designee.  It was a polite way for undesirable men to be kicked out of the unit, while allowing them a measure of honor.  This is what McConnell’s letter alluded when he predicted, “Hall would follow the same cure taken by Cowdin.” 37 Cowdin quit the French Air Service in October of 1916 after initially spending some time in Paris “recuperating.” He briefly served in the RFC, ferrying and delivering planes to the French.  He returned to the United States towards the end of the war and was accepted as a major in the USAS, put in charge of inspecting airfields.  He was finally discharged for good in 1919. 38

Thomas Hewitt was another Lafayette Escadrille member that proved to be less than courageous.  He was no shirker however; it was just deemed that he lacked the qualities that make men fighter pilots.  Surprisingly he had done very well in the French fighter schools and everyone expected great things of him.  He was aggressive in flying and tactics and excelled in all the stages of training.  He was picked for the Lafayette Escadrille with great enthusiasm. 39

He proved to be a huge disappointment.  After the first flight with the Escadrille over enemy lines he became so unnerved by antiaircraft artillery that he landed ten miles short of the airfield and did not know where he was.  Hewitt’s lack of courageousness and inability to confront the enemy was soon noted and frowned upon by his squadron mates who expected everyone to shoulder their fare share of the burden.  He soon became known as “Horrible Hewitt” and he shrank further and further from his combat responsibilities.  He was so unnerved that he started experiencing problems even on non-combat flights.  Hewitt was the pilot that had twice crashed his plane in the ditch.  Thenault subsequently grounded him and he was never put back on the flight schedule.  On September 17, 1917, Captain Thenault removed Hewitt from the squadron roster and he was assigned to bombers.  He washed out of that program and was released from the service due to “ill health.”  He died alone, an alcoholic, unclaimed in a Washington, D.C. morgue. 40

Chouteau Johnson was a different type of case; he fought and flew with Lafayette Escadrille for fourteen months and held an average record.  A letter from McConnell to Paul Rockwell on June 15, 1916, noted that, “Johnson and Rumsey frankly dislike the game.” 41 Edmond Genet noted in his diary on numerous occasions that Johnson was a shirker and always looking to get out of his flying missions.  Genet called him “decidedly lazy” 42 and in a longer entry spared no disgust in his description of him,

“Am mighty well disgusted with one of the fellows here of whom I have mentioned before.  (Johnson) is not an enthusiastic fighter and takes every possible chance to shirk, while we break our necks and risk our lives to keep up the good name of the Escadrille.  (Johnson) I’m certain will see the finish of the war, return to America, and pose as the hero of the Escadrille and be received by everyone – who will know the difference?”43

 

Genet’s prediction would come to pass.  Genet died shortly thereafter, killed in combat while Chouteau Johnson would survive the war.  He was not hated like Bert Hall, and many of the Escadrille men liked him, although they considered him somewhat of a shirker.  He died from throat cancer in 1939.

There were a few other men in the Lafayette Escadrille who had problems with courage.  Lawrence Rumsey, a problem drinker, chose to hide his fear behind alcohol.  He was asked to leave the unit after burning his plane.  Clyde Balsley was wounded almost immediately after joining the Escadrille, and his wounds would cause him to be invalided for the length of the war.  He was nevertheless known for his lack of courage and was described “as needing a new pair of shorts every time that he goes out.” 44 Another fellow named John Drexel lasted only 36 days in the Lafayette Escadrille before he used his wealthy father’s influence to be reassigned to a liaison office.  According to Edwin Parsons, “John Drexel made no patrols over the lines.” He was effeminate, different, very aloof, an immediate oddball in the Escadrille, but more importantly he lacked the mettle for combat.  When he discovered that the war was for real, he chose to get out of it.  45

Another account is frankly startling; however, it shows the extent to which the reputation of the unit was at stake and demonstrates how despised shirkers and cowards really were.  Pilot Charles Dolan, in an USAF Oral History Program interview on August 15, 1968, related the following incredible story, 

“There was one incident where this fellow would be in a patrol, and he’d fly until they crossed the (enemy) line, and then he’d drop out with engine trouble or something and come home.  The next day he’d drop out because the sun had blinded him or something.  At any rate he would fly along the lines, and when the squadron had come back over the lines, he’d drop in place.  This got so bad that at the end of about a month the fellows shot him down – his own man shot him down. (!) They did not want any French men to think that they had these kinds of Americans.  So he’s among the missing, and his record is unnamed in the history of the Escadrille.”  46 

Dolan never named the pilot in question who was shot down, but if true, the story is incredible.  A murder was committed to save the reputation of the Lafayette Escadrille, and to punish a coward.  This action speaks powerfully of the distrust these shirkers caused in the ranks.       

Dissension in the Ranks

To add to the poor discipline and distrust, there were serious dissension problems in the Lafayette Escadrille.  There was a fundamental split in the unit that separated the majority of the men into two groups.  This split did not involve everybody, for some never chose sides, but it was palpable enough that a pilot from a Canadian unit noted that, “The pilots give the impression of being very war-like, even amongst themselves…there was tendency to resolve themselves into cliques, wherein individuals of similar tendencies grouped and lambasted the others.  Consequently teamwork suffered.” 47 One historian thinks that the cliques centered around northern and southern American origins, a very real possibility considering that the major protagonists in the unit came from wealthy, well-to-do northern families or rich, southern traditionalist families with roots dating back to the American Civil War. 48 

The Lafayette Escadrille contained many colorful characters who enjoyed their spot in the limelight.  When the Escadrille was first organized, its inception was met with great fanfare.  The men were the darlings of the world, and enjoyed special attention in Paris.  In the early days of the Escadrille, Parisians could not get enough of them; countless articles were written about them and a film crew even did a brief documentary of the Escadrille pilots.  They were admired by all and envied by many.

It was natural that the young men would let some of this attention get to them.  Some of them craved the attention like an addiction and wanted more.  To add to the attention and competition for glory, “there was an established system of rewards for citations and decorations” as well. 48 (Gros, p. 6) This hopelessly tainted the innocence of the men’s intentions.  The sums rewarded were not small for a pilot who earned “nine sous a day” and an additional “franc a day” as recorded by the “Carnets de comptabilite de campagne.”49 (The men did receive an additional 100 francs a month, later increased to 200 francs a month, from the Franco-American Flying Corps run by Dr. Gros and associates, as their mess fund.) The prizes were distributed as follows, 

Legion d’Honneur –1,500 francs (or $300.00)

Medaille Militraire – 1,000 francs (or $200.00)

Croix de Guerre — 500 francs (or $100.00)

Citation — 250 francs (or $50.00)

Downing an enemy aircraft – 1,000 francs (or $200.00) 50

One can see how lucrative a victory, medal, or a citation could be.  No wonder men were accused of buttering up their superiors in order to obtain confirmations or award recommendations.  To add to the glory, the man who downed a plane in the Escadrille would usually have a special byline and picture of him in the front page of the world’s newspapers, or at least certainly on the front page of the Paris-based New York Herald, the America daily newspaper and predecessor to the International Herald Tribune.  This extra, free publicity would make the man the toast of the town the next time he came to Paris on leave or liberty.  This type of coverage was especially popular in the beginning the war when the aviation service was still considered the new bright spot in the war and the chivalrous replacement to the cavalry. 51                                                                                   

* * *

The center of the competition and dissension in the unit revolved around two of the Lafayette Escadrille’s most dashing, young men, and who were both in the Escadrille from the start: Norman Prince and Kiffin Yates Rockwell.  Educated at the best schools, from well-to-do families with rich traditions, these young men had given up everything, including their safe lives back home in order to volunteer in war effort. 

Norman Prince had spent much of his time growing up with his father in the south of France at Pau.  The father owned significant property in that region, and would eventually donate the tract of land that would one day field the Pau Aerodrome.  Kiffin Rockwell had come from a family of fighters, and could trace his military ancestors back to the American Revolution.  He had enlisted in the French Foreign Legion before transferring to the French Air Service.

As similar as they were in background, the two seemed at odds with each other and the cliques would revolve around these two young protagonists.  Unfortunately, for the unit, the dissension they created would carry long past both of their deaths.    

Kiffin Rockwell scored the Escadrille’s first victory on May 13, 1916, a feat that would land him in the record books of the unit.  Prince’s first kill took a while longer to achieve.  He claimed as his first victory, on August 25, 1916, to have single handedly brought down a German Aviatik two-seater during a battle that took place six miles inside German lines, and that he forced another plane to land behind enemy lines. 52 When he flew back, several of the pilots did not believe his story, but Captain Thenault allowed his victory and recommended him for the Medaille Militaire. 53 It was this claim that spurred hostility between Rockwell and Prince.  Rockwell thought for sure that Prince had curried favor with Captain Thenault and was unjustly cited, while his own recent efforts had been overlooked.  In a letter to his brother he stated as much, saying that “no one thinks that Prince got a German…I am going to have to call him out when he gets back (from Paris) as he talked awfully big about us behind my back when I was away.  We have all agreed to try to get him kicked out of the Escadrille.” 54

Although it is not clear who “we all” is, it is very clear that Rockwell was not happy that Prince was grabbing his share of the glory.  No one was questioning Lufbery’s kills, which already numbered four at this point.  Rockwell was unreasonably steamed about Prince’s claims and subsequent recognition, for he started blaming everyone and everything for his lack of recent success.  He even blamed Captain Thenault for his problems.  Kiffin, in a letter to this brother, Paul Rockwell, said,

“My citation has not gone through, so can’t send you a copy yet.  Don’t think there is much doubt of the medaille, but don’t expect two citations.  There is no reason why I shouldn’t have them, except we are very unlucky in having a captain who is a nice fellow and brave, but doesn’t know how to look after his men, and doesn’t try to.  I have been fighting with him ever since being back (from an injury), mainly about the fact that I have no machine, and he gave my old one to Prince (of all insults!) and is not in a hurry to get me a new one.  I think that in a few weeks I will be plenty sick of this outfit.” 55

He had already been promoted to sergeant and awarded the Medaille Militaire and the Croix de Guerre for actions completed, but his anger and his suspicions seemed to have clouded his head for on August 31, 1916, he wrote to his brother, Paul,

“I want to be changed to a French Escadrille unless certain conditions change here… I want a legion d’honneur and a sous-lieutenant’s grade.  I don’t give a d___ how conceited it may appear, but I think that I have well earned the two… Everyone here is unhappy and discontented and I am about the worst of any.” 56 

Rockwell questioned Prince’s sincerity and believed that his motive for helping found and serving with the Escadrille was for his own personal glory.  Rockwell had fought 40 official air duels without a kill in August of 1916 when he wrote the above letters, and it is possible that the stress of not getting a victory was getting to him. 57  

Prince was described as being “in it for the sport,” rather than for fierce idealistic reasons, but so were others, and one could argue that at least he was there. 58 He was a brave young man full of vigor and pride, but so then were many others in the Escadrille.  The only criticism the author found of Prince came from a relative, who said that he was myopic, but vain enough that he refused to wear corrective lenses — Norman Prince exclaiming, “No ace wears glasses!” 59  

Whatever the cause of the discord, the two men did not get along.  This is not surprising by itself, but when testimony from outside sources note that the unit appears to be split into feuding cliques centered on distinct personalities, then the unit has a problem.  This animosity detracted from the unit and served to undermine its potential greatness.  As the friction between the two men was coming to a head, they each had less than two months to live.  Rockwell would die first, shot down by a German.  Prince would die soon after, after hitting a wire upon approach to the airfield.  Ironically, the man who refused to wear glasses did not see the wire in the dimming light.  His plane flipped over and he was mortally injured, dying days later. Huge funerals were held for both men, and many turned out to honor the young heroes.  In death they would find peace from their differences.  Little did anyone know that the Rockwell and Prince names would surface again as protagonists in a bitter dispute after the war. 

The Dissension and Discord Carry on after the War 

The dissension and discord in the Escadrille would spill over into the years after the war, especially during a very memorable time for the unit, the erection and dedication of the Lafayette Escadrille Memorial.  This time the discord centered on two main issues; the first concerned the Prince name and the erection of the Memorial.  The second also involved the Memorial, but this time the differences were between the Lafayette Escadrille and the Lafayette Flying Corps.

The Rockwell-Prince Saga Continues 

When Kiffin Rockwell and Norman Prince died, the country of France mourned for them as if they had lost their own sons.  And the Lafayette Escadrille was the less due to the loss of two of its famous members.  Many hoped that the rivalry that had split the two apart would finally be laid to rest.  Unknown to the Lafayette Escadrille at the time, another Prince would carry on the fight of the family name.          

Frederick Henry Prince, Norman’s father, was a very wealthy man.  Despite his vast holdings and interests in France, he had violently disagreed with his son’s departure to France to fight; in fact, he tried to use his influence, unbeknownst to Norman, to have him transferred to a rearward position.  Norman Prince had been Frederick Prince’s favorite son, and he had hoped that one day Norman would take over the family business.  Norman’s rebellious move to run off and join the war effort upset his father’s plans for him. 

Upon Norman’s death, Mr. Prince embraced his fallen son and sought to glorify his son’s deeds.  Norman’s death became an obsession for the old man (despite having another older son and namesake, Frederick Prince, Jr., in the Lafayette Escadrille who he inexplicably shunned).  The father was an obsessive, complicated, petty man who bullied people to have his way.  His efforts to glorify his son at the expense of others drove the Escadrille members mad with rage. 

Mr. Prince’s efforts started almost immediately after Norman’s death.  His primary intent was to make sure that history accorded his son Norman as the sole person responsible for the founding of the Lafayette Escadrille.  He would also seek to embellish and enlarge his son’s record, to the detriment of the others.  First, Mr. Prince he financed and published a book in 1917 entitled, Norman Prince, a Volunteer who Died for the Cause he Loved which he financed and published himself in 1917.  The book is full of praise for his dead son, but it also, unfortunately, contained a lot of misleading statements and claims.  The surviving members of the Escadrille, understandably, took exception to the errors.  The most egregious misstatement was that Norman was the sole founder of the Lafayette Escadrille.  The men of the Lafayette Escadrille were understandably upset since Mr. Prince was beating everyone to the punch by publishing these claims while they were still fighting in the war.  The American public back home, eager to hear stories from the Front, readily gobbled up these claims. 60

Mr. Prince’s efforts continued after the war.  In 1921, Captain Georges Thenault unwittingly turned over his memoir L’Escadrille Lafayette, to Mr. Prince to have it translated and published in the United States.  A letter from Paul Rockwell, Kiffin’s older brother who also served in France and who always maintained very close ties with the Escadrille, captures the anger and frustration that the men of the Lafayette Escadrille expressed at the doctored translation,

     “I mailed you yesterday my copies of the two editions of Georges Thenault’s story of the Lafayette Escadrille; the authentic Paris edition, and the edition altered by the Prince family and published in Boston.  I am enclosing these with some articles covering the affair.  I have many others but these will give an idea of how the father and the uncle of Norman Prince attempted to glorify him by suppressing Thenault’s account of good work done by William Thaw and other pilots of the Lafayette Escadrille. 

     “When you read Chapter One of Thenault’s book as he wrote it, you will note that he considered Thaw the originator of the plan for the Escadrille of Americans volunteers in the service of France.  I agree entirely with Thenault, and I knew Thaw intimately from August 1914, until his death.  I must admit for a number of years following World War I, I like many others, was very sentimental about the fellows who had been killed during the War, and I often gave Norman Prince credit for founding the Lafayette Escadrille, although I knew Bill Thaw had the idea long before Prince ever came to France and volunteered.

     “I had a long talk with Thaw sometime before the end of World War I, regarding the efforts of the Prince family to glorify Norman Prince and the extravagant claims made for him.  Thaw’s comment was, “Let Norman have all the credit they wish to give him.  He was dead, I am alive, and I enjoy living.” But after I learned that the Prince’s were not only making unjustified claims for Norman (“sole founder of the Lafayette Escadrille,”etc.); but were deliberately suppressing credit given William Thaw and others pilots for work well done, my attitude changed.  It was not Thaw’s fault that he survived the war, he faced death as often and as bravely as did Norman Prince and my brother Kiffin and the others that were killed.” 61  

Thaw, a known even hand and important member of the Escadrille who never succumbed to joining the cliques in the unit, had even at the end of the war tried to remain neutral, but his neutrality did not last for long. 

Meanwhile, Mr. Prince had stepped up his efforts to glorify his son’s role in the Lafayette Escadrille.  In May of 1923, the “L’Association du Memorial de L’Escadrille Lafayette” was founded to commemorate the efforts of the Lafayette Escadrille and the Lafayette Flying Corps.  A large fund raising drive featuring many circulars was conducted in order to raise money.  Prominent men of France and the Unites States backed the memorial and raised and donated funds themselves.  Mr. Prince became a member of the association’s board due to his financial clout and influence, and by donating a huge sum of money.  But from the very start, a war broke out between the formerly neutral William Thaw and Paul Rockwell and Mr. Prince, which endured through the duration of the construction of the Memorial, due to be unveiled and dedicated July 4, 1928.  This was a five-year test of words and wills that unfortunately sullied the memory of the Memorial and the men it was dedicated to, and likewise caused animosity for years afterwards.   

Mr. Prince bullied the members of the Association with his financial clout and unveiled threats, which included former members of the Lafayette Escadrille and Lafayette Flying Corps, among them Austin Crehore, and associates such as Paul Rockwell and Dr. Gros.  Mr. Prince, as a primary provider of the Memorial, wanted the monument to be erected in the memory of his son, Norman.  In his idea for the memorial, Norman Prince would be featured as the main attraction, a tomb with Norman’s remains would be the centerpiece.  The rest of the men would be honored too, but they would be ancillary to Norman, their tombs or names featured as a backdrop or as part of the scenery.  The men were dumbfounded; although they had no problem with Norman Prince, they certainly did not hold him in higher esteem than any of the other members of the Lafayette Escadrille.  Above all, the Memorial was meant to honor all those who had fought and served. 62

Thaw and Rockwell led the charge against Prince’s efforts.  They rallied the support of the other men involved in the memorial’s construction and proved to be an effective counter-force against Prince’s power and influence.  As the construction of the monument proceeded, they managed to override Mr. Prince’s demands, but he stayed on as a member of the Association, attempting to influence the monument in his son’s favor.  A review of the Association’s minutes of meetings and the correspondence sent between members of the Association’s Board reveal an embattled Mr. Prince vainly fighting for his son’s cause.  Finally, in a series of letters dated May 4, May 25, and June 6, 1928, on the very eve of the Memorial’s dedication, Mr. Prince quit the Association and attempted to blame his resignation on another of the Board members, although it was evident that he was unhappy with the monument’s final form.  Too late to withdraw his funding, he made sure everyone knew he felt slighted.  In letters to certain Board members, he described how he had been “insulted by (Austen Crehore) and offended by him, as he offends everyone else,” and how “purely personal the affront was,” and that he was giving the board his letter of resignation. 63 He subsequently pulled out the remainder of his funding, and left to search for another site to memorialize his son. 

The surviving members of the Lafayette Escadrille were happier for his departure.  As Paul Rockwell put it, “We have weathered successfully many storms, such as the attempt of the Prince family to take away from us the Memorial at Garches to all of our dead, and turn it into a memorial for one pilot only.” 64 However, the fight that had broken out over the Lafayette Escadrille soured the beauty of the monument’s purpose, and others found that the fight was still not over with the Prince family. 

William Thaw, in response to an article written by Mr. Prince in the Pittsburgh Post Gazette, wrote the following letter to the editor published on May 11, 1929.  Thaw had taken exception to the excessive claims laid out in the Prince article and sought to rectify the record,

     “I am taking the liberty to writing you relative to your editorial of Thursday, April 25th, on the subject of the service of Norman Prince with the Lafayette Escadrille…without wanting to in any way detract from the good work done by Prince while with the Lafayette Escadrille, I do wish to correct your figures.  You wrote that he “fought 122 engagements and was credited with five enemy planes, and with four others not officially rewarded.” 

“I was with the Lafayette Escadrille as second in command under Captain  Thenault, now French Air Attaché at Washington, during the period of Prince’s sojourn therewith, and during that time (I have before me the official records) the entire squadron had 156 aerial combats, and destroyed officially 17 enemy planes, for three of which Prince was given credit….

“It is illogical to assume that any one pilot actively participated in 80% of the squadron’s combats and over 53% of its victories….” 65

  In some ways the fight against the Prince’s was less direct.  Paul Rockwell once stated in a letter dated November 8, 1959, that “I always felt I could not write an important history of the unit, some of the fellows (not many) I did not like and I might not be fair to them.” 66 He was right.  In his book American Fighters in the Foreign Legion, 1914 -1918, Paul Rockwell mentions Norman Prince only once in his whole book (in a copy of a citation), while his brother Kiffin, is mentioned over 50 times. 67            

These, and other efforts and letters, are some of the examples of how Lafayette Escadrille members would have to defend the true history of their unit.  The main effort would be directed against Mr. Prince who continued to champion his son until his death.  It was with great irony that neither Norman Prince, Kiffin Yates Rockwell, nor William Thaw would be buried at the Lafayette Escadrille Memorial.  Kiffin Rockwell was left in his original burial spot, in the town of Luxeuil.  Thaw was buried in his hometown of Pittsburgh.  And Prince would eventually get his own memorial.

Mr. Prince, after being rebuked by the Association, pushed hard for a $500,000 memorial dedicated entirely to his son at Ft. Meyer in Washington, D. C., but he was rebuffed by base officials.  He finally used his influence to have his son’s remains buried in the Washington National Cathedral, in Washington, D. C.   Norman Prince’s remains lay in a prominent chapel inside the cathedral, where a statue of him and his crypt glisten in white stone.  Prince is in august surroundings, of which heads of state like Woodrow Wilson are buried.  The chapel was dedicated in 1937; Norman Prince’s remains were transferred from France and entombed there.  Mr. Prince strove until the end to promote his son’s role in the Escadrille; indeed, for all visitors who come to this site and see the tomb, engraved on the side are the following words:

NORMAN PRINCE

Founder of the Lafayette Escadrille

Among the first to lead where the nation followed in the World War 68

  The Lafayette Escadrille versus the Lafayette Flying Corps 

On the eve of the dedication of the Lafayette Escadrille Memorial, a gathering was held for the survivors of the Lafayette Escadrille and the Lafayette Flying Corps.  They met at the Hotel Chatham, a favorite gathering place for the Lafayette men during the war.  They gathered to fete the unveiling of the monument that would honor their fallen brethren in perpetuity.  Although they had had no official recognition in the United States, they knew this memorial would help the memory of their feats endure.                   

However, the gathering was not as festive as the members would have liked it to be.  An argument broke out between the pilots.  One of the Lafayette Escadrille pilots had accused the Lafayette Flying Corps members of trying “to steal the thunder” of the Lafayette Escadrille;  other Lafayette Escadrille pilots seconded the opinion.  The Flying Corp pilots took exception to this.  Additionally, some pilots believed that no one still alive should be on the monument, and that it should just be a memorial to those who died in combat.  Some were upset because some of their comrades had not made the monument’s list of names to be etched on the Memorial; others were mad at some of the names that were to be included.  Finally Austen Crehore, a member of the Lafayette Flying Corps, and a board member of the Association of the Lafayette Escadrille Memorial, took the floor and made a calming speech, “We have brought you our dead, don’t exclude them.  We all fought for the same cause.” But the controversy would not subside, and a great deal of bickering would haunt the Lafayette Escadrille and Flying Corps members for years to come. 69    

* * *

Many of the 10,000 attendees, to include French notables such as Marshal’s Foch and Petain, at the next day’s dedication ceremony of the Lafayette Escadrille Memorial, had no idea of the controversy overshadowing the Memorial they were about to unveil.  The names of the Lafayette Escadrille and the Lafayette Flying Corps members were yet to be added to the Memorial at this point; no one was quite sure how to appropriately address this issue.  Some of the Lafayette Escadrille members thought that only the original 38 members of the unit plus the French officers that commanded them, should be included on the Memorial.  The members of the Lafayette Flying Corps rightly thought they had a reason to be on the monument as well.  They fought the same air battles at the same time for the same ally.  But what really constituted inclusion into the Lafayette Flying Corps? Was it only the 180 who had only served in combat at the Front? Or was it all of the 269 estimated men that had gone through French training, even the ones who never reached the front? Why not include those who had died during training in accidents; had they not too paid the ultimate sacrifice? Was it to consist of pilots who had volunteered in good faith, but who were then dropped from the roles of fight school due to inaptitude, sickness, or injuries due to training? The decision was difficult and no one had the perfect solution.

The case of Eugene Bullard is one such case in point and exemplifies the dissension over the Memorial.  Bullard was America’s first black pilot, and the only black pilot in the Lafayette Flying Corps.  Bullard had been a professional boxer before the war and had gone to France to find a better life amongst the more racially unbiased French.  He enlisted in the French Foreign Legion when the war started.  He was wounded on March 5, 1916, by shrapnel and he subsequently received a citation and a Croix de Guerre with a bronze star.  He applied for aviation since his wound gave him trouble marching and he was accepted.  By all accounts he performed well in flight school, which he had started September 3, 1916.  He served with SPA-93 from August 27, 1917 to September 13, 1917, and with SPA-85 from September 13, 1917 to November 11, 1917. 70

Bullard was well liked and had friends in the Escadrille.  A letter from Edmond Genet on March 26, 1917, who befriended Bullard in the French Foreign Legion, expressed his fondness for Bullard, and applauded him in “coming on so well with the flying” and that he hears he is “so near to being brevete.” 71                   

Unfortunately for Bullard, an event happened that would haunt his reputation with the Lafayette for the remainder of his life.  Bullard was in Montmatre on permission with a black friend and two ladies when they got into an argument with a French officer and a British officer.  The French Officer and Bullard escalated the argument and they came to blows.  Bullard being a professional boxer easily thrashed the French Officer; however the troubles were just beginning.  Bullard was arrested and charged with striking a French officer, with wearing a fourragere from the French Foreign Legion illegally, and using brass knuckles in his fight.  He was threatened with imprisonment, but eventually released on all counts. 72

The incident was unfortunately brought to the attention of Lafayette Flying Corps officials.  The condemnation from Dr. Gros, who had a particular dislike for Bullard, was swift. 73 In a letter from Dr. Gros to Captain W. W. Hoffman, Headquarters, AEF, on November 16, 1917, Gros showed his lack of support for Bullard,

My Dear Captain Hoffman,

     The Bullard dilemma has ended with a very graceful solution.  Bullard who is a former prizefighter, knocked out a French adjutant for which he was given ten days prison.  He was assigned two more for allegedly wearing the Fourragere to which he was only entitled to as a member of the Foreign Legion. 

 This leads to his total radiation from the Aviation Section of the French Army and to his transfer to the ranks of the French infantry.

Under these conditions you will consider of course that he is morally unfit to form a part of the United States Army and you can reject him on these     grounds.

At least one dark cloud is dispersed from our horizon. 7   

               In another letter from Dr. Gros to Bullard, he wrote,

               I received your letter announcing your very unfortunate experience in getting into fisticuffs.  There is no excuse for such a lack of dignity, and this,                  unfortunately will be strongly placed against you. 

   I can do nothing to attenuate the predicament which you have very rightly   incurred from the French Military Authorities.” 75

Bullard was kicked out of the Lafayette Flying Corps due to this incident and due to Dr. Gros’ failure to defend him.  He finished the war in the French infantry.  This incident later led to Dr. Gros demand that Bullard be excluded from the Lafayette Escadrille Memorial.  Yet the great Lufbery himself spent ten days in jail — this was a well-known incident.  In fact, the telegram he originally sent from Chartres is still taped to the interior of the Journal des operations et marches at the Smithsonian Institution.  Perhaps this was due to Lufbery’s exceptional record.  However, this would not explain Dr. Gros’ subsequent support for Bert Hall to be included in the ranks of the named.  In a letter to Austen Crehore, Dr. Gros wrote,   

“….One name in question, that of Bert Hall, has lead to many discussions.  My own feeling is that, though Bert Hall may not have ended with all possible glory, he began bravely and was part of the first Escadrille and eventually did something to win fame for this famous body….” 76 

Dr. Gros had no way of knowing that Bert Hall would go on to become a felon and perpetual ne’er-do-well.  However, the reputation of Bert Hall as an unsavory character who lied on numerous occasions and who was asked to leave the Escadrille based solely on character was well documented, and does not explain Gros’ objections to Bullard, who was cleared of all charges against him. 

In the same letter mentioned above from Dr. Gros to Crehore, on May 17, 1929, Gros explained that,

“We feel that those who were killed or seriously injured in training schools and as a result of these accidents were unable to receive the brevet should figure on the list (of the Memorial).  On the contrary, those who, though inaptitude, indiscipline, or even due to health reasons, were unable to obtain their wings, should be left out.” 77   

That men who never flew in combat should be included on the monument to the Lafayette Escadrille (to include Dr. Gros’ name), while men who had served honorably were eschewed is maddening.  Bullard apparently felt so and let those in charge know that he felt slighted.  In a letter from Bullard to Austen Crehore, dated December 17, 1928, he wrote,

     “I am sending you my declaration in which you ask for hoping that there will be no more stumbling blocks which is very very injust (sic) concerning my military record, as I was good enough to fly side by side with and risk my life with a lot of the pilots and soldiers, who lost their life where I might have lost mine.  I feel that it is the most pitefull (sic) thing I have ever heard and I know pilots of my time who well agree with me.” 7 

Bullard’s fight for his right to be included on the Escadrille Memorial included letters from his former commanding officer, and old chief in the Legion, one-armed Colonel Girod, who cited Bullard’s “conduite, sa discipline, (et) son courage.” 79 Bullard also subsequently brought charges of 40, 000 francs against the Chicago Tribune which published an article wrongly depicting the events that transgressed on that fateful day.  In May 1923, the Chicago Tribune settled out of court in favor of Bullard, and ran a front-page apology to Bullard and a correct version of the events. 80

In a letter from Lewis D. Crenshaw of the L’Association du Memorial de L’Escadrille Lafayette to Austen Crehore, dated 19 September 1928, Crenshaw defended Bullard, and saw that “there is nothing in his record from October 1914, to the armistice which should keep him from the honor roll.” He also explained that Bullard never served any jail time for his fisticuffs or fourragere affair, and that the event was remarkably overplayed.  Crenshaw also said that Dr. Gros was the sole reason why Bullard’s name was not on the list. 81

Dr. Gros won in the end.  Bullard’s name was not included.  Bullard died, a member of the Legion D’Honneur, and winner of the Croix de Guerre, a man who had served France for four full years in the Legion, in the air, and on the ground, alone and poor – serving as a forgotten hotel elevator operator in Chicago in his last years. 

In the end, it was decided that of the 269 possible candidates, only 209 would be listed.  There were 60 names omitted, including Bullard’s and Bert Hall’s.  Most of these were of men that had not served at the Front or had never completed flight training.    

The men are all dead now and the argument is mute in hindsight, but that there was dissension to begin with over what names were to be included, and that the argument became public, did nothing to serve the memory of these valiant men.  The bickering could only bring dishonor to the cause they served. 

Summary

Hold any famous unit up for close inspection, and one is bound to find faults.  The Lafayette Escadrille was no different than any other unit; it was composed of mortal men.  Yet, for the observer and historian, it is a sad memory betrothed to their memory. 

The dissension, discord, distrust, and indiscipline found in the Lafayette Escadrille are part of the unit’s history.  And unfortunately it was highlighted when the very men of the Escadrille made their petty rivalries and arguments public.  Perhaps now, it does not seem like a big to do, but at the time, especially when the Lafayette Memorial was to be dedicated to their memory, all of these detractors lessened the legacy of the Lafayette aviators.        

 

 

  1. Flying for France, Modom Productions—France 3, 1999.  Citation du fils de Georges Thenault.
  2. Gordon, Pilot Biographies, p. 230.
  3. Parsons, I Flew, p. 125. 
  4. Gordon, Pilot Biographies, p. 59.
  5. Lettre, date 2 juillet 1916, James R. McConnell à Marcelle Guerin.  James R. McConnell (JRM) Collection, University of Virginia.
  6. Mason, Lafayette Escadrille, p. 128.
  7. Gordon, Pilot Biographies, p. 249.
  8. Parson, I Flew, p. 216.
  9. Thenault, L’Escadrille Lafayette, p. 43.
  10. Ibid., p. 52.
  11. Journal: Escadrille N° 124.
  12. Lettre, date 19 juillet 1916, James R. McConnell to Paul A. Rockwell. JRM Collection.
  13. Parsons, I Flew, p. 148.
  14. Chicago Tribune, 5 mai 1923.
  15. Gordon, The Lafayette Flying Corps, p. 38.
  16. Ibid., p. 121.
  17. Parsons, I Flew, p. 290.
  18. Ibid., p. 270.
  19. Ibid., p. 275.
  20. Ibid., p. 265.
  21. Ibid., p. 250.
  22. Parsons, I Flew, p. 220.
  23. Genet, An American for Lafayette, entrée de journal personnel, daté le 25 février 1917.
  24. Parsons, I Flew, p. 290.
  25. Gordon, Pilot Biographies, p. 226.
  26. Rockwell, Paul A., American Fighters in the Foreign Legion (NY, Hougton, Mifflin, Co., 1930), p. 187. 
  27. Gordon, Lafayette Flying Corps, p. 69.
  28. Rockwell, Paul A., Interview #550: Colonel Paul A. Rockwell (“Cross and Cockade Society”, 1962), p. 7.
  29. Kennett, The First Air War, p. 143.
  30. Lettre, date 1 juillet 1916, James R. McConnell à Paul A. Rockwell.  JRM Collection.
  31. Lettre, date 19 juillet 1916, James R. McConnell à Paul A. Rockwell. JRM Collection.
  32. Gordon, Lafayette Flying Corps.
  33. Gordon, Pilot Biographies, p. 68.
  34. Ibid.
  35. Lettre, date 21 juin 1916, James R. McConnell à Paul A. Rockwell.  JRM Collection.
  36. Lettre, date 25 juin 1916, James R. McConnell à Paul A. Rockwell. JRM Collection.
  37. Lettre, date 1 juillet 1916, James R. McConnell à Paul A. Rockwell. JRM Collection.
  38. Gordon, Pilot Biographies, p. 68. 
  39. Ibid., p. 84.
  40. Ibid., p.191.
  41. Lettre, date 16 juin 1916, James R. McConnell à Paul A. Rockwell.  JRM Collection.
  42. Genet, An American for Lafayette, p. 146.
  43. Lettre, date 15 juin 1916, James R. McConnell à Paul A. Rockwell. JRM Collection.
  44. Dolan, Oral Interview, p. 10. 
  45. Mason, Lafayette Escadrille, p. 128. 
  46. Flammer, The Vivid Air.
  47. Gros, A Brief History, p. 6.
  48. Les Carnets de Comptabilité en Campagne, Esc N° 124.  SHAA.
  49. Gordon, The Lafayette Flying Corps, p. 20.
  50. New York Herald.
  51. Bailey, The French Air Service War Chronology, p. 68.
  52. Gordon, Pilot Biographies, p. 45.
  53. Ibid., p. 45.
  54. Gordon, The Lafayette Flying Corps, p. 52.
  55. Ibid.
  56. Ibid., p. 53.
  57. Lettre, date 15 juin 1916, James R. McConnell à Paul A. Rockwell.  JRM Collection.
  58. Flying for France, vidéo, citation du neveu de Norman Prince.
  59. Gordon, Lafayette Flying Corps, p. 129.
  60. Lettre, date 12 juin 1960, Paul A. Rockwell à Phillip Hopkins.  NASMA.
  61. « L’Escadrille La Fayette, Tome II. » Icare, N° 160, P. 190.
  62. Tous les lettres écrit par M. Prince mentionné sont à Blérancourt.
  63. Gordon, Lafayette Flying Corps, p. 140.
  64. Lettre, date 8 mai 1929, William Thaw à Pittsburgh Post Gazette.  NASMA.
  65. Lettre, date 8 novembre 1959, Paul A. Rockwell à Charles Dolan.  Charles Dolan Collection, USAF Academy.
  66. Rockwell, American Fighters .
  67. Visite d’auteur.
  68. Gordon, Lafayette Flying Corps, p. 140, et Austen Crehore Collection, USAF Academy.
  69. Dossier Officiel d’Eugene Bullard, Blérancourt.
  70. Lettre, date 26 mars 1917, Edmond Genet à Eugene Bullard.  Blérancourt.
  71. Chicago Times et autres sources divers.
  72. Gordon, Lafayette Flying Corps, p. 7.
  73. Lettre, date 16 novembre 1917, Dr. Edmund Gros à Capitaine Hoffman.  Blérancourt.
  74. Lettre, date 4 novembre 1917, Dr. Edmund Gros à Eugene Bullard. Blérancourt.
  75. Lettre, date 17 mai 1929, Dr. Edmund Gros à Austen Crehore.  Blérancourt.
  76. Ibid.
  77. Lettre, date 27 décembre 1928, Eugene Bullard à Austen Crehore.  Blérancourt.
  78. Recommandation de Colonel Jan Girod, date janvier 1923.  Blérancourt.
  79. Chicago Times 23 mai 1923 et lettre de Lewis D. Crenshaw à Austen Crehore.  Austen Crehore Collection.
  80. Lettre, de Lewis D. Crenshaw à Austen Crehore.  Austen Crehore Collection.
Publié dans Uncategorized | Commentaires fermés sur Chapter Six. Dissension in the Ranks

Chapter Five. The Failure of the United States Air Service to Properly Integrate the Lafayette Escadrille

Perhaps one of the greatest factors that affected the Lafayette Escadrille and its long-term reputation was its dealings with the USAS during World War I.  America and the USAS was woefully unprepared when it entered the Great War; its preparations were marred by indecision, unreal expectations, a general lack of proper planning, and failure to appreciate the lessons already learned by the Allies.  It also greatly mismanaged the transition of the Lafayette Escadrille and failed to capitalize on the value of the squadron.  Some of the men of Lafayette Escadrille would choose to stay with French due to the treatment they received; some became disheartened and lost all hope and patience with the fumbling USAS.  Whatever the case, the USAS failed to properly integrate the Lafayette Escadrille and shunned them, a miscue that would irreparably harm the reputation of the Escadrille.

The USAS’s Early Lack of Preparation 

At the start of the war in August 1914, Germany had 232 aircraft, Russia 190, France 162, and Great Britain, Italy, and Austria-Hungary around 50 to 100 each.  Belgium possessed sixteen aircraft.  Each country had a few balloons and dirigibles.  At the time, the U. S. Army had eight aircraft. 1

As the war dragged on and the countries geared up their industrial bases, innovation and necessity led to the production of hundreds and thousands of planes.  The leap in the technology and lethality of the aircraft between 1914 and 1918 was impressive. 

The amount of American aviation assets would be poor in comparison with the allies, and, in fact, it never caught up during the war.  As late as 1913, aviation was still part of the Army’s Air Arm Signal Corps (the precursor to the USAS) since it was considered as “an information gathering platform” and for the “immediate future ninety-nine per cent of its value would be in the sense of information.” 2

In December 1914, in Congressional Hearings before the Committee on Military Affairs to determine the Army Appropriation Bill for 1915 and 1916, General Scrivner, the chief of the Signal Corps, and thus in charge of the Air Service at the time, described the aviation situation in the ongoing war in Europe.  At this point, he said, the French had 500 aircraft, the Russians 500, the British 250, Germany 500, Austria 100, and Italy 150.  The General went onto describe the successful use of aircraft in the war, emphasizing observation and not the other facets of aviation’s future.  His request for one million dollars in funding was rejected and he was given much less.  The USAS possessed eleven at this time; General Scrivner wanted to procure 48 aircraft.  It was obvious from the General’s testimony, and even more so from the Congressmen’s reactions, that the US was failing to grasp the importance of aviation.  In that same meeting in December, the Committee members had also derided the advent of the airplane as “largely responsible for the indecisiveness of the battles raging in northern Europe,” and that “aero planes were a distinct disappointment to those who believed that aircraft would play an important role in the war.” Furthermore, the only “distinction they have accomplished is that of terrifying helpless women and children.” 3

If one continues to read the records of Congressional Meetings and Hearings from this pre-war period, it is evident that at the start the American Congress and the Army did not understand what was happening in aviation in Europe – thus America would continue to fall behind the rest of the belligerents.  In July 1916, in testimony before Congress, General Scrivner would again ask for an increase in aircraft – this time requesting eighteen squadrons composed of 432 aircraft.  Still, even these numbers were comparatively low, and failed to compete with the rapidly increasing aviation forces overseas.  At the time this request was put to Congress in 1916, only 23 aircraft existed in the USAS. 4

In Washington, D. C., the Air Arm of the Signal Corps was being run by a  few ex-cavalrymen, engineers, and administration officials.  These men still lived in an era of telegraph wires, semaphore flags, and heliograph instruments; they believed that aircraft were unnecessary to carry out aerial observation.  Some even thought that aircraft were too noisy and that kite balloons were preferable since they were silent and could be flown in any weather, day or night! Three years of savage fighting had not impressed upon these men the changing nature of warfare and technology. 5

Declaration of War  

When America declared war on April 6, 1917, the entire American Army, and especially the  newly formed USAS, was in a state of disarray.  The very Congressmen that had held back the development of the Air Service and the rest of the Army now sought to redress the glaring deficiencies in training and material. 

At the declaration of war, there totaled only 200,000 men in the U. S. Army.  Worse, there were only 131 officers and 1,087 enlisted in the USAS; and though it had added a few planes, the total number was still less than 250, most of which were completely obsolete — not one worthy of combat. 6 Congress swung into action and sought to make up for years of inactivity and stringent funding.  An even greater exterior impetus was received when a cable from the French Government arrived, requesting that the U. S. to furnish up to 4,500 aircraft as soon as possible — at least by 1918 — to include the requisite equipment and personnel.  The Joint Army-Navy Technical Aircraft Board quickly translated this request into a plan of action, and even optimistically increased the numbers, assuming that they could produce 12,000 aircraft by early 1918.  This was called the “12,000-Plane Program”, which included plans for an additional 5,000 training aircraft.  An equally optimistic Congress accepted this plan, and accorded an appropriation of $640,000,000 dollars, an extraordinary sum and the largest single one ever passed by Congress on a single issue to date.  President Woodrow Wilson signed the bill on July 24, 1917. 7

Even the President was overly confident that the rapid infusion of cash would make a miracle Air Service appear where there had been none before.  In a letter to Secretary of War Newton Baker, Woodrow Wilson wrote, “The total amount proposed is $640,000,000…this effort will lead to the immediate and effective speeding up of our war effort in air activity.” 8 Congress promised to “darken the skies over Germany with American-made aircraft, manned by American-trained pilots.” The $64 million dollar appropriation accounted for the eventual construction of 22,625 aircraft (four times the number of aircraft at the time in service with the French, British, and Italian air services) and 44,000 engines.  They believed that the largest appropriation in American history was going to elevate it to the world’s leading air power. 9

Others were skeptical.  General Pershing of the American Expeditionary Force (AEF) commented on the status of the USAS in late 1917: “The Army should be mortified.  Out of the 65 officers and the 1,000 men in the Air Service Section of the Signal Corps, there were 35 officers who could fly…with the exception of five or six officers, none of them could have met the requirements for modern battle.” 10 Billy Mitchell, the father of the modern USAF, was even more blunt during his brief exploration trip to France to evaluate the status of Allied air services in 1917, “Our air force consists of one Nieuport, which I used myself, and that is all.” 11

As expected, and quite rapidly, reality hit the well-intentioned Americans.  The industrial base to support the building of aircraft was nonexistent, and training could not support the large numbers of pilots that were planned for; in short, the Americans now realized that they were way behind the other belligerents.  The shortage of men, training, and materiel constituted the most serious deficiency that the Air Service faced in its race to complete its plans.  It became quickly apparent that the facilities did not exist nor the time to correctly train this vast number of personnel.  The Americans were forced to turn to France for these express purposes. 12 The known lack of infrastructure and other support materiel made it highly unlikely that the Americans could train more than 500 pilots before June 1, 1918, and then with only a bare minimum of advanced training.  To meet the immediate needs the French offered the Issoudun air training facility, and during the latter part of July 1917, authorization for American personnel to begin flight training.  Another already operational school in Tours was given to the Americans for training in November 1917. 13

Of the original 65 flying officers of the USAS only a few had seen combat in Mexico; the rest of them were recent graduates of flight training themselves.  There was certainly “no officer qualified by training or exposure to take charge of the higher levels of aviation instruction, and the officers assigned to special instruction knew little or nothing of the subjects they were called upon to teach.” 14             At the time, Colonel Mitchell expressed his reservations and frustrations very bluntly, “The General Staff is now trying to run the Air Service with about as much knowledge of it as a hog knows of skating.”15 He was not far off.  He had come over earlier than the AEF on a fact-finding mission to evaluate the status of the Allied air services.  He was amazed at the advancement of the allied airplanes. 16 Yet still, the Americans stubbornly wanted to produce their own war machines.  Instead of taking the blueprints of aircraft that existed and modifying them, they tried to develop their own “Liberty Aircraft” with its own “Liberty Engine.” The first result of their efforts was a catastrophe and was dubbed the “Flying Coffin.” It never flew in combat. 17

In 1918, America gave up hope and bought every available French Nieuport it could find.  Despite the 640 million dollar infusion of money in 1917, by 6 April 1918, America still had no completely operational wholly American unit, no American plane of its own, and no American engine. 18 And what of the 12000-Plane Program and the budgeted for 22,625 aircraft? By the armistice, the Americans had only built 196 airplanes of their own. 19

It is with this scenario of miscues in mind that the attention is turned to the integration of the Lafayette Escadrille. 

The Transfer of the Lafayette Escadrille 

If the efforts of the USAS to catch up to its allies were clumsy, whimsical, and inefficient, then the transfer and integration of the Lafayette Escadrille into the USAS could only be described as criminal.  One historian put it thusly, « The transfer of the Lafayette Escadrille to the American Air Service in early 1918 (was) a graphic illustration of the chaos and turmoil that accompanied the American efforts to suddenly change an insignificant section of the Signal Corps into an armada of gigantic proportions.” 20

Billy Mitchell had seen the value of the Lafayette Escadrille men immediately.  He knew that the Lafayette Escadrille men and the other men flying with French in other squadrons could furnish a wealth of American experience and technical capability.  He wrote numerous letters urging that the Lafayette Flying Corps men be granted to his jurisdiction for immediate inclusion into the AEF; but Mitchell was a colonel without a command in Europe and the higher-ups back home refused to listen to him.  The effort, according to the generals back home, was to be an all-American one; they did not need men who had served for another country.  The way they had figured it, they had plenty of time on their side, and besides, American know-how and moxie would make up for all of the differences.  It was as if the American pilots of the Lafayette were tainted in some fashion and the USAS did not want to touch them. 21

* * *

The future of the Lafayette Escadrille was already being discussed by the French.  Once America declared war, the French became eager to get the Americans out of French uniform and into American ones for reasons of diplomacy and morale.  On the very day that the Americans declared war, the French Ambassador to America, Jules Jusserand, cabled a report that the Lafayette Escadrille was to be transferred as soon as possible. “It is of great importance that the American flag be engaged in the conflict without delay,” he wrote. 22 Almost immediately, the French Ministry of War, thinking it was the Americans that had given the Ambassador the idea, agreed with the suggestion and forwarded its approval back to the United States.  In an official declaration, it was decided, “That henceforth, from this day forward, all flying and non-flying personnel attached to the Lafayette Escadrille will fight in the uniform and under the flag of the Unites States.” 23 The French, again thinking that they were doing the American’s bidding, also notified the press and decreed that on April 11, 1917, the American pilots of the Lafayette Escadrille would soon be part of the American Army.  These French actions were in turn brought to the attention of the U. S. War Department.  Secretary of War Baker sidestepped the issue by saying that though he had not officially sanctioned the plan, he would do nothing to oppose it.  He released a communiqué, stating that the Lafayette Escadrille would not be brought home to become part of the U. S. military since it was doing much more important work at the front.  He had washed his hands of the squadron; however, nobody bothered to contact the men directly to let them know what was in store.  24

The Lafayette Escadrille men, receiving the order from the French and hearing in the press that they were to be released immediately, rebelled.  Captain Thenault wrote an official response on behalf of the men, asking if anybody higher up had even thought of the ramifications of this order.  To whom would they be released? How would they be released? Sure, these men had taken an oath to follow the rules of the French Army, would they be officially sworn out? What about questions of pay, uniforms, and ranks? Who would provide them? How would they receive commissions in the USAS? Who would take their place in the front lines?

The squadron would have to obviously remain intact as a unit until someone figured out these all of these details.  Captain Thenault and the men offered valid opposition, so much so that the leadership acquiesced; the rush to transfer the Lafayette men would have to wait until there was a better plan. 25

The men of the Lafayette Escadrille, although happy that America had declared war, were very disturbed about their unit disposition.  Indecision and lack of information create morale issues.  In times of uncertainty, rumors and suspicion become rampant, and the men of the Lafayette Escadrille were no different.  The men became frustrated with the indecision and hesitation.  It seemed that nobody wanted them or had a plan for them.  They knew that the talk of “12,000 planes and the darkening of the skies of Germany” was much hype.  They could not help but feel left out of the grand plan; that they were not part of the swell of appreciation and excitement that emanated from America.  Edwin Parsons explained the Lafayette sentiment perfectly, 

“Unfortunate and untimely propaganda claimed that the US had hundreds of pilots and thousands of planes nearly completed.  Bitter experience made us a little skeptical of the last statement.  However, it seemed that, with such magnificent preparations, they had no need for us who had been carrying the burden.  It cut us all pretty deeply, for we began to feel like we were partially outcast; men without a country.” 26    

Commandant Fequant, the Groupe de Combat 13 Commander and higher headquarters commander then in charge of the Lafayette Escadrille, wrote in September of 1917 that the men of the Escadrille were subject to a “certain ill air,” and “whereas the Lafayette pilots once incited each other in their endeavors to maintain at a high level the reputation of the unit, a certain number had now lost interest.  Only the better ones continued to be urged by the noble sentiment of the past.” He even recommended disbanding the unit immediately and farming the pilots out to French Escadrilles in order to save it from itself. 27

Dr. Edmund Gros, who had been granted a commission as a major in the USAS and who still considered himself the director and leader of the men in the Lafayette Flying Corps and the Escadrille, even misjudged the situation.  Pressured by the French to see if the men of the unit would accept commissions from the U. S., he had answered that it would not be a problem.  He even made the mistake of calling the unit and telling them to change the color of their cocardes from French colors to American ones, which had white centers instead of blue ones.  The men did not react very well to this, saying that they intended to fight for the French until a distinct plan had been drawn up and they would not have to serve two masters.  They certainly did not want unknown American USAS officers based in France who had no combat experience commanding them, nor did they want them in their chain of command until they had proven themselves.  They also wanted to know what the fate of all mechanics, non-flying personnel, and other men attached to the unit would be before disbanding.  They were not going to change colors until the fate of their support personnel had been satisfactorily arranged. 28          

Finally, Colonel Bolling, who had been assigned as the Commander of the Zone of the Interior, USAS, AEF, developed a process to get American flying men from France and other whereabouts to enter the USAS.  “Special Order No. 34” was issued from Paris on September 11, 1917, by Bolling from the Headquarters, Air Service, AEF.  “Special Order No. 34” assigned Major Dr. Edmund Gros, Major R. H. Goldthwaite, and Lieutenant R. S. Beam, all either doctors and/or officers, to a special review board in order to have them officially evaluate potential recruits for acceptance in the USAS.  They would first travel to the French aviation schools at Avord and Tours, and then to the American aviation school at Issoudun, for the purpose of examining Americans who wished to transfer from the French Army to the USAS. 29

This first step was small, but a very critical one in getting the process going.  The USAS had a large number of men volunteering for it and could afford to be selective.  In fact, it was decided that only half of the available candidates would be able to enter.  The USAS, with no real prior experience or understanding of the rigors of flying in combat, did its best to determine what it thought to be the necessary traits for combat aviators.  A quote from a War Department Bulletin stated the following about the special kind of recruit desired,

“One who is to fly three or four miles up in the air must have a perfect heart and lungs; to monitor aerial navigation, reconnaissance, wireless, and machine gunnery, he must have a clear mind; and to pick out and send down important information he must have judgment and a sense of responsibility.  Many men have one, perhaps two, of these characteristics, but only a limited number have all three. 

The candidate should be naturally athletic and have a reputation for reliability, punctuality and honesty.  He should have a cool head in emergencies, good eye for distance, keen ear for familiar sounds, steady hand and sound body with plenty of reserves; he should be quick-witted, highly intelligent and tractable.  Immature, high strung, and over confident, impatient candidates are not desired.  30

 

These criteria were subject to discussion as to whether or not they really quantified a pilot, a lot of these requisites were obviously too subjective or irrelevant, and in some cases, opposite of the very qualities truly needed.  But the Special Board members could afford to be very selective with students in flight school who did not know any better, but what would the board do when it faced the tough, seasoned aviators on the Front? They soon had the chance to find out because after the flight students the next round of interviews were with the Americans at the Front interested in transferring.  To this end, “Special Order No. 113” came out on October 1, 1917.  It created the Special Board of American doctors and officers who would do the evaluations for acceptance of transfer for frontline pilots.  The Board once again included Dr. Gros.  The Board’s official mission was “for the examination of such American citizens now commissioned or enlisted in the French Aviation Service, as may desire to obtain their release from that service for the purpose of entering the service of the U. S.” 31 The board traveled by auto car, stopping at every aerodrome from Dunkerque to Verdun, where any American expressing the desire to transfer would be interviewed.  This included the Lafayette Escadrille. 32

The members of the Lafayette Escadrille were not amused, and in fact quite insulted, that after all the flying they had done they would be subjected to the same battery of tests and evaluations that the students and other candidates had to endure.  They knew very well, of course, that they had the mettle necessary; they were proving that every day on the Front. They also knew that they did not meet some of the standards as described in the War Bulletin, and knew that the criteria were arbitrary and ridiculous.  Some were already too old according to regulations.  Others had physical limitations that they had never revealed, but had got along quite well with; others had been wounded in combat.  One pilot was completely blind in one eye.  And all of them knew that they were high strung; the stress of combat had made them that way.  So, ironically, these combat aviators submitted themselves to the belittling experience of being evaluated to see if they had what it took to become combat aviators.  Parsons captured this absurd exercise in humiliation,

“After cumulative physical examinations, which, much to the dismay of some of our boys, included urinalyses and blood tests, we were put through a long series of rather ridiculous physical demonstrations which weren’t particularly helped by frequent visits to the bar to bolster our courage.  The awful truth came out! In solemn, owlish conclave, the board decided that not one of us, despite hundreds of hours in the air, all thoroughly trained war pilots with many victories to our credit, could be an aviator.  These tests showed that physically, mentally, and morally we were unfit to be pilots.  Dud Hill’s blind eye, Bill Thaw’s bad vision and crippled arm, Lufbery’s inability to walk a crack backwards, Dolan’s tonsils, Hank Jones’ flat feet – we were just a broken down crew of troubled misfits!” 33 

One aviator, William Thaw, snarled to the board of examiners, “You haven’t got an instrument in that (medical) bag that can measure the guts of a guy.” 34 The unit had just received a citation from General Petain himself.

Luckily, the Board had Dr. Gros on it, and he understood the idiocy of the policy.  The Board’s recommendations back to Colonel Bolling in the rear would be favorable, but many of the pilots of the Lafayette Escadrille would need waivers for unsuitable conditions and “disqualifying” features.  The board sent in the following recommendation,

“The board was much impressed by the class of men examined.  The material is valuable as a nucleus of aviators, around which can be grouped the less experienced pilots currently in training.  It is capital with which to build and should be pursued.  The Americans are not receiving any outside pecuniary assistance, which they have had hitherto, cannot live on French pay, and most have no independent source of income.  It is the position of the board and also for the French officers commanding these Americans that this position should be settled as soon as possible; that they should be immediately commissioned in the American service; that they should be allowed to remain at the front until requested by the AEF; and that this should be done as soon as possible.  The army should militarily indicate the new duty assigned them.” 35

 

On October 9, 1917, the Board reconvened at Aviation Headquarters, Paris, to evaluate all of the applications.  All men would be considered and grouped into the following categories:

  1. Capable of commanding a squadron; rank — major
  2. Capable of commanding a flight of six aircraft; rank – captain.
  3. Capable of commanding, but not to be commissioned as flight commanders until later, due to lack of experience; rank – 1st lieutenant.
  4. Capable of being pilots; rank – 1st lieutenant.
  5. Capable of being Instructor 1st Class; rank – captain.
  6. Capable of being Instructor 2nd Class; rank — 1st lieutenant. 36

The board sent its recommendations to higher headquarters on October 20, 1917.  General Kenley, the Commanding General of the USAS, AEF, followed up with an official endorsement on November 6, 1917, asking that the Board’s recommendations be honored by Washington, D.C. 37 This process and the inherent paperwork associated, though painful and disrespectful, and very long after war had officially been declared by America, was actually quickly routed through bureaucratic channels; at least as far as from the Special Board to Headquarters, Air Service, AEF.  Most of the men would not see their commissions until six months later, but they had no way of knowing this.  In the meantime the pilots of the Lafayette Escadrille were requested to officially ask for their release from the French Air Service in a formerly worded missive.

A monsieur le Sous-Secretaire d’Etat de l’Aeronautique,

Being an American citizen and having enlisted in the French Army as a (pilot or observer), I respectfully request that I be released from my enlistment in order that I might pass into the aviation portion of the American Army.  38 

As if the inconveniences had not been enough, now the Lafayette men had to play bureaucratic games with the French officials.  They were hesitant to sign these forms and submit them, but they had no other recourse.  This sentiment was expressed in a letter from Alan Nichols, a Lafayette Flying Corps pilot, to his parents, “I asked some pointed questions [in a letter to Dr. Gros] as to whether I would be left in the escadrille, whether I could be put on a chasse aircraft and what model, etc.  Dr. Gros’ response destroyed my hopes.  He said I was offered 2nd lieutenant because of a “change in policy.” The only thing they can guarantee is that I won’t have to be an instructor.  He can’t even tell me whether I would get a chasse model or any at all.” 39 The men had reason to be wary, as Parsons tell it, “Due to the advice from high officials, all the pilots printed their demands to the French Army for release, expecting to receive immediate commissions in the American Army.  The releases were granted, but no commissions arrived.” 40   

Dr. Gros had in fact recommended that the men sign the releases and take the offer for commissions.  At the time that he urged this, he had understood that his Board’s recommendations had been submitted up the chain of command, and he had no reason to believe that they would not be accepted.  He was confident that they would be acted upon immediately, or at least very quickly.  But due to administrative delays, other pressing war business, the obliviousness with which the USAS had habitually treated the Lafayette, and most importantly, due to a very recent change of leadership at Headquarters, Air Service, AEF, Paris, the men of the Lafayette Escadrille would have to wait.  In fact, the men flew as private citizens from December 1, 1917, to February 18, 1918 — three and a half months of fighting without an official country or colors.  The state of limbo they were in would cause confusion and despondency. As Carl Dolan put it,

“The Americans did not take us over as one unit.  They took us over individually.  Some of us were in American uniforms, some of us in French uniforms.  After we transferred, the Americans left us with the French, but we were getting orders from the Americans and the French.” 41

The men would receive such treatment until the end of their days with the Lafayette Escadrille. 

Aftermath of the Transfer 

In late February 1918, the Lafayette Escadrille was formerly disbanded and re-designated as the 103rd Aero Pursuit Squadron.  But all of the members of the Lafayette Escadrille were not kept together.  As Parsons lamented, “the Lafayette Escadrille was split up instead of allowing us to fly together.” 42 The men wanted to continue the tradition of the Lafayette Escadrille as a unit.  Many hoped that the Escadrille would keep its name and colors.  The USAS failed to value the integrity of the Escadrille as a combat unit. 

As for the whole Lafayette Flying Corps, 90 pilots were transferred to the Army, 22 men were transferred to the Navy, and 37 remained with the French Air Service.  Some became group commanders and pursuit squadron commanders like William Thaw.  Edwin Parsons was one of the men who decided to remain with the French Air Service. 43 

Until the end, however, the men of the Escadrille and the Flying Corps would be shortchanged and treated unfairly.  Most of the men were reduced by one entire rank from what they had been promised upon receiving their commissions.  This was done by a spiteful new commanding general of the USAS, AEF, Benjamin Foulois, who was not happy with the previous commanding general’s decisions, so changed them despite the outrage and disservice it caused.  The men would eventually regain their ranks, but the damage to morale had been done.  Some felt cheated and resented having to serve under “90-day wonders”, newly-arrived officers that had come from the States who outranked them in grade but not experience.  Others chafed at the new rules and the enforcement of old ones that had never been obligatory before.  For instance, there was a big to do over wearing a regulation USAS uniform with a high collar that chafed the men’s necks and made it difficult for them to turnaround in flight and check their rear quarter.  Some like Lufbery were made to sit inexplicably behind a desk with no assigned duties, and others became instructors when what they wanted was to serve at the front. 

The Lafayette Men, Failed by the USAS

The USAS’ treatment of the Lafayette Escadrille and the Lafayette Flying Corps men was a failure in leadership.  There is no other way to describe the poor treatment the Lafayette men received at the hands of the USAS.  Perhaps the USAS did not realize the true value of the men of the Lafayette, despite Billy Mitchell’s and others’ recommendations to the contrary.  It is more likely that the USAS, as witnessed by its whole approach to entering the war, was dead set – right or wrong — on doing it its own way.

It is a sad testimony of the USAS’ mindset at the time.  The Lafayette men could have been used to several obvious advantages.  They could have been returned home immediately to help spur on the war effort, whether it be by promoting war bonds, lecturing and teaching prospective students, or by helping in the design of combat aircraft.  This would have not made most of the Lafayette men happy, but at least they would have been recognized for their sacrifice, efforts, and knowledge.  The USAS could have also kept the unit intact, re-designating it as the “124th Aero Pursuit Squadron.”  Even if it had not kept the same men in the unit, the lineage of the unit would have been preserved and it would have served enormous propaganda purposes for the French and the Americans.  By disbanding it immediately, the USAS sent a signal that it wanted nothing to do with the Lafayette volunteers and that the Americans were going to do things their own way.  Had the USAS taken a little personal interest in the Lafayette Escadrille, the unit might have had a completely different history today. 

It is amazing to think what the legacy of the unit could have been like today had its original designation been kept.  It would certainly be the most storied unit in the USAF today.                             

 

 

  1. Kennett, The First Air War, p. 21.
  2.  “Act to increase the efficiency of the military establishment of the United States.” Hearings before the Committee on Military Affairs, House of Representatives, 1913.
  3. “Army Appropriations Bill, 1916.” Hearings before the Committee on Military Affairs, House of Representatives, 1914.
  4. “Preparedness for National Defense.” Hearings before the Committee on Military Affairs, U. S. Senate, 1916.
  5. Whitehouse, Legion of the Lafayette, p. 184.
  6. Flammer, The Vivid Air, p. 116.
  7. The USAS in World War I, Vol. II, p. 105.
  8. Link, Woodrow Wilson Papers, p. 256.
  9. Mason, The Lafayette Escadrille, p. 231.
  10. Ibid., p. 230.
  11. Ibid.
  12. The USAS in World War I, Vol. I, p. 65.
  13. Ibid., p. 58.
  14. Ibid., p. 93.
  15. Mason, The Lafayette Escadrille, p. 230, et Mitchell, William, Memoirs of World War I (NY, Random House, 1960), p. 165.
  16. Ibid., p. 183, et Ibid., p. 170.
  17. Whitehouse, Legion of the Lafayette, p. 193.
  18. Kennett, The First Air War, p. 215.  
  19. Mason, The Lafayette Escadrille, P. 231.
  20. Flammer, Primus Inter Pares, p. iv. 
  21. Whitehouse, Legion of the Lafayette, p. 183.
  22. Flammer, The Vivid Air, p. 112.
  23. Ibid., p. 163.
  24. Ibid., p. 164.
  25. Ibid., p. 163.
  26. Parsons, I Flew with the Lafayette Escadrille, p. 284.
  27. Flammer, The Vivid Air, p. 168.
  28. Mason, The Lafayette Escadrille, p. 232.
  29. “Special Order No. 34”, date 9 novembre 1917, AFHRA, Maxwell AFB.
  30. Flammer, The Vivid Air, p. 171.
  31. “Special Order No. 113”, date 1 octobre 1917, AFHRA, Maxwell AFB.
  32. Gros, A Brief History, p. 14.
  33. Parsons, I Flew with the Lafayette Escadrille, p. 313.
  34. Ibid., p. 314.
  35. “Report to Brig. Gen. Wm. Kenly from board appointed by Special Order No. 113, Paragaph 5.” AFHRA, Maxwell AFB.
  36. Gros, A Brief History, p. 15.
  37. “Report No. 272.S”, date 6 novembre 1917, AFHRA, Maxwell AFB.
  38. Flammer, The Vivid Air, p. 175. 
  39. Nichols, Alan H., Letters Home from the Lafayette Flying Corps (Maryland, U. S. Naval Institute Press, 1986), p. 207.
  40. Parsons, I Flew, p. 330.
  41. Dolan, Charles, Interview: Charles Dolan (USAF Oral History Program, 1968), p. 17.
  42. Parsons, I Flew, p. 331.
  43. Gros, A Brief History, p. 1 et 2.

 

Publié dans Uncategorized | Commentaires fermés sur Chapter Five. The Failure of the United States Air Service to Properly Integrate the Lafayette Escadrille

Chapter Four. An Average Combat Record

There is no precise way to measure the ultimate impact of the Lafayette Escadrille on the outcome of the Great World.  In terms of intangible benefits, the arrival of the American Lafayette pilots was a great contribution, not only in that it justified the Allied cause, but also because it represented the vanguard of what was hoped to be a much larger American intervention.  Though small in number, the 38 American pilots had an impact of a much greater magnitude.

However, if one looks solely at the tangible results of the Lafayette Escadrille, that is, its combat record, then its contributions were negligible, and represented an infinitesimally small part of the total war effort.  The squadron achieved less than spectacular results; in fact, they could be considered average to below average in comparison with other contemporary combat aviation units.  No one questions the sacrifices and the efforts of the men of Lafayette Escadrille; however, the effectiveness of the squadron needs to be put into a contextual reference in order to evaluate its value.  This assessment will surely invite opprobrium from those who admire the Escadrille, but it is important to realistically assess its contribution to see if its record is tied to the unit’s failure to leave an indelible impression on the American psyche. 

The Lafayette Escadrille Combat Record

At the end of nearly 23 months of flying and fighting the 38 American pilots of the Lafayette Escadrille and their four French officers claimed 40 confirmed kills. 1 By any measure of comparison, the number of official victories was not a lot.  In fact, the Lafayette Escadrille achieved average to below average results when compared to other contemporary French squadrons and successor American pursuit squadrons.  This is especially surprising since the unit was always stationed at the Front in support of all of the major offensives that occurred during its existence.  These comparisons will be made shortly, but first it is perhaps useful to explore some of the reasons why the unit was not more successful.  

* * *

The reputation of the squadron was actually judged as fine by contemporaries in other units.  According to one historian, they did not achieve miracles “but they had a reputation as an elite unit” and for being a “reliable escort.” 2 So then what are the reasons for the Lafayette Escadrille’s apparent lack of success?

The Lafayette Escadrille did not get off to a rapid start.  As a newly formed unit it experienced the usual growing pains that all new units go through.  They lacked sufficient aircraft at the start.  Designated and stood up on April 16, 1916, it received its first six aircraft – Nieuport-11’s or “Baby Nieuports” – on May 1.  Captain Georges Thenault was forced to take the members of the plane-less squadron on long country drives in his car to scout out suitable emergency landing strips and to familiarize the men with the countryside.  “Enfin, nous les recunes, le premier mai.  Il y en avaient six,” Thenault recounts in his memoirs; they could finally get to business. 3 The squadron only had seven American pilots and two French pilots at the outset, which was rather small for a frontline pursuit unit.  In comparison, the British worked with three platoons of six men, for a total of 18 pilots.  The French never had less than twelve per unit.  So the Lafayette Escadrille started off short of men and short of planes.  Such shortages made it difficult to construct a flight schedule, making sure the two-pilot daylight alerts were manned, making sure the squadron could meet its escort duties, and making sure that neither men nor aircraft flew beyond their limits. 4

In any case, they must have been eager to fly.  The first patrol was conducted on May 13, 1916, but it took a while for the unit to establish a rhythm.  Although it shot down three planes in May, on the 18th, 22nd, and 24th, it only shot down one in June, while three men were wounded, one invalided due to his wounds, and one killed in action.  It must be remembered that the pilots manning the Escadrille were of different experience levels.  Captain Thenault and Lieutenant deLaage, the French officers in charge, had flown in frontline units before.  Americans like William Thaw and Norman Prince had flown before the war and had briefly flown with other escadrilles before joining the Lafayette.  The other original American members of the Lafayette Escadrille were fresh out of training and new to combat.  Some of the men proved hesitant like all novices.  But in Victor Chapman’s case, he was too reckless and it cost him his life.  He was shot down single handedly attacking a superior number of German aircraft over enemy lines less than one month after the unit was formed. 5

Initially the unit was engaged primarily on escort missions for bombing raids at the outset.  Though these missions at times presented chances for kills, the escort fighters were attached to the bombers’ mission and were somewhat restricted.  Air-to-air conflicts would be more characteristic of later patrols in battle. 6           

By the time that July and August 1916 rolled around, the unit had received more pilots and aircraft and it appeared to establish more of a rhythm, for it started to produce better results.  This was surely aided by two factors; one, the unit was moved to Bar-le-Duc, Verdun Sector, where it was sure to find more than its share of combat, and two, Raoul Lufbery had joined the unit.  The former influence would change as the unit moved around the Front; however, the latter influence, Lufbery, would remain a constant positive impetus to the unit’s results throughout the Lafayette Escadrille’s existence.  He will be discussed in more detail later.                  

Once the unit had been established a solid foothold on the combat scene, shaking off its neophyte nervousness and inexperience, it still failed to produce many victories. One item that is brought up in defense of the Lafayette Espadrille by historians is that it might have had a total of one hundred unconfirmed “probable” kills.  This may be true, but, it is irrelevant, albeit unfortunate.  All units, especially the French Air Service, had to abide by the exact same confirmation policy.  Early experience in the war with the new air service had proved that the reporting system for kills was inaccurate and that a rigid system would have to be put into place to claim victories. 

     Captain Thenault, the squadron commander, commented on the rigid policy that had been adopted:

“Les autorites francaises se sont toujours montrees tres strictes pour la confirmation des victoires.  Elles exigeaient que, dans chaque cas, la chute de l’avion ennemi eut ete signalee par l’observateur terrestre.  Le nombre reel des avions abattus fut, j’en suis sur, tres superieur a celui qui donnait notre liste officielle.  Guynemer [a famous French ace], afin de fournir la preuve de ses success, lorsqu’il livrait un combat trop loin dans les lignes allemands pour etre vu par les postes d’observation francais, avait finalement installe un appareil photographique sur son Spad et, souvent, il rapporta des clichés de ses victims, tombant en flammes ou en morceaux. 7

Edwin Parsons, a Lafayette Escadrille pilot, complained that the “rules for downing aircraft was quite limiting – you needed to have three sources as a witness, your own squadron mates were not enough.”                 

Sometimes the lack of confirmation proved to be a great source of irritation.  During the last three weeks of July 1916, an important part of the early evolutionary stage of the Lafayette Escadrille, and which proved to be an exceptionally dangerous period having taken part over the Verdun Sector, the pilots from the squadron would often return sure of a new kill, only to have it listed as unconfirmed.  The majority of these combats were taking place deep behind Germans lines, and it was difficult for the kills to be confirmed by observers tethered in balloons far behind friendly lines.

Sometimes, conversely, bogus confirmations were awarded to squadron members by well-meaning observers from the aerial battles.  On one occasion, Kiffin Rockwell and Lieutenant deLaage attacked a pair of German planes.  One plummeted to the ground, seemingly out of control, only to redress his aircraft just in time to save it and escape, a not uncommon occurrence.  Rockwell explained what subsequently happened,

“The (observation) post sent in a report that a German machine had been brought down in German lines; they wanted to give us credit but we both knew we had not brought down the machine and told him so, explaining the circumstance.  Yet two well-known French pilots claimed it the following day and were given credit.” 9 

In the quest for fame and glory liberties were sometimes taken with supposed victories.  In fact, one reason the confirmation policy was supposedly started was because the new aviation service was composed of many enlisted men, and during this era their conduct and ethics were not considered to be that of ‘gentlemen’; thus their word alone would not be sufficient. 10

Members of the Lafayette Escadrille understood the loopholes in the system.  Some discounted the importance of kills and numbers, such as Lufbury who sometimes reputedly did not bother to claim kills or pursue their verification.  Others took advantage of the system; one pilot said of Bert Hall that he often “raced back as soon as he saw a huge fire on the ground to place his confirmation.” 11

Additional probable kills are irrelevant.  All French units suffered from the same exacting regulations and so it cannot be used in defense of the Lafayette’s combat record.  Men were sometimes unjustly robbed by the system, but just as often, men tried to beat the system or at times made mistakes.  The British and the American claims were much more lenient, and their air victory claims are excessive compared to the French, but for the Lafayette Escadrille, the researcher must remain within the French system.  It must also be noted that pilot claims, even from the most upstanding, honest men, are often subject to the fog of action.  Unless an aircraft was actually seen crashing into the ground, no one could be exactly sure what the end result was.  Even members of the Lafayette described instances in which they had been trapped in a death spin or spiral, certain that they were going to crash, only to be able to pull their aircraft out meters from the ground.                     

The numbers of official kills is the most direct, comprehensible, comparable way to measure success, even if it tends to obscure some other contributions and intangible impacts.  The numbers are one of the only things that will stand the test of time in popular historical reflection. 

Lafayette Escadrille in Comparison with the Overall World War I Aviation Effort

It is important to put the Lafayette Escadrille into a correct historical perspective in comparison with the overall World War I effort and the overall World War I aviation effort.  For when a unit is isolated for inspection it is easy to forget that there were thousands of other units and millions of other men.  Under this criterion, it is easier to see how the efforts of 38 men, no matter how Herculean or Lilliputian, can quickly become overshadowed over time.               

One thing that is often overlooked is that the flying services of the Great War were extremely small in comparison with forces as a whole.  This misperception can be attributed to the great imbalance in publicity given to the aviators, their exploits were the subject of great acclaim and advertisement in the media of the day.  But they were still considered more of a novelty and a sideshow than as a powerful new combat arm by the general staffs.  A lot of this had to do with aviation’s emphasis on one-on-one combat, whereas millions of men were fighting it out in the trenches below.  The small gains in bombing at the time were not impressive and more of a terror tool than they were actually effective.  Observation, reconnaissance, and artillery spotting missions were deemed quite important, but they were still considered only supporting functions to the king and queen of battle — the artillery and the infantry.

One has but to look at the numbers involved to see how small a part aviation played.  For instance, the 500 airmen that Germany mobilized in 1914 were just a fraction of the 4 million called to arms.  Through 1917, the Royal Flying Corps (RFC) made up no more than 3% of the total British Expeditionary Force (BEF).  Two thousand men ended up in Russian air force versus the 3.5 million-ground force.  The French considered the aviation forces as officially 0% of its force at the start of 1914; and it was only increased to 3.5% by the end of the armistice.  Similar disparate numbers existed to reflect casualties in the air as compared with those on the ground; on the first day of the Somme, the RFC lost five aviators, compared to the 57,000 British soldiers that were killed or wounded on the battlefield.12

The air services did increase in number as the war went on but overall they remained comparatively miniscule.  In 1918, Germany had 5,000 pilots; ten times that it had started the war with, while the number of Germans in uniform did not change overall.  Another example that demonstrates the increases in aviation concerns the logistical and support of the aviation forces.  In 1914 the Germans were using 600,000 kilograms of gasoline a month for aviation.  By 1915 the fuel consumption was 3 million kilograms a month; by 1916, 4.5 million; in 1917; 5.5 million kilograms; and by 1918, 7 million kilograms a month for aviation. 13

Casualties increased as the services continued flying and fighting.  According to aviation figures, France suffered 75% of its casualties (killed, wounded, and missing) in the last two years of the war, and they suffered almost 48% of those casualties in the last remaining few months of the war. 14

In order to meet the increasing demands of aviation the number of pilots trained had to be augmented as well.  In the French Service, 134 were turned out in 1914; 1,484 in 1915; 2,698 in 1916; 5,608 in1917; and 8,000 in 1918.  In all the French had about 18,000 pilots, the British 21,957, and the Germans 5,000.  These numbers still represented only a tiny fraction of the war’s millions involved.  Indeed, airpower was considered by many to have a secondary role, and that it did not contribute much in the way of the war effort.  In fact, aircraft were banned from the victory parade on July 14, 1919, although a pilot allegedly showed up and flew his plane through the Arc de Triomphe a few days later.  And the British Army’s official history described the aviation bombing campaign of 1918 to have been “without important results.” 15

So even though the air service was increasing in size by the end of the war, it was still relegated to an inferior position by the commanders running it.  Though they understood that aviation had some benefits, they looked at it as a necessary evil that drained manpower and assets.  And although the numbers of aviators were increasing, they still represented a very small part of the overall war effort.  History, despite the flamboyant press coverage and fascination given to the aviators, could only treat aviation in the same fashion.  So it is not surprising that the Lafayette Escadrille, like all other squadrons, represents just a tiny fraction of the war’s overall effort.          

* * *

How then did the Lafayette Escadrille compare with the whole World War I aviation effort?

The Germans claim that according to their records only 3,000 of their aircraft were shot down.  This reflects a wide disparity with the numbers claimed by the Allies — 11,785 (perhaps there was justification for the French in having such stringent confirmation regulations).  However, since it is impossible to break down by country the 3,000-plane German number, it only remains feasible to use the Allied claims.  Of the 11,785 claimed Allied kills, the British claimed 7,054 victories; the French claimed 3,950 * (numbers differ); and the Americans claimed 781.  In comparison with the number 11,785, the Lafayette Escadrille’s 40 confirmed kills in almost 23 months of flying represents only .00034% of the overall kills.  Looked at another way, if one divides the number of French claims (3,950) by the number of French escadrilles de chasse during the war, 92, one obtains 42.9 as a rough average per unit.  The Lafayette’s numbers therefore are just below average.  Take the number of victories claimed by the Americans, 781, and divide by the number of pursuit squadrons, 16, and one obtains 48.8 as a rough average per unit, again the numbers of the Escadrille fall below average.16

These statistical comparisons should only be considered as rough averages, and do not reflect an exact science.  Airplane victory totals came from a variety of sources and not all kills came solely from escadrilles de chasse.     

Compare the Lafayette Escadrille’s victories with the overall FAS’s victories on a month-by-month basis for the 23 months that the Escadrille existed, and one can see in another way how the unit fared against the whole.  There are many months where the unit did not get kill at all.  Below is a month-by-month comparison of the Escadrille’s kills compared to the overall French aviation combat record.  These tallies were taken from the Journal des marche et operations, Escadrille 124, located at the Smithsonian Institution National Air and Space Museum Archives (NASMA), and the “French Air Service War Chronology, 1914-1918”.  The different total of 66 rather than 40 official claims made by the Lafayette Escadrille reflect extra claims accepted by Georges Thenault who signed off on the Operations log as opposed to victories that were actually confirmed by authorities.  They also represent “probables,” airplanes forced to land behind enemy lines (but still intact), and joint claims, where two or more pilots claimed the same victory.  Similarly, there are the same discrepancies accorded to the overall French totals.  

Month        Overall Total    Lafayette Escadrille Total

1916

April                 49                            0 (No combat missions performed)

May                  80                            4  (First flight May 13, 1916)

June                  51                            1

July                  130                          6  (One kill by Nungesser)

August             172                           5

September        172                          5

October            218                          5

November        139                          2

December         182                          3

1917

January            83                             3

February          64                             0

March              102                           0

April                129                           8

May                 47                             0

June                 175                           1

July                 156                           0

August            211                           1

September       279                           10

October           172                           11

November       47                             0

December       115                            3

1918

January          145                             1

February        131                           0

Total              3349                        66 

There are eleven months where the squadron achieved one or no kills, almost half of its existence; this figure can be lowered to nine months of no kills if the first and last months of the squadron’s existence are counted.  There are fifteen months that the unit reported three or fewer kills.  Overall the official total number of 40 kills represents 1.7 kills per month.  It is interesting to note that if Lufbury’s 17 kills are subtracted, then the squadron is left with just 23 kills, or just one kill per month.  These statistics alone can be misleading, for it is not the purpose of the author to break down every unit’s totals per month.  However, it is interesting to see how the unit fit into the overall picture contextually.  It is of course unfair not to consider Lufbery’s kills as well; however, take away his victories and the unit’s efforts pale even further. 

The Lafayette Escadrille in Comparison with other French Escadrilles

In comparison with the other 92 French escadrilles de chasse, the Lafayette Escadrille has already been shown to have a slightly lower than average number of victories – 42.9 to 40.  The reader may wonder if the lower numbers were really the Escadrille’s fault considering the unit stood up later than others and perhaps it did not have a chance to evolve as quickly as others on the Front.  The reader may also wonder if since the unit was disbanded in early 1918, was it unable to take full advantage of the time later in the war when kills were progressing more rapidly as the Germans became overwhelmed and the end was near for them? Although the author cannot completely verify the first, he can return to the French Air Service War Chronology and verify what others were doing and accomplishing at the same time.  Unfortunately, a comparison with later results and circumstances is beyond measure since it would entail too much speculation.     

     At the time of the formation of the Lafayette Escadrille, aviation was still in its infancy and was yet to experience the gains in speed and lethality that would characterize the aircraft near the end of the war.  However, in the month of April 1916, when the Lafayette Escadrille came into exsitence, Sous-Lieutenant Navarre of N-67 already had nine kills; Adjutant Nungesser of N-65 had seven; and Sous-Lieutenant Guynemer had eight kills, and they all were accumulating them at a rate of one or two per month.  At this point in 1916, victories were not the occasional occurrence they had been at the start of the war, when airplanes and weapons were crude and ineffective, and when kills happened more by chance than they did by skill and effort.  Men were already flying and fighting their machines with a certain degree of lethality. 17 

How did the pilots of the Lafayette Escadrille view their own contributions? After the initial excitement and novelty died down, the reality of the long, brutal conflict set in.  The men experienced frustration at their lack of kills and their ability to influence events.  The rare kill was certainly feted; a special “Bottle of Death” had been incorporated into the squadron mess on behalf of the Rockwell’s to be shared only after a confirmed victory.  The Bottle must have sat rather unmolested until Lufbery’s arrival.  The men would bicker over victories and suspect each other of false claims, but this was only a result of the dry spells that the men experienced.  Some of the men were in a plain funk over their lack of success.  Kiffin Rockwell remarked to his brother in a letter, “The Escadrille isn’t doing any more than any other French squadron.” 18 This was apparently true.

The Lafayette Escadrille in Comparison with all USAS Aero Pursuit Squadrons

 In comparison with the American Aero Pursuit Squadrons (APS) that formed the fighter element of the USAS, the record of the Lafayette Escadrille is again average.  The Lafayette Escadrille existed for a total of 674 days and of course totaled 40 victories (as compared to a rough estimate of 47.25 victories per USAS pursuit squadron).  To compare the Lafayette Escadrille with the later American pursuit squadrons, even though some of them flew the same type of planes, is not a completely fair proposition since tactics changed or got better, the strategic situation was different, the war effort was escalating, etc.  These units were products of different times and different circumstances. 

The numbers and tabulations in Figure One were gathered from Over the Front: A Complete Record of the Fighter Aces and Units of the United States and the French Air Services, 1914-1918 by Frank Bailey, a comprehensive and exhaustively researched companion to the French Air Service War Chronology by the same author. 

 

Unit       Day activated or    Victories/Planes      No. of             No. of  days of flying

               1st Patrol                                                   Aces   (Until Armistice, Nov.11, 1918)

N-124     16/4/16-18/2/18                 40                     1                            674 days

13th APS   29 July 18                        29                     5                            106 days

17th APS   15 July 18                        53                     6                            119 days

22nd APS   16 Aug.18                       46                     4                              88 days

27th APS   2 June 18                         56                     6                             163 days

28th APS   2 Sept.18                         15                     2                               71 days

49th APS   14 Sept.18                       24                     0                               59 days

93rd APS    11 Aug.18                      31                     3                                93 days

94th APS    14 Apr.18                       67                     6                             212 days

95th APS    18 Feb.18                       47                     5                             268 days

103rd APS   26 Feb.18                      49                     7                             260 days

139th APS   30 June 18                     37                     7                             135 days

141st APS   23 Oct.18                       2                       0                               19 days

147th APS   15 July 18                      31                     6                             117 days

148th APS   15 July 18                      47                     7                             147 days

213th APS   14 Aug.18                      16                     1                               90 days

185th APS   (Last days of war)           0                      0                                 ~  days          

Total/                                                   553                   67 aces                 

Average (¸15)                                    36.86                 4.46                         121 days 

Note: Lufbery was with the 94th but had no kills.  Thaw was with the 103rd and claimed two kills.  Peterson was with 94th and became an ace.           

The fifteen American pursuit squadrons (the 185th is not counted since it came into being in the last days of the war) averaged almost 37 victories in an average 121 days of existence; this of course still includes the squadrons that were only around for a few weeks at the end of the war, which brings down the aggregate average.  A significantly higher “time-in-service-to-kill ratio” exists for these squadrons in comparison to the Lafayette Escadrille.  The pursuit squadrons also averaged 4.2 aces per unit.  Of these sixteen pursuit squadrons, five had better kill records than the Lafayette Escadrille, and these five managed to do this in an average of 165 days, or 24% of 674 days.

Again these numbers can be misleading, but the overall effect of the comparison is to show that the Lafayette Escadrille accomplished nothing extraordinary during its time of service.

The Lafayette Escadrille in Comparison with the 103rd Aero Pursuit Squadron

The most direct comparison that can be made between the Lafayette Escadrille and an American unit is to compare it with the 103rd Aero Pursuit Squadron (APS), the Lafayette Escadrille’s immediate and direct American successor.  The Lafayette Escadrille was officially disbanded on February 18, 1918, and the 103rd, which assumed its colors and lineage, was stood up officially on the same day.  Although the 103rd’s official squadron flight operations log is not complete – the log does not start until April 1, 1918 – it is continuous from that date to November 11, 1918, Armistice Day, when flight operations ceased.  During these 260 days, the unit experienced 55 days of bad weather in which they could not fly; another eight days were consumed by unit transfers to different bases.  This means there were 197 actual flight days available, or 75% of the days.  If the 69 days were added in which the unit, for whatever reason, completed combat patrols but did to have anything to report (signified by “Rien a Signaler” or RAS), then the total number of days available for fighting the Germans in actual combat drops to 128 days, or 49% of the time.  Yet in these 128 days the unit flew 470 missions, engaged in 327 combats, shot down 47 aircraft and two balloons (with another 82 planes and 2 balloons listed as “probables”), flew over 3,075 combat hours, and dropped 1,620 pounds of bombs in the last three months of the war.  This averages out to one enemy aircraft shot down every 4.2 days of flying, or one enemy aircraft shot down every 2.7 days of available combat time.  Twenty-eight different pilots racked up kills individually or in tandem with another squadron mate.  The unit also had a total of seven aces, four of which gained all of their victories in the 103rd.  Three of the aces had kills carry over from other units, to include William Thaw who had two with the Lafayette Escadrille.  Four pilots in total had transferred from the Lafayette Escadrille – Thaw, James Norman Hall, Christopher W. Ford, and Charles H. Dolan – but excluding Thaw who was the squadron commander and had three kills while with the 103rd, the others were not squadron leaders, and at least ten others of the 28-man roster had more kills than they.  This is especially surprising since the majority of the men in the 103rd were new, inexperienced pilots that had been trained in America. 19                        

This compares with the Lafayette Escadrille that had 40 kills in 674 days.  Or, subtracting the approximate 189 days of bad weather (152), unit transfers (30), and unit special days off (7) that the Lafayette Escadrille had, the number becomes 40 kills in 485 days of possible flying, roughly one kill every twelve days.  If the RAS days are added, which totaled 102 complete days, the unit had 353 days where it encountered the enemy.  Forty kills in 353 days averages out to one kill every nine days.  The Lafayette Escadrille also logged over 3,000 combat hours but the unit failed to match the achievements of the 103rd.  And it only had one ace, Lufbery, who did the majority of the killing; and only sixteen out of 42 pilots achieved kills. 20

In this example, the numbers from the direct comparison speak for themselves.

The Lafayette Escadrille in Context with the Total War Effort

When the war ended on November 11, 1918, there were 45 American squadrons of all types, 740 airplanes owned by the USAS, 767 USAS pilots, 481 observers, 23 aerial gunners, and the thousands of men to support them all in Europe.  The Americans claimed 781 enemy airplanes and 73 enemy balloons, while America’s losses totaled 289 airplanes and 48 balloons.  Americans had flown 150 bombing raids, dropped over 27,500 pounds of explosives, and had flown over 350,000 hours. 21

Lufbery: The Lafayette Escadrille’s Only Ace

The Lafayette Escadrille contribution to the number of aces in the war was lacking, in fact only Lufbery would become an ace during the Lafayette Escadrille’s existence.  Below is the number of confirmed kills by the pilots of N124: 22

Name                              Victories

Lufbery, G. Raoul                 17

DeLaage deMeux                   3

Prince, Norman                      3

Hall, Bert                               3

Rockwell, Kiffin                     2

Thaw, William                       2

Hall, James                           1

Haviland, Willis                     1

Johnson, Charles                   1

Jones, Henry                         1

Lovell, Walter                       1

Masson, Didier                     1

Marr, Kenneth                      1

Nungesser, Charles               1

Parsons, Edwin                     1

Peterson, David                    1

Cowdin, Elliot                       1

Total                                  40   

Of the 42 pilots, only sixteen had kills at all (Nungesser is not included; he was attached to the unit for only one flight, in which he achieved a victory).  The one bright spot of the Lafayette Escadrille was the man named Raoul Lufbery.  His 17 official victories, and possibly as many as 40 more, made up the majority of the kills for the Lafayette Escadrille; he is truly its most famous member. 

But why did the Lafayette Escadrille not produce more aces? There were a total of 118 American aces and 186 French aces during the war.  If one takes the number of American aces and divides by the total number of American squadrons, 45, it averages out to 2.6 aces for every unit.  Or if one takes the number of American pilots at the end of the war in Europe, 767, and divides by the number of aces, 118, it averages out to one ace for every 6.5 pilots.  If one takes the 186 aces that the French produced and divides by the number of escadrilles de chasse (92), then one arrives at least two aces per unit.  Although these computations are meaningless, it does still raise the question, “Where were the other aces in the Lafayette Escadrille?”

Some of the Lafayette pilots would become aces later on during the war, but why were there not more produced during the 674 days that the squadron existed? This author has gone back to the original Journales des marches et operations, Escadrille 124 that were kept by the squadron and verified by Captain Thenault in order to find a possible reason or reasons.  The author decided to go through the record and tally up the number of flights each pilot flew in the Escadrille.  Because the records are not complete, they abruptly start on August 24, 1916, (but do end on February 25, 1918) the author chose to take a one-year “snapshot” of the unit’s flying record in order to better manage and compare the information.  By choosing to examine the dates of August 24, 1916, to August 24, 1917, the author managed to capture the flight habits and patterns of the majority of the Escadrille pilots during the heart of the unit’s operations.  The start date, which coincides with the start date of the flying records, also allowed him to capture the bulk of the original members and track their performance over a year’s time. 

First one must examine the how flying opportunities in the unit presented themselves. As mentioned before, a record of the available days for scrutiny shows that the squadron had a total of 674 days from the calendar period April 16, 1916, to February 25, 1918.  Out of that number, 152 days were canceled due to bad weather and the unit did not fly at all.  Another 37 days were taken up by squadron mass transfers as the unit moved from one airfield to another, a procedure that could encompass anywhere from one to seven days.  This seven days also included four or five days where the unit was granted special permissions as a whole, namely for the 4th of July, American Independence Day.  In total there were approximately 189 no-fly days due to weather, transfer, or permission, a sum that represents 24% of the 674 days that the squadron had available for combat.  Obviously these were days that the unit did not fly and fight in combat.  The author proceeded to count the days that the squadron flew full patrols but managed to encounter nothing during the whole day, signified by RAS.  Whether these RAS days were due to bad but flyable weather, no enemy activity, or simply no luck in finding anything to report, the result was the same, it was another day of not fighting.  These RAS days total 102 complete days.  Add the two together and one ends up with 291 days or 43% of the time that a squadron pilot would not have been able to achieve a kill or fight in combat.  That left 383 days to go out and fly to kill.  If the squadron was up to full numbers of aircraft and a full complement of pilots, say twelve and twelve, and if the average squadron pilot planned to fly at least three times a week, then the average squadron pilot had roughly 127 opportunities to fly during the available days.  Take away individual leave, rest and relaxation, alerts, sickness, administrative duties such as ferrying planes to and from Paris or where ever, and any of the other things that could affect a pilot’s status, and one can see that a Lafayette pilot really did not have that many opportunities to fly.  Ergo, if he wanted to capitalize on the chance to become an ace, then he better fly as much as he could. 

Men like Lufbery did.  Some others in the Escadrille fell far short.  For the men who flew passionately, almost obsessively, like Lufbery, the kills were sure to come as long as luck and some skill played on that man’s part.  But there are a variety of reasons for the other men who did not fly quite as much; some of them were legitimate, some of them were not.  The air war was very stressful; no one questions that the flying, especially during this era, was still a novelty.  Man was still not quite sure how flying affected him physically, psychologically, etc.  Many of the men had sought the glory and the fame that the skies promised, but the harsh reality was that flying was hard and strenuous work, especially when someone was trying to kill you.  The average life expectancy for new pilots was something around two to three weeks. 23 And some men realized that it wasn’t a matter of if they would be shot down, but really just when.  The men of the Lafayette Escadrille had also buried a lot of their squadron mates; a few funerals dampened even the hardiest of the men’s spirits.  Losses to the Escadrille of great, young men like Kiffin Rockwell and Norman Prince were unsettling and painfully real.  Nonetheless, there were a few men of the Lafayette Escadrille who did not fly much at all.  Some of the men’s names are surprising; some of them were expected.  But altogether these men who did not fly often detracted from the Escadrille’s success and made a few bear the brunt of the workload for all.  There was only so much Lufbery and a few others could do.

The author now turns to the examination of the men’s flight records.  During the snapshot in time from August 24, 1916, to August 24, 1917, there were 205 of 365 available flying days due to weather, transfers, etc.  The wide disparity in flight time recorded by the author between the pilots of the Escadrille during this period is startling and in some cases, vastly different.  For example, of the pilots who were present the full 205 days – that is, the majority of the some of the original squadron members like Lufbery, Thaw, Johnson, Hill, and Thenault; Lufbery lead the group with 155 flights in 205 days, or a record of flying 76% of the available flying time.  Thaw had 109 flights or 53%.  Johnson, one of the less courageous members of the Escadrille had only 50 flights in 205 days, or just 24%.  Hill had 62 flights in 205 days, for a low 30%; and Captain Thenault, the squadron commander, only 32 flights in 205 days, a very low 16%.  Some of the men flew several flights in one day, so the exact number of flights do not equal days flown, but nevertheless this method gives a rough idea of how men maximized the time available to fly.  Some might have had excuses; a man like Thenault might have been tied to his administrative duties in running the squadron, and he was also sick for a month during the year and therefore could not fly as often.  But these numbers demonstrate one thing for sure: If a pilot is not flying, he is not fighting, and therefore, he is not downing enemy aircraft.  Lufbery had more than half of his kills during this period. Thaw one of his two while with the Escadrille, Johnson one, Hill one and Thenault, zero. 

A breakdown of all of the pilots of the Escadrille using this method is presented below; the pilots who were killed in action, transferred from the unit, or who joined the unit too late in 1917 to be effectively counted, are excluded.

Dates: August 24, 1916, to August 24, 1917 (205 flying days during this year period)

Name   Number of flights/days available to fly  Percentage   Kills  

Lufbery          155/205                                               76%              10

Thaw, W.       109/205                                               53%                1 

Johnson, C.      50/205                                               24%                1

Hill, D.             62/205                                               30%                 0

Thenault, G.     32/205                                               16%                 0     

Soubiran, R.     63/173                                               36%                 0

Haviland, W.    61/173                                               35%                1

Parsons, E .      92/151                                               61%                1

Bigelow, S.      62/146                                               42%                 0

Willis, H.       103/135                                               76%                 0

Lovell, W.        58/133                                               44%                1

Dugan, J.          50/114                                               44%                0 

Marr, K.           62/113                                               55%               1

Campbell, A.   65/104                                               63%                 0

Rockwell, R.    80/174                                               46%                0     

Hewitt, T.        60/113                                               55%                 0

Jones, C.            49/81                                               60%                 1                                    

Bridgman, R.     54/91                                               54%                 0

 

* * *

Lufbery’s success would seem to assure the unit’s glory? But he was killed in action on May 19, 1918, while he was flying for the 94th APS.  In addition, he was a very private man and did not seek the limelight.  He was a man dedicated to flying and killing to revenge the only true friend and family he had ever known, Marc Poupre, a famous French aviator.  Lufbery did not glamorize his kills nor did he seek publicity.  When he did give interviews, he recounted his exploits without embellishment and without fanfare.  Many in the Lafayette Escadrille did not understand him and could not figure him out.  It was rare when he opened up and it was probably not bizarre that his best friend in the unit was the lion mascot, Whiskey, who had a special relationship with Lufbery and favored him above all other pilots.

Lufbery did not take naturally to flying, despite evidence to the contrary.  He had flown as an observer for a while before becoming a pilot.  He was deemed average in flight training. It was only his tenacity and drive that earned him a slot in the escadrilles de chasse.  When he arrived he kept quiet and avoided squadron politics and fanfare, preferring to keep about his own business.  He meticulously inspected his aircraft, going so far as to individually load every single round in the belt of the machine gun, so that it would not jam in flight – a notorious problem with the “Lewis” guns.  He also knew his plane inside out and would work with the mechanics on the planes learning more.  This approach paid off, as he soon started to kill enemy aircraft faster and more often than any other pilot in the Escadrille.  He demonstrated the ability to stalk his prey patiently and ruthlessly, taking advantage of his experience and technique.  During World War I, four percent of the pilots would account for 50% of the kills for the French. 24 Lufbery accounted for 42.5% of the kills of the Lafayette Escadrille. 

Had Lufbery lived, the Lafayette Escadrille might have had the perfect emissary to shoulder the unit history.  The truth will never be known. 

Lufbery’s record in death, however, was not enough to carry his legend far since there would be many who would eclipse his record, racking up more kills then he could have even imagined.  But even though his record practically doubled the number of kills that the squadron had, so too would others’ records dwarf his own.  For instance, Billy Bishop shot down 25 airplanes in one twelve-day stretch! Renee Fonck, France’s all-time leading ace, had 75 victories.  Seventeen French aces and two American aces killed more aircraft than Lufbery. 25

The Lafayette Flying Corps 

The 209 men of the Lafayette Flying Corps, including the men of the Lafayette Escadrille, some of whom went on to fight for the French afterwards, ended up achieving a total of 199 victories for the duration of the war.  These kills were of course added to the French totals since the men flew with French Escadrilles.  Of this 209, only 180 men actually made it to the Front.  Thirteen would become aces.  Comparisons with these 180 are problematic since they were spread out over many French escadrilles.  Suffice it to say that these American men’s efforts were measured in far greater terms of intangibility than in actual palpable results. 26 

A Forgotten Combat Record

The Lafayette Escadrille earned wide publicity when the squadron was organized, and it garnered worldwide attention as long as it existed as the sole American flying unit in the war.  But as has been shown, the efforts of these 38 American men were but a very small part of a horrible and long war. And the results of the Lafayette Escadrille, although appreciated, did not make them anymore special than any other of the units on the front lines or the ones flying over them.  Other units would achieve more kills, more fame, and more glory.

The author understands that the Escadrille’s results were not the only impact the unit had on the war, but he believes that it is one reason why the unit, though once very popular, has faded over time.  Had the unit truly been elite, and had it contained a cast of characters that were as colorful as Eddie Rickenbacker or Billy Mitchell, then perhaps it would have stood the test of time in a better fashion.

* * *

An example of this type of unit exists in the 20th century, and it is a unit that Americans associate with and know very well.  The unit is the American Volunteer Group (AVG), or the “Flying Tigers” of China/Burma fame, and the one, incidentally, that was the most universally recognized in the survey. 

Comparisons between the two units is problematic since the comparisons concern different times, circumstances, conditions, foes, equipment, and support, of which the AVG had the tacit approval of the American government.   

Nonetheless, the results were spectacular and would bring the unit everlasting fame.  In seven months it destroyed a confirmed 297 Japanese planes, and probably destroyed another 153.  Although 22 pilots lost their lives, they executed a much higher kill-ratio in a shorter period of time than did the Lafayette Escadrille.  Their leaders included the colorful “Pappy” Boyington, a Marine fighter pilot who would go on to command a famous squadron, “the Black Sheep” in World War II, and the AVG Commander General Claire Chennault.  Their skill, daring, and notoriety assured the unit of everlasting fame.  The unit’s name was also preserved through history; becoming part of the 4th Air Force in World War II, and through a private transport company that used its name.  Also, the squadron insignia, the Tiger’s Teeth painted on the unit’s plane cowlings, instilled an immediate recognition factor, one that the Screaming Sioux warrior of the Lafayette Escadrille has failed to engender in the United States. 27 

* * *

It is unfortunate, but the Lafayette Escadrille’s average record has done nothing to enhance any everlasting fame.   

 

  1. Flammer, Philip M., Primus Inter Pares (Mémoire, Yale, 1963), p. iv.
  2. Ibid.
  3. Thenault, Georges, L’Escadrille Lafayette (Paris, Librarie Hachette), p. 32.
  4.  Whitehouse, Arch, Legion of the Lafayette (NY, Doubleday, 1962), p. 88.
  5.  Parsons, Edwin C., I Flew with the Lafayette Escadrille (NY, Doubleday and Doran, 1937), p. 112. 
  6. Gordon, Pilot Biographies, p. 27. 
  7. Thenault, L’Escadrille Lafayette, p. 93.
  8. Parsons, I flew with the Lafayette Escadrille, p. 145.
  9. Mason, Herbert M., The Lafayette Escadrille (NY, Random House, 1964), p. 88.
  10. Ibid.
  11. Genet, Edmond C., An American for Lafayette (The University of Virginia Press, 1981), p. 170.
  12. Kennett, Lee, The First Air War (NY, The Free Press, 1981), p. 83.
  13. Ibid., p. 84.
  14. Ibid.
  15. Ibid., p. 85 et 217.
  16. Kennett, The First Air War, p. 164.
  17. Bailey, The French Air Service War Chronology.  Les chiffres cité viennent de ce livre.
  18. Ibid.
  19. Mason, The Lafayette Escadrille, p. 88.
  20. 103rd Aero Pursuit Squadron Logbook, AFHRA, Maxwell AFB, Alabama.
  21. Journal: Escadrille N° 124.
  22. The U.S. Air Service in World War I, Vol. I (Washington, D. C.: Office of Air Force History, 1978), p. 17.
  23. Mason, The Lafayette Escadrille, p. 295.
  24. Parsons, I Flew with the Lafayette Escadrille, p. 216. 
  25. Ibid., p. 220.
  26. Kennett, The First Air War, p. 169.
  27. Ibid.
  28. Gordon, Dennis, The Lafayette Flying Corps (Penn., Schiffer Military Historical Press, 2000).
  29. Ford, Daniel, Flying Tigers (Washington, D. C., Smithsonian Institute Press, 1991).
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