Chapter Five. The Failure of the United States Air Service to Properly Integrate the Lafayette Escadrille

Publié le 2 janvier 2023 par WebmestreAgile

Perhaps one of the greatest factors that affected the Lafayette Escadrille and its long-term reputation was its dealings with the USAS during World War I. America and the USAS was woefully unprepared when it entered the Great War; its preparations were marred by indecision, unreal expectations, a general lack of proper planning, and failure to appreciate the lessons already learned by the Allies. It also greatly mismanaged the transition of the Lafayette Escadrille and failed to capitalize on the value of the squadron. Some of the men of Lafayette Escadrille would choose to stay with French due to the treatment they received; some became disheartened and lost all hope and patience with the fumbling USAS. Whatever the case, the USAS failed to properly integrate the Lafayette Escadrille and shunned them, a miscue that would irreparably harm the reputation of the Escadrille.

The USAS’s Early Lack of Preparation

At the start of the war in August 1914, Germany had 232 aircraft, Russia 190, France 162, and Great Britain, Italy, and Austria-Hungary around 50 to 100 each. Belgium possessed sixteen aircraft. Each country had a few balloons and dirigibles. At the time, the U. S. Army had eight aircraft. ¹

As the war dragged on and the countries geared up their industrial bases, innovation and necessity led to the production of hundreds and thousands of planes. The leap in the technology and lethality of the aircraft between 1914 and 1918 was impressive.

The amount of American aviation assets would be poor in comparison with the allies, and, in fact, it never caught up during the war. As late as 1913, aviation was still part of the Army’s Air Arm Signal Corps (the precursor to the USAS) since it was considered as “an information gathering platform” and for the “immediate future ninety-nine per cent of its value would be in the sense of information.” ²

In December 1914, in Congressional Hearings before the Committee on Military Affairs to determine the Army Appropriation Bill for 1915 and 1916, General Scrivner, the chief of the Signal Corps, and thus in charge of the Air Service at the time, described the aviation situation in the ongoing war in Europe. At this point, he said, the French had 500 aircraft, the Russians 500, the British 250, Germany 500, Austria 100, and Italy 150. The General went onto describe the successful use of aircraft in the war, emphasizing observation and not the other facets of aviation’s future. His request for one million dollars in funding was rejected and he was given much less. The USAS possessed eleven at this time; General Scrivner wanted to procure 48 aircraft. It was obvious from the General’s testimony, and even more so from the Congressmen’s reactions, that the US was failing to grasp the importance of aviation. In that same meeting in December, the Committee members had also derided the advent of the airplane as “largely responsible for the indecisiveness of the battles raging in northern Europe,” and that “aero planes were a distinct disappointment to those who believed that aircraft would play an important role in the war.” Furthermore, the only “distinction they have accomplished is that of terrifying helpless women and children.” ³

If one continues to read the records of Congressional Meetings and Hearings from this pre-war period, it is evident that at the start the American Congress and the Army did not understand what was happening in aviation in Europe – thus America would continue to fall behind the rest of the belligerents. In July 1916, in testimony before Congress, General Scrivner would again ask for an increase in aircraft – this time requesting eighteen squadrons composed of 432 aircraft. Still, even these numbers were comparatively low, and failed to compete with the rapidly increasing aviation forces overseas. At the time this request was put to Congress in 1916, only 23 aircraft existed in the USAS. ⁴

In Washington, D. C., the Air Arm of the Signal Corps was being run by a few ex-cavalrymen, engineers, and administration officials. These men still lived in an era of telegraph wires, semaphore flags, and heliograph instruments; they believed that aircraft were unnecessary to carry out aerial observation. Some even thought that aircraft were too noisy and that kite balloons were preferable since they were silent and could be flown in any weather, day or night! Three years of savage fighting had not impressed upon these men the changing nature of warfare and technology. ⁵

Declaration of War

When America declared war on April 6, 1917, the entire American Army, and especially the newly formed USAS, was in a state of disarray. The very Congressmen that had held back the development of the Air Service and the rest of the Army now sought to redress the glaring deficiencies in training and material.

At the declaration of war, there totaled only 200,000 men in the U. S. Army. Worse, there were only 131 officers and 1,087 enlisted in the USAS; and though it had added a few planes, the total number was still less than 250, most of which were completely obsolete — not one worthy of combat. ⁶ Congress swung into action and sought to make up for years of inactivity and stringent funding. An even greater exterior impetus was received when a cable from the French Government arrived, requesting that the U. S. to furnish up to 4,500 aircraft as soon as possible — at least by 1918 — to include the requisite equipment and personnel. The Joint Army-Navy Technical Aircraft Board quickly translated this request into a plan of action, and even optimistically increased the numbers, assuming that they could produce 12,000 aircraft by early 1918. This was called the “12,000-Plane Program”, which included plans for an additional 5,000 training aircraft. An equally optimistic Congress accepted this plan, and accorded an appropriation of $640,000,000 dollars, an extraordinary sum and the largest single one ever passed by Congress on a single issue to date. President Woodrow Wilson signed the bill on July 24, 1917. ⁷

Even the President was overly confident that the rapid infusion of cash would make a miracle Air Service appear where there had been none before. In a letter to Secretary of War Newton Baker, Woodrow Wilson wrote, “The total amount proposed is $640,000,000…this effort will lead to the immediate and effective speeding up of our war effort in air activity.” ⁸ Congress promised to “darken the skies over Germany with American-made aircraft, manned by American-trained pilots.” The $64 million dollar appropriation accounted for the eventual construction of 22,625 aircraft (four times the number of aircraft at the time in service with the French, British, and Italian air services) and 44,000 engines. They believed that the largest appropriation in American history was going to elevate it to the world’s leading air power. ⁹

Others were skeptical. General Pershing of the American Expeditionary Force (AEF) commented on the status of the USAS in late 1917: “The Army should be mortified. Out of the 65 officers and the 1,000 men in the Air Service Section of the Signal Corps, there were 35 officers who could fly…with the exception of five or six officers, none of them could have met the requirements for modern battle.” ¹⁰ Billy Mitchell, the father of the modern USAF, was even more blunt during his brief exploration trip to France to evaluate the status of Allied air services in 1917, “Our air force consists of one Nieuport, which I used myself, and that is all.” ¹¹

As expected, and quite rapidly, reality hit the well-intentioned Americans. The industrial base to support the building of aircraft was nonexistent, and training could not support the large numbers of pilots that were planned for; in short, the Americans now realized that they were way behind the other belligerents. The shortage of men, training, and materiel constituted the most serious deficiency that the Air Service faced in its race to complete its plans. It became quickly apparent that the facilities did not exist nor the time to correctly train this vast number of personnel. The Americans were forced to turn to France for these express purposes. ¹² The known lack of infrastructure and other support materiel made it highly unlikely that the Americans could train more than 500 pilots before June 1, 1918, and then with only a bare minimum of advanced training. To meet the immediate needs the French offered the Issoudun air training facility, and during the latter part of July 1917, authorization for American personnel to begin flight training. Another already operational school in Tours was given to the Americans for training in November 1917. ¹³

Of the original 65 flying officers of the USAS only a few had seen combat in Mexico; the rest of them were recent graduates of flight training themselves. There was certainly “no officer qualified by training or exposure to take charge of the higher levels of aviation instruction, and the officers assigned to special instruction knew little or nothing of the subjects they were called upon to teach.” ¹⁴ At the time, Colonel Mitchell expressed his reservations and frustrations very bluntly, “The General Staff is now trying to run the Air Service with about as much knowledge of it as a hog knows of skating.”¹⁵ He was not far off. He had come over earlier than the AEF on a fact-finding mission to evaluate the status of the Allied air services. He was amazed at the advancement of the allied airplanes. ¹⁶ Yet still, the Americans stubbornly wanted to produce their own war machines. Instead of taking the blueprints of aircraft that existed and modifying them, they tried to develop their own “Liberty Aircraft” with its own “Liberty Engine.” The first result of their efforts was a catastrophe and was dubbed the “Flying Coffin.” It never flew in combat. ¹⁷

In 1918, America gave up hope and bought every available French Nieuport it could find. Despite the 640 million dollar infusion of money in 1917, by 6 April 1918, America still had no completely operational wholly American unit, no American plane of its own, and no American engine. ¹⁸ And what of the 12000-Plane Program and the budgeted for 22,625 aircraft? By the armistice, the Americans had only built 196 airplanes of their own. ¹⁹

It is with this scenario of miscues in mind that the attention is turned to the integration of the Lafayette Escadrille.

The Transfer of the Lafayette Escadrille

If the efforts of the USAS to catch up to its allies were clumsy, whimsical, and inefficient, then the transfer and integration of the Lafayette Escadrille into the USAS could only be described as criminal. One historian put it thusly, « The transfer of the Lafayette Escadrille to the American Air Service in early 1918 (was) a graphic illustration of the chaos and turmoil that accompanied the American efforts to suddenly change an insignificant section of the Signal Corps into an armada of gigantic proportions.” ²⁰

Billy Mitchell had seen the value of the Lafayette Escadrille men immediately. He knew that the Lafayette Escadrille men and the other men flying with French in other squadrons could furnish a wealth of American experience and technical capability. He wrote numerous letters urging that the Lafayette Flying Corps men be granted to his jurisdiction for immediate inclusion into the AEF; but Mitchell was a colonel without a command in Europe and the higher-ups back home refused to listen to him. The effort, according to the generals back home, was to be an all-American one; they did not need men who had served for another country. The way they had figured it, they had plenty of time on their side, and besides, American know-how and moxie would make up for all of the differences. It was as if the American pilots of the Lafayette were tainted in some fashion and the USAS did not want to touch them. ²¹

* * *

The future of the Lafayette Escadrille was already being discussed by the French. Once America declared war, the French became eager to get the Americans out of French uniform and into American ones for reasons of diplomacy and morale. On the very day that the Americans declared war, the French Ambassador to America, Jules Jusserand, cabled a report that the Lafayette Escadrille was to be transferred as soon as possible. “It is of great importance that the American flag be engaged in the conflict without delay,” he wrote. ²² Almost immediately, the French Ministry of War, thinking it was the Americans that had given the Ambassador the idea, agreed with the suggestion and forwarded its approval back to the United States. In an official declaration, it was decided, “That henceforth, from this day forward, all flying and non-flying personnel attached to the Lafayette Escadrille will fight in the uniform and under the flag of the Unites States.” ²³ The French, again thinking that they were doing the American’s bidding, also notified the press and decreed that on April 11, 1917, the American pilots of the Lafayette Escadrille would soon be part of the American Army. These French actions were in turn brought to the attention of the U. S. War Department. Secretary of War Baker sidestepped the issue by saying that though he had not officially sanctioned the plan, he would do nothing to oppose it. He released a communiqué, stating that the Lafayette Escadrille would not be brought home to become part of the U. S. military since it was doing much more important work at the front. He had washed his hands of the squadron; however, nobody bothered to contact the men directly to let them know what was in store. ²⁴

The Lafayette Escadrille men, receiving the order from the French and hearing in the press that they were to be released immediately, rebelled. Captain Thenault wrote an official response on behalf of the men, asking if anybody higher up had even thought of the ramifications of this order. To whom would they be released? How would they be released? Sure, these men had taken an oath to follow the rules of the French Army, would they be officially sworn out? What about questions of pay, uniforms, and ranks? Who would provide them? How would they receive commissions in the USAS? Who would take their place in the front lines?

The squadron would have to obviously remain intact as a unit until someone figured out these all of these details. Captain Thenault and the men offered valid opposition, so much so that the leadership acquiesced; the rush to transfer the Lafayette men would have to wait until there was a better plan. ²⁵

The men of the Lafayette Escadrille, although happy that America had declared war, were very disturbed about their unit disposition. Indecision and lack of information create morale issues. In times of uncertainty, rumors and suspicion become rampant, and the men of the Lafayette Escadrille were no different. The men became frustrated with the indecision and hesitation. It seemed that nobody wanted them or had a plan for them. They knew that the talk of “12,000 planes and the darkening of the skies of Germany” was much hype. They could not help but feel left out of the grand plan; that they were not part of the swell of appreciation and excitement that emanated from America. Edwin Parsons explained the Lafayette sentiment perfectly,

“Unfortunate and untimely propaganda claimed that the US had hundreds of pilots and thousands of planes nearly completed. Bitter experience made us a little skeptical of the last statement. However, it seemed that, with such magnificent preparations, they had no need for us who had been carrying the burden. It cut us all pretty deeply, for we began to feel like we were partially outcast; men without a country.” ²⁶

Commandant Fequant, the Groupe de Combat 13 Commander and higher headquarters commander then in charge of the Lafayette Escadrille, wrote in September of 1917 that the men of the Escadrille were subject to a “certain ill air,” and “whereas the Lafayette pilots once incited each other in their endeavors to maintain at a high level the reputation of the unit, a certain number had now lost interest. Only the better ones continued to be urged by the noble sentiment of the past.” He even recommended disbanding the unit immediately and farming the pilots out to French Escadrilles in order to save it from itself. ²⁷

Dr. Edmund Gros, who had been granted a commission as a major in the USAS and who still considered himself the director and leader of the men in the Lafayette Flying Corps and the Escadrille, even misjudged the situation. Pressured by the French to see if the men of the unit would accept commissions from the U. S., he had answered that it would not be a problem. He even made the mistake of calling the unit and telling them to change the color of their cocardes from French colors to American ones, which had white centers instead of blue ones. The men did not react very well to this, saying that they intended to fight for the French until a distinct plan had been drawn up and they would not have to serve two masters. They certainly did not want unknown American USAS officers based in France who had no combat experience commanding them, nor did they want them in their chain of command until they had proven themselves. They also wanted to know what the fate of all mechanics, non-flying personnel, and other men attached to the unit would be before disbanding. They were not going to change colors until the fate of their support personnel had been satisfactorily arranged. ²⁸

Finally, Colonel Bolling, who had been assigned as the Commander of the Zone of the Interior, USAS, AEF, developed a process to get American flying men from France and other whereabouts to enter the USAS. “Special Order No. 34” was issued from Paris on September 11, 1917, by Bolling from the Headquarters, Air Service, AEF. “Special Order No. 34” assigned Major Dr. Edmund Gros, Major R. H. Goldthwaite, and Lieutenant R. S. Beam, all either doctors and/or officers, to a special review board in order to have them officially evaluate potential recruits for acceptance in the USAS. They would first travel to the French aviation schools at Avord and Tours, and then to the American aviation school at Issoudun, for the purpose of examining Americans who wished to transfer from the French Army to the USAS. ²⁹

This first step was small, but a very critical one in getting the process going. The USAS had a large number of men volunteering for it and could afford to be selective. In fact, it was decided that only half of the available candidates would be able to enter. The USAS, with no real prior experience or understanding of the rigors of flying in combat, did its best to determine what it thought to be the necessary traits for combat aviators. A quote from a War Department Bulletin stated the following about the special kind of recruit desired,

“One who is to fly three or four miles up in the air must have a perfect heart and lungs; to monitor aerial navigation, reconnaissance, wireless, and machine gunnery, he must have a clear mind; and to pick out and send down important information he must have judgment and a sense of responsibility. Many men have one, perhaps two, of these characteristics, but only a limited number have all three.

The candidate should be naturally athletic and have a reputation for reliability, punctuality and honesty. He should have a cool head in emergencies, good eye for distance, keen ear for familiar sounds, steady hand and sound body with plenty of reserves; he should be quick-witted, highly intelligent and tractable. Immature, high strung, and over confident, impatient candidates are not desired. ³⁰

These criteria were subject to discussion as to whether or not they really quantified a pilot, a lot of these requisites were obviously too subjective or irrelevant, and in some cases, opposite of the very qualities truly needed. But the Special Board members could afford to be very selective with students in flight school who did not know any better, but what would the board do when it faced the tough, seasoned aviators on the Front? They soon had the chance to find out because after the flight students the next round of interviews were with the Americans at the Front interested in transferring. To this end, “Special Order No. 113” came out on October 1, 1917. It created the Special Board of American doctors and officers who would do the evaluations for acceptance of transfer for frontline pilots. The Board once again included Dr. Gros. The Board’s official mission was “for the examination of such American citizens now commissioned or enlisted in the French Aviation Service, as may desire to obtain their release from that service for the purpose of entering the service of the U. S.” ³¹ The board traveled by auto car, stopping at every aerodrome from Dunkerque to Verdun, where any American expressing the desire to transfer would be interviewed. This included the Lafayette Escadrille. ³²

The members of the Lafayette Escadrille were not amused, and in fact quite insulted, that after all the flying they had done they would be subjected to the same battery of tests and evaluations that the students and other candidates had to endure. They knew very well, of course, that they had the mettle necessary; they were proving that every day on the Front. They also knew that they did not meet some of the standards as described in the War Bulletin, and knew that the criteria were arbitrary and ridiculous. Some were already too old according to regulations. Others had physical limitations that they had never revealed, but had got along quite well with; others had been wounded in combat. One pilot was completely blind in one eye. And all of them knew that they were high strung; the stress of combat had made them that way. So, ironically, these combat aviators submitted themselves to the belittling experience of being evaluated to see if they had what it took to become combat aviators. Parsons captured this absurd exercise in humiliation,

“After cumulative physical examinations, which, much to the dismay of some of our boys, included urinalyses and blood tests, we were put through a long series of rather ridiculous physical demonstrations which weren’t particularly helped by frequent visits to the bar to bolster our courage. The awful truth came out! In solemn, owlish conclave, the board decided that not one of us, despite hundreds of hours in the air, all thoroughly trained war pilots with many victories to our credit, could be an aviator. These tests showed that physically, mentally, and morally we were unfit to be pilots. Dud Hill’s blind eye, Bill Thaw’s bad vision and crippled arm, Lufbery’s inability to walk a crack backwards, Dolan’s tonsils, Hank Jones’ flat feet – we were just a broken down crew of troubled misfits!” ³³

One aviator, William Thaw, snarled to the board of examiners, “You haven’t got an instrument in that (medical) bag that can measure the guts of a guy.”³⁴ The unit had just received a citation from General Petain himself.

Luckily, the Board had Dr. Gros on it, and he understood the idiocy of the policy. The Board’s recommendations back to Colonel Bolling in the rear would be favorable, but many of the pilots of the Lafayette Escadrille would need waivers for unsuitable conditions and “disqualifying” features. The board sent in the following recommendation,

“The board was much impressed by the class of men examined. The material is valuable as a nucleus of aviators, around which can be grouped the less experienced pilots currently in training. It is capital with which to build and should be pursued. The Americans are not receiving any outside pecuniary assistance, which they have had hitherto, cannot live on French pay, and most have no independent source of income. It is the position of the board and also for the French officers commanding these Americans that this position should be settled as soon as possible; that they should be immediately commissioned in the American service; that they should be allowed to remain at the front until requested by the AEF; and that this should be done as soon as possible. The army should militarily indicate the new duty assigned them.” ³⁵

On October 9, 1917, the Board reconvened at Aviation Headquarters, Paris, to evaluate all of the applications. All men would be considered and grouped into the following categories:

Capable of commanding a squadron; rank — major
Capable of commanding a flight of six aircraft; rank – captain.
Capable of commanding, but not to be commissioned as flight commanders until later, due to lack of experience; rank – 1^st lieutenant.
Capable of being pilots; rank – 1^st lieutenant.
Capable of being Instructor 1^st Class; rank – captain.
Capable of being Instructor 2^nd Class; rank — 1^st lieutenant. ³⁶

The board sent its recommendations to higher headquarters on October 20, 1917. General Kenley, the Commanding General of the USAS, AEF, followed up with an official endorsement on November 6, 1917, asking that the Board’s recommendations be honored by Washington, D.C. ³⁷ This process and the inherent paperwork associated, though painful and disrespectful, and very long after war had officially been declared by America, was actually quickly routed through bureaucratic channels; at least as far as from the Special Board to Headquarters, Air Service, AEF. Most of the men would not see their commissions until six months later, but they had no way of knowing this. In the meantime the pilots of the Lafayette Escadrille were requested to officially ask for their release from the French Air Service in a formerly worded missive.

A monsieur le Sous-Secretaire d’Etat de l’Aeronautique,

Being an American citizen and having enlisted in the French Army as a (pilot or observer), I respectfully request that I be released from my enlistment in order that I might pass into the aviation portion of the American Army. ³⁸

As if the inconveniences had not been enough, now the Lafayette men had to play bureaucratic games with the French officials. They were hesitant to sign these forms and submit them, but they had no other recourse. This sentiment was expressed in a letter from Alan Nichols, a Lafayette Flying Corps pilot, to his parents, “I asked some pointed questions [in a letter to Dr. Gros] as to whether I would be left in the escadrille, whether I could be put on a chasse aircraft and what model, etc. Dr. Gros’ response destroyed my hopes. He said I was offered 2^nd lieutenant because of a “change in policy.” The only thing they can guarantee is that I won’t have to be an instructor. He can’t even tell me whether I would get a chasse model or any at all.” ³⁹ The men had reason to be wary, as Parsons tell it, “Due to the advice from high officials, all the pilots printed their demands to the French Army for release, expecting to receive immediate commissions in the American Army. The releases were granted, but no commissions arrived.” ⁴⁰

Dr. Gros had in fact recommended that the men sign the releases and take the offer for commissions. At the time that he urged this, he had understood that his Board’s recommendations had been submitted up the chain of command, and he had no reason to believe that they would not be accepted. He was confident that they would be acted upon immediately, or at least very quickly. But due to administrative delays, other pressing war business, the obliviousness with which the USAS had habitually treated the Lafayette, and most importantly, due to a very recent change of leadership at Headquarters, Air Service, AEF, Paris, the men of the Lafayette Escadrille would have to wait. In fact, the men flew as private citizens from December 1, 1917, to February 18, 1918 — three and a half months of fighting without an official country or colors. The state of limbo they were in would cause confusion and despondency. As Carl Dolan put it,

“The Americans did not take us over as one unit. They took us over individually. Some of us were in American uniforms, some of us in French uniforms. After we transferred, the Americans left us with the French, but we were getting orders from the Americans and the French.” ⁴¹

The men would receive such treatment until the end of their days with the Lafayette Escadrille.

Aftermath of the Transfer

In late February 1918, the Lafayette Escadrille was formerly disbanded and re-designated as the 103^rd Aero Pursuit Squadron. But all of the members of the Lafayette Escadrille were not kept together. As Parsons lamented, “the Lafayette Escadrille was split up instead of allowing us to fly together.” ⁴²The men wanted to continue the tradition of the Lafayette Escadrille as a unit. Many hoped that the Escadrille would keep its name and colors. The USAS failed to value the integrity of the Escadrille as a combat unit.

As for the whole Lafayette Flying Corps, 90 pilots were transferred to the Army, 22 men were transferred to the Navy, and 37 remained with the French Air Service. Some became group commanders and pursuit squadron commanders like William Thaw. Edwin Parsons was one of the men who decided to remain with the French Air Service. ⁴³

Until the end, however, the men of the Escadrille and the Flying Corps would be shortchanged and treated unfairly. Most of the men were reduced by one entire rank from what they had been promised upon receiving their commissions. This was done by a spiteful new commanding general of the USAS, AEF, Benjamin Foulois, who was not happy with the previous commanding general’s decisions, so changed them despite the outrage and disservice it caused. The men would eventually regain their ranks, but the damage to morale had been done. Some felt cheated and resented having to serve under “90-day wonders”, newly-arrived officers that had come from the States who outranked them in grade but not experience. Others chafed at the new rules and the enforcement of old ones that had never been obligatory before. For instance, there was a big to do over wearing a regulation USAS uniform with a high collar that chafed the men’s necks and made it difficult for them to turnaround in flight and check their rear quarter. Some like Lufbery were made to sit inexplicably behind a desk with no assigned duties, and others became instructors when what they wanted was to serve at the front.

The Lafayette Men, Failed by the USAS

The USAS’ treatment of the Lafayette Escadrille and the Lafayette Flying Corps men was a failure in leadership. There is no other way to describe the poor treatment the Lafayette men received at the hands of the USAS. Perhaps the USAS did not realize the true value of the men of the Lafayette, despite Billy Mitchell’s and others’ recommendations to the contrary. It is more likely that the USAS, as witnessed by its whole approach to entering the war, was dead set – right or wrong — on doing it its own way.

It is a sad testimony of the USAS’ mindset at the time. The Lafayette men could have been used to several obvious advantages. They could have been returned home immediately to help spur on the war effort, whether it be by promoting war bonds, lecturing and teaching prospective students, or by helping in the design of combat aircraft. This would have not made most of the Lafayette men happy, but at least they would have been recognized for their sacrifice, efforts, and knowledge. The USAS could have also kept the unit intact, re-designating it as the “124^th Aero Pursuit Squadron.” Even if it had not kept the same men in the unit, the lineage of the unit would have been preserved and it would have served enormous propaganda purposes for the French and the Americans. By disbanding it immediately, the USAS sent a signal that it wanted nothing to do with the Lafayette volunteers and that the Americans were going to do things their own way. Had the USAS taken a little personal interest in the Lafayette Escadrille, the unit might have had a completely different history today.

It is amazing to think what the legacy of the unit could have been like today had its original designation been kept. It would certainly be the most storied unit in the USAF today.

Kennett, The First Air War, p. 21.
“Act to increase the efficiency of the military establishment of the United States.” Hearings before the Committee on Military Affairs, House of Representatives, 1913.
“Army Appropriations Bill, 1916.” Hearings before the Committee on Military Affairs, House of Representatives, 1914.
“Preparedness for National Defense.” Hearings before the Committee on Military Affairs, U. S. Senate, 1916.
Whitehouse, Legion of the Lafayette, p. 184.
Flammer, The Vivid Air, p. 116.
The USAS in World War I, Vol. II, p. 105.
Link, Woodrow Wilson Papers, p. 256.
Mason, The Lafayette Escadrille, p. 231.
Ibid., p. 230.
Ibid.
The USAS in World War I, Vol. I, p. 65.
Ibid., p. 58.
Ibid., p. 93.
Mason, The Lafayette Escadrille, p. 230, et Mitchell, William, Memoirs of World War I (NY, Random House, 1960), p. 165.
Ibid., p. 183, et Ibid., p. 170.
Whitehouse, Legion of the Lafayette, p. 193.
Kennett, The First Air War, p. 215.
Mason, The Lafayette Escadrille, P. 231.
Flammer, Primus Inter Pares, p. iv.
Whitehouse, Legion of the Lafayette, p. 183.
Flammer, The Vivid Air, p. 112.
Ibid., p. 163.
Ibid., p. 164.
Ibid., p. 163.
Parsons, I Flew with the Lafayette Escadrille, p. 284.
Flammer, The Vivid Air, p. 168.
Mason, The Lafayette Escadrille, p. 232.
“Special Order No. 34”, date 9 novembre 1917, AFHRA, Maxwell AFB.
Flammer, The Vivid Air, p. 171.
“Special Order No. 113”, date 1 octobre 1917, AFHRA, Maxwell AFB.
Gros, A Brief History, p. 14.
Parsons, I Flew with the Lafayette Escadrille, p. 313.
Ibid., p. 314.
“Report to Brig. Gen. Wm. Kenly from board appointed by Special Order No. 113, Paragaph 5.” AFHRA, Maxwell AFB.
Gros, A Brief History, p. 15.
“Report No. 272.S”, date 6 novembre 1917, AFHRA, Maxwell AFB.
Flammer, The Vivid Air, p. 175.
Nichols, Alan H., Letters Home from the Lafayette Flying Corps (Maryland, U. S. Naval Institute Press, 1986), p. 207.
Parsons, I Flew, p. 330.
Dolan, Charles, Interview: Charles Dolan (USAF Oral History Program, 1968), p. 17.
Parsons, I Flew, p. 331.
Gros, A Brief History, p. 1 et 2.

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Chapter Four. An Average Combat Record

Publié le 2 janvier 2023 par WebmestreAgile

There is no precise way to measure the ultimate impact of the Lafayette Escadrille on the outcome of the Great World. In terms of intangible benefits, the arrival of the American Lafayette pilots was a great contribution, not only in that it justified the Allied cause, but also because it represented the vanguard of what was hoped to be a much larger American intervention. Though small in number, the 38 American pilots had an impact of a much greater magnitude.

However, if one looks solely at the tangible results of the Lafayette Escadrille, that is, its combat record, then its contributions were negligible, and represented an infinitesimally small part of the total war effort. The squadron achieved less than spectacular results; in fact, they could be considered average to below average in comparison with other contemporary combat aviation units. No one questions the sacrifices and the efforts of the men of Lafayette Escadrille; however, the effectiveness of the squadron needs to be put into a contextual reference in order to evaluate its value. This assessment will surely invite opprobrium from those who admire the Escadrille, but it is important to realistically assess its contribution to see if its record is tied to the unit’s failure to leave an indelible impression on the American psyche.

The Lafayette Escadrille Combat Record

At the end of nearly 23 months of flying and fighting the 38 American pilots of the Lafayette Escadrille and their four French officers claimed 40 confirmed kills. ¹ By any measure of comparison, the number of official victories was not a lot. In fact, the Lafayette Escadrille achieved average to below average results when compared to other contemporary French squadrons and successor American pursuit squadrons. This is especially surprising since the unit was always stationed at the Front in support of all of the major offensives that occurred during its existence. These comparisons will be made shortly, but first it is perhaps useful to explore some of the reasons why the unit was not more successful.

* * *

The reputation of the squadron was actually judged as fine by contemporaries in other units. According to one historian, they did not achieve miracles “but they had a reputation as an elite unit” and for being a “reliable escort.” ² So then what are the reasons for the Lafayette Escadrille’s apparent lack of success?

The Lafayette Escadrille did not get off to a rapid start. As a newly formed unit it experienced the usual growing pains that all new units go through. They lacked sufficient aircraft at the start. Designated and stood up on April 16, 1916, it received its first six aircraft – Nieuport-11’s or “Baby Nieuports” – on May 1. Captain Georges Thenault was forced to take the members of the plane-less squadron on long country drives in his car to scout out suitable emergency landing strips and to familiarize the men with the countryside. “Enfin, nous les recunes, le premier mai. Il y en avaient six,” Thenault recounts in his memoirs; they could finally get to business. ³ The squadron only had seven American pilots and two French pilots at the outset, which was rather small for a frontline pursuit unit. In comparison, the British worked with three platoons of six men, for a total of 18 pilots. The French never had less than twelve per unit. So the Lafayette Escadrille started off short of men and short of planes. Such shortages made it difficult to construct a flight schedule, making sure the two-pilot daylight alerts were manned, making sure the squadron could meet its escort duties, and making sure that neither men nor aircraft flew beyond their limits. ⁴

In any case, they must have been eager to fly. The first patrol was conducted on May 13, 1916, but it took a while for the unit to establish a rhythm. Although it shot down three planes in May, on the 18^th, 22^nd, and 24^th, it only shot down one in June, while three men were wounded, one invalided due to his wounds, and one killed in action. It must be remembered that the pilots manning the Escadrille were of different experience levels. Captain Thenault and Lieutenant deLaage, the French officers in charge, had flown in frontline units before. Americans like William Thaw and Norman Prince had flown before the war and had briefly flown with other escadrilles before joining the Lafayette. The other original American members of the Lafayette Escadrille were fresh out of training and new to combat. Some of the men proved hesitant like all novices. But in Victor Chapman’s case, he was too reckless and it cost him his life. He was shot down single handedly attacking a superior number of German aircraft over enemy lines less than one month after the unit was formed. ⁵

Initially the unit was engaged primarily on escort missions for bombing raids at the outset. Though these missions at times presented chances for kills, the escort fighters were attached to the bombers’ mission and were somewhat restricted. Air-to-air conflicts would be more characteristic of later patrols in battle. ⁶

By the time that July and August 1916 rolled around, the unit had received more pilots and aircraft and it appeared to establish more of a rhythm, for it started to produce better results. This was surely aided by two factors; one, the unit was moved to Bar-le-Duc, Verdun Sector, where it was sure to find more than its share of combat, and two, Raoul Lufbery had joined the unit. The former influence would change as the unit moved around the Front; however, the latter influence, Lufbery, would remain a constant positive impetus to the unit’s results throughout the Lafayette Escadrille’s existence. He will be discussed in more detail later.

Once the unit had been established a solid foothold on the combat scene, shaking off its neophyte nervousness and inexperience, it still failed to produce many victories. One item that is brought up in defense of the Lafayette Espadrille by historians is that it might have had a total of one hundred unconfirmed “probable” kills. This may be true, but, it is irrelevant, albeit unfortunate. All units, especially the French Air Service, had to abide by the exact same confirmation policy. Early experience in the war with the new air service had proved that the reporting system for kills was inaccurate and that a rigid system would have to be put into place to claim victories.

Captain Thenault, the squadron commander, commented on the rigid policy that had been adopted:

“Les autorites francaises se sont toujours montrees tres strictes pour la confirmation des victoires. Elles exigeaient que, dans chaque cas, la chute de l’avion ennemi eut ete signalee par l’observateur terrestre. Le nombre reel des avions abattus fut, j’en suis sur, tres superieur a celui qui donnait notre liste officielle. Guynemer [a famous French ace], afin de fournir la preuve de ses success, lorsqu’il livrait un combat trop loin dans les lignes allemands pour etre vu par les postes d’observation francais, avait finalement installe un appareil photographique sur son Spad et, souvent, il rapporta des clichés de ses victims, tombant en flammes ou en morceaux. ⁷

Edwin Parsons, a Lafayette Escadrille pilot, complained that the “rules for downing aircraft was quite limiting – you needed to have three sources as a witness, your own squadron mates were not enough.” ⁸

Sometimes the lack of confirmation proved to be a great source of irritation. During the last three weeks of July 1916, an important part of the early evolutionary stage of the Lafayette Escadrille, and which proved to be an exceptionally dangerous period having taken part over the Verdun Sector, the pilots from the squadron would often return sure of a new kill, only to have it listed as unconfirmed. The majority of these combats were taking place deep behind Germans lines, and it was difficult for the kills to be confirmed by observers tethered in balloons far behind friendly lines.

Sometimes, conversely, bogus confirmations were awarded to squadron members by well-meaning observers from the aerial battles. On one occasion, Kiffin Rockwell and Lieutenant deLaage attacked a pair of German planes. One plummeted to the ground, seemingly out of control, only to redress his aircraft just in time to save it and escape, a not uncommon occurrence. Rockwell explained what subsequently happened,

“The (observation) post sent in a report that a German machine had been brought down in German lines; they wanted to give us credit but we both knew we had not brought down the machine and told him so, explaining the circumstance. Yet two well-known French pilots claimed it the following day and were given credit.” ⁹

In the quest for fame and glory liberties were sometimes taken with supposed victories. In fact, one reason the confirmation policy was supposedly started was because the new aviation service was composed of many enlisted men, and during this era their conduct and ethics were not considered to be that of ‘gentlemen’; thus their word alone would not be sufficient. ¹⁰

Members of the Lafayette Escadrille understood the loopholes in the system. Some discounted the importance of kills and numbers, such as Lufbury who sometimes reputedly did not bother to claim kills or pursue their verification. Others took advantage of the system; one pilot said of Bert Hall that he often “raced back as soon as he saw a huge fire on the ground to place his confirmation.” ¹¹

Additional probable kills are irrelevant. All French units suffered from the same exacting regulations and so it cannot be used in defense of the Lafayette’s combat record. Men were sometimes unjustly robbed by the system, but just as often, men tried to beat the system or at times made mistakes. The British and the American claims were much more lenient, and their air victory claims are excessive compared to the French, but for the Lafayette Escadrille, the researcher must remain within the French system. It must also be noted that pilot claims, even from the most upstanding, honest men, are often subject to the fog of action. Unless an aircraft was actually seen crashing into the ground, no one could be exactly sure what the end result was. Even members of the Lafayette described instances in which they had been trapped in a death spin or spiral, certain that they were going to crash, only to be able to pull their aircraft out meters from the ground.

The numbers of official kills is the most direct, comprehensible, comparable way to measure success, even if it tends to obscure some other contributions and intangible impacts. The numbers are one of the only things that will stand the test of time in popular historical reflection.

Lafayette Escadrille in Comparison with the Overall World War I Aviation Effort

It is important to put the Lafayette Escadrille into a correct historical perspective in comparison with the overall World War I effort and the overall World War I aviation effort. For when a unit is isolated for inspection it is easy to forget that there were thousands of other units and millions of other men. Under this criterion, it is easier to see how the efforts of 38 men, no matter how Herculean or Lilliputian, can quickly become overshadowed over time.

One thing that is often overlooked is that the flying services of the Great War were extremely small in comparison with forces as a whole. This misperception can be attributed to the great imbalance in publicity given to the aviators, their exploits were the subject of great acclaim and advertisement in the media of the day. But they were still considered more of a novelty and a sideshow than as a powerful new combat arm by the general staffs. A lot of this had to do with aviation’s emphasis on one-on-one combat, whereas millions of men were fighting it out in the trenches below. The small gains in bombing at the time were not impressive and more of a terror tool than they were actually effective. Observation, reconnaissance, and artillery spotting missions were deemed quite important, but they were still considered only supporting functions to the king and queen of battle — the artillery and the infantry.

One has but to look at the numbers involved to see how small a part aviation played. For instance, the 500 airmen that Germany mobilized in 1914 were just a fraction of the 4 million called to arms. Through 1917, the Royal Flying Corps (RFC) made up no more than 3% of the total British Expeditionary Force (BEF). Two thousand men ended up in Russian air force versus the 3.5 million-ground force. The French considered the aviation forces as officially 0% of its force at the start of 1914; and it was only increased to 3.5% by the end of the armistice. Similar disparate numbers existed to reflect casualties in the air as compared with those on the ground; on the first day of the Somme, the RFC lost five aviators, compared to the 57,000 British soldiers that were killed or wounded on the battlefield.¹²

The air services did increase in number as the war went on but overall they remained comparatively miniscule. In 1918, Germany had 5,000 pilots; ten times that it had started the war with, while the number of Germans in uniform did not change overall. Another example that demonstrates the increases in aviation concerns the logistical and support of the aviation forces. In 1914 the Germans were using 600,000 kilograms of gasoline a month for aviation. By 1915 the fuel consumption was 3 million kilograms a month; by 1916, 4.5 million; in 1917; 5.5 million kilograms; and by 1918, 7 million kilograms a month for aviation. ¹³

Casualties increased as the services continued flying and fighting. According to aviation figures, France suffered 75% of its casualties (killed, wounded, and missing) in the last two years of the war, and they suffered almost 48% of those casualties in the last remaining few months of the war. ¹⁴

In order to meet the increasing demands of aviation the number of pilots trained had to be augmented as well. In the French Service, 134 were turned out in 1914; 1,484 in 1915; 2,698 in 1916; 5,608 in1917; and 8,000 in 1918. In all the French had about 18,000 pilots, the British 21,957, and the Germans 5,000. These numbers still represented only a tiny fraction of the war’s millions involved. Indeed, airpower was considered by many to have a secondary role, and that it did not contribute much in the way of the war effort. In fact, aircraft were banned from the victory parade on July 14, 1919, although a pilot allegedly showed up and flew his plane through the Arc de Triomphe a few days later. And the British Army’s official history described the aviation bombing campaign of 1918 to have been “without important results.” ¹⁵

So even though the air service was increasing in size by the end of the war, it was still relegated to an inferior position by the commanders running it. Though they understood that aviation had some benefits, they looked at it as a necessary evil that drained manpower and assets. And although the numbers of aviators were increasing, they still represented a very small part of the overall war effort. History, despite the flamboyant press coverage and fascination given to the aviators, could only treat aviation in the same fashion. So it is not surprising that the Lafayette Escadrille, like all other squadrons, represents just a tiny fraction of the war’s overall effort.

* * *

How then did the Lafayette Escadrille compare with the whole World War I aviation effort?

The Germans claim that according to their records only 3,000 of their aircraft were shot down. This reflects a wide disparity with the numbers claimed by the Allies — 11,785 (perhaps there was justification for the French in having such stringent confirmation regulations). However, since it is impossible to break down by country the 3,000-plane German number, it only remains feasible to use the Allied claims. Of the 11,785 claimed Allied kills, the British claimed 7,054 victories; the French claimed 3,950 * (numbers differ); and the Americans claimed 781. In comparison with the number 11,785, the Lafayette Escadrille’s 40 confirmed kills in almost 23 months of flying represents only .00034% of the overall kills. Looked at another way, if one divides the number of French claims (3,950) by the number of French escadrilles de chasse during the war, 92, one obtains 42.9 as a rough average per unit. The Lafayette’s numbers therefore are just below average. Take the number of victories claimed by the Americans, 781, and divide by the number of pursuit squadrons, 16, and one obtains 48.8 as a rough average per unit, again the numbers of the Escadrille fall below average.¹⁶

These statistical comparisons should only be considered as rough averages, and do not reflect an exact science. Airplane victory totals came from a variety of sources and not all kills came solely from escadrilles de chasse.

Compare the Lafayette Escadrille’s victories with the overall FAS’s victories on a month-by-month basis for the 23 months that the Escadrille existed, and one can see in another way how the unit fared against the whole. There are many months where the unit did not get kill at all. Below is a month-by-month comparison of the Escadrille’s kills compared to the overall French aviation combat record. These tallies were taken from the Journal des marche et operations, Escadrille 124, located at the Smithsonian Institution National Air and Space Museum Archives (NASMA), and the “French Air Service War Chronology, 1914-1918”. The different total of 66 rather than 40 official claims made by the Lafayette Escadrille reflect extra claims accepted by Georges Thenault who signed off on the Operations log as opposed to victories that were actually confirmed by authorities. They also represent “probables,” airplanes forced to land behind enemy lines (but still intact), and joint claims, where two or more pilots claimed the same victory. Similarly, there are the same discrepancies accorded to the overall French totals.

Month Overall Total Lafayette Escadrille Total

1916

April 49 0 (No combat missions performed)

May 80 4 (First flight May 13, 1916)

June 51 1

July 130 6 (One kill by Nungesser)

August 172 5

September 172 5

October 218 5

November 139 2

December 182 3

1917

January 83 3

February 64 0

March 102 0

April 129 8

May 47 0

June 175 1

July 156 0

August 211 1

September 279 10

October 172 11

November 47 0

December 115 3

1918

January 145 1

February 131 0

Total 3349 66

There are eleven months where the squadron achieved one or no kills, almost half of its existence; this figure can be lowered to nine months of no kills if the first and last months of the squadron’s existence are counted. There are fifteen months that the unit reported three or fewer kills. Overall the official total number of 40 kills represents 1.7 kills per month. It is interesting to note that if Lufbury’s 17 kills are subtracted, then the squadron is left with just 23 kills, or just one kill per month. These statistics alone can be misleading, for it is not the purpose of the author to break down every unit’s totals per month. However, it is interesting to see how the unit fit into the overall picture contextually. It is of course unfair not to consider Lufbery’s kills as well; however, take away his victories and the unit’s efforts pale even further.

The Lafayette Escadrille in Comparison with other French Escadrilles

In comparison with the other 92 French escadrilles de chasse, the Lafayette Escadrille has already been shown to have a slightly lower than average number of victories – 42.9 to 40. The reader may wonder if the lower numbers were really the Escadrille’s fault considering the unit stood up later than others and perhaps it did not have a chance to evolve as quickly as others on the Front. The reader may also wonder if since the unit was disbanded in early 1918, was it unable to take full advantage of the time later in the war when kills were progressing more rapidly as the Germans became overwhelmed and the end was near for them? Although the author cannot completely verify the first, he can return to the French Air Service War Chronology and verify what others were doing and accomplishing at the same time. Unfortunately, a comparison with later results and circumstances is beyond measure since it would entail too much speculation.

At the time of the formation of the Lafayette Escadrille, aviation was still in its infancy and was yet to experience the gains in speed and lethality that would characterize the aircraft near the end of the war. However, in the month of April 1916, when the Lafayette Escadrille came into exsitence, Sous-Lieutenant Navarre of N-67 already had nine kills; Adjutant Nungesser of N-65 had seven; and Sous-Lieutenant Guynemer had eight kills, and they all were accumulating them at a rate of one or two per month. At this point in 1916, victories were not the occasional occurrence they had been at the start of the war, when airplanes and weapons were crude and ineffective, and when kills happened more by chance than they did by skill and effort. Men were already flying and fighting their machines with a certain degree of lethality. ¹⁷

How did the pilots of the Lafayette Escadrille view their own contributions? After the initial excitement and novelty died down, the reality of the long, brutal conflict set in. The men experienced frustration at their lack of kills and their ability to influence events. The rare kill was certainly feted; a special “Bottle of Death” had been incorporated into the squadron mess on behalf of the Rockwell’s to be shared only after a confirmed victory. The Bottle must have sat rather unmolested until Lufbery’s arrival. The men would bicker over victories and suspect each other of false claims, but this was only a result of the dry spells that the men experienced. Some of the men were in a plain funk over their lack of success. Kiffin Rockwell remarked to his brother in a letter, “The Escadrille isn’t doing any more than any other French squadron.” ¹⁸ This was apparently true.

The Lafayette Escadrille in Comparison with all USAS Aero Pursuit Squadrons

In comparison with the American Aero Pursuit Squadrons (APS) that formed the fighter element of the USAS, the record of the Lafayette Escadrille is again average. The Lafayette Escadrille existed for a total of 674 days and of course totaled 40 victories (as compared to a rough estimate of 47.25 victories per USAS pursuit squadron). To compare the Lafayette Escadrille with the later American pursuit squadrons, even though some of them flew the same type of planes, is not a completely fair proposition since tactics changed or got better, the strategic situation was different, the war effort was escalating, etc. These units were products of different times and different circumstances.

The numbers and tabulations in Figure One were gathered from Over the Front: A Complete Record of the Fighter Aces and Units of the United States and the French Air Services, 1914-1918 by Frank Bailey, a comprehensive and exhaustively researched companion to the French Air Service War Chronology by the same author.

Unit Day activated or Victories/Planes No. of No. of days of flying

1^st Patrol Aces (Until Armistice, Nov.11, 1918)

N-124 16/4/16-18/2/18 40 1 674 days

13^th APS 29 July 18 29 5 106 days

17^th APS 15 July 18 53 6 119 days

22^nd APS 16 Aug.18 46 4 88 days

27^th APS 2 June 18 56 6 163 days

28^th APS 2 Sept.18 15 2 71 days

49^th APS 14 Sept.18 24 0 59 days

93^rd APS 11 Aug.18 31 3 93 days

94^th APS 14 Apr.18 67 6 212 days

95^th APS 18 Feb.18 47 5 268 days

103^rd APS 26 Feb.18 49 7 260 days

139^th APS 30 June 18 37 7 135 days

141^st APS 23 Oct.18 2 0 19 days

147^th APS 15 July 18 31 6 117 days

148^th APS 15 July 18 47 7 147 days

213^th APS 14 Aug.18 16 1 90 days

185^th APS (Last days of war) 0 0 ~ days

Total/ 553 67 aces

Average (¸15) 36.86 4.46 121 days

Note: Lufbery was with the 94^th but had no kills. Thaw was with the 103^rd and claimed two kills. Peterson was with 94^th and became an ace.

The fifteen American pursuit squadrons (the 185^th is not counted since it came into being in the last days of the war) averaged almost 37 victories in an average 121 days of existence; this of course still includes the squadrons that were only around for a few weeks at the end of the war, which brings down the aggregate average. A significantly higher “time-in-service-to-kill ratio” exists for these squadrons in comparison to the Lafayette Escadrille. The pursuit squadrons also averaged 4.2 aces per unit. Of these sixteen pursuit squadrons, five had better kill records than the Lafayette Escadrille, and these five managed to do this in an average of 165 days, or 24% of 674 days.

Again these numbers can be misleading, but the overall effect of the comparison is to show that the Lafayette Escadrille accomplished nothing extraordinary during its time of service.

The Lafayette Escadrille in Comparison with the 103^rd Aero Pursuit Squadron

The most direct comparison that can be made between the Lafayette Escadrille and an American unit is to compare it with the 103^rd Aero Pursuit Squadron (APS), the Lafayette Escadrille’s immediate and direct American successor. The Lafayette Escadrille was officially disbanded on February 18, 1918, and the 103^rd, which assumed its colors and lineage, was stood up officially on the same day. Although the 103^rd’s official squadron flight operations log is not complete – the log does not start until April 1, 1918 – it is continuous from that date to November 11, 1918, Armistice Day, when flight operations ceased. During these 260 days, the unit experienced 55 days of bad weather in which they could not fly; another eight days were consumed by unit transfers to different bases. This means there were 197 actual flight days available, or 75% of the days. If the 69 days were added in which the unit, for whatever reason, completed combat patrols but did to have anything to report (signified by “Rien a Signaler” or RAS), then the total number of days available for fighting the Germans in actual combat drops to 128 days, or 49% of the time. Yet in these 128 days the unit flew 470 missions, engaged in 327 combats, shot down 47 aircraft and two balloons (with another 82 planes and 2 balloons listed as “probables”), flew over 3,075 combat hours, and dropped 1,620 pounds of bombs in the last three months of the war. This averages out to one enemy aircraft shot down every 4.2 days of flying, or one enemy aircraft shot down every 2.7 days of available combat time. Twenty-eight different pilots racked up kills individually or in tandem with another squadron mate. The unit also had a total of seven aces, four of which gained all of their victories in the 103^rd. Three of the aces had kills carry over from other units, to include William Thaw who had two with the Lafayette Escadrille. Four pilots in total had transferred from the Lafayette Escadrille – Thaw, James Norman Hall, Christopher W. Ford, and Charles H. Dolan – but excluding Thaw who was the squadron commander and had three kills while with the 103^rd, the others were not squadron leaders, and at least ten others of the 28-man roster had more kills than they. This is especially surprising since the majority of the men in the 103^rd were new, inexperienced pilots that had been trained in America. ¹⁹

This compares with the Lafayette Escadrille that had 40 kills in 674 days. Or, subtracting the approximate 189 days of bad weather (152), unit transfers (30), and unit special days off (7) that the Lafayette Escadrille had, the number becomes 40 kills in 485 days of possible flying, roughly one kill every twelve days. If the RAS days are added, which totaled 102 complete days, the unit had 353 days where it encountered the enemy. Forty kills in 353 days averages out to one kill every nine days. The Lafayette Escadrille also logged over 3,000 combat hours but the unit failed to match the achievements of the 103^rd. And it only had one ace, Lufbery, who did the majority of the killing; and only sixteen out of 42 pilots achieved kills. ²⁰

In this example, the numbers from the direct comparison speak for themselves.

The Lafayette Escadrille in Context with the Total War Effort

When the war ended on November 11, 1918, there were 45 American squadrons of all types, 740 airplanes owned by the USAS, 767 USAS pilots, 481 observers, 23 aerial gunners, and the thousands of men to support them all in Europe. The Americans claimed 781 enemy airplanes and 73 enemy balloons, while America’s losses totaled 289 airplanes and 48 balloons. Americans had flown 150 bombing raids, dropped over 27,500 pounds of explosives, and had flown over 350,000 hours. ²¹

Lufbery: The Lafayette Escadrille’s Only Ace

The Lafayette Escadrille contribution to the number of aces in the war was lacking, in fact only Lufbery would become an ace during the Lafayette Escadrille’s existence. Below is the number of confirmed kills by the pilots of N124: ²²

Name Victories

Lufbery, G. Raoul 17

DeLaage deMeux 3

Prince, Norman 3

Hall, Bert 3

Rockwell, Kiffin 2

Thaw, William 2

Hall, James 1

Haviland, Willis 1

Johnson, Charles 1

Jones, Henry 1

Lovell, Walter 1

Masson, Didier 1

Marr, Kenneth 1

Nungesser, Charles 1

Parsons, Edwin 1

Peterson, David 1

Cowdin, Elliot 1

Total 40

Of the 42 pilots, only sixteen had kills at all (Nungesser is not included; he was attached to the unit for only one flight, in which he achieved a victory). The one bright spot of the Lafayette Escadrille was the man named Raoul Lufbery. His 17 official victories, and possibly as many as 40 more, made up the majority of the kills for the Lafayette Escadrille; he is truly its most famous member.

But why did the Lafayette Escadrille not produce more aces? There were a total of 118 American aces and 186 French aces during the war. If one takes the number of American aces and divides by the total number of American squadrons, 45, it averages out to 2.6 aces for every unit. Or if one takes the number of American pilots at the end of the war in Europe, 767, and divides by the number of aces, 118, it averages out to one ace for every 6.5 pilots. If one takes the 186 aces that the French produced and divides by the number of escadrilles de chasse (92), then one arrives at least two aces per unit. Although these computations are meaningless, it does still raise the question, “Where were the other aces in the Lafayette Escadrille?”

Some of the Lafayette pilots would become aces later on during the war, but why were there not more produced during the 674 days that the squadron existed? This author has gone back to the original Journales des marches et operations, Escadrille 124 that were kept by the squadron and verified by Captain Thenault in order to find a possible reason or reasons. The author decided to go through the record and tally up the number of flights each pilot flew in the Escadrille. Because the records are not complete, they abruptly start on August 24, 1916, (but do end on February 25, 1918) the author chose to take a one-year “snapshot” of the unit’s flying record in order to better manage and compare the information. By choosing to examine the dates of August 24, 1916, to August 24, 1917, the author managed to capture the flight habits and patterns of the majority of the Escadrille pilots during the heart of the unit’s operations. The start date, which coincides with the start date of the flying records, also allowed him to capture the bulk of the original members and track their performance over a year’s time.

First one must examine the how flying opportunities in the unit presented themselves. As mentioned before, a record of the available days for scrutiny shows that the squadron had a total of 674 days from the calendar period April 16, 1916, to February 25, 1918. Out of that number, 152 days were canceled due to bad weather and the unit did not fly at all. Another 37 days were taken up by squadron mass transfers as the unit moved from one airfield to another, a procedure that could encompass anywhere from one to seven days. This seven days also included four or five days where the unit was granted special permissions as a whole, namely for the 4^th of July, American Independence Day. In total there were approximately 189 no-fly days due to weather, transfer, or permission, a sum that represents 24% of the 674 days that the squadron had available for combat. Obviously these were days that the unit did not fly and fight in combat. The author proceeded to count the days that the squadron flew full patrols but managed to encounter nothing during the whole day, signified by RAS. Whether these RAS days were due to bad but flyable weather, no enemy activity, or simply no luck in finding anything to report, the result was the same, it was another day of not fighting. These RAS days total 102 complete days. Add the two together and one ends up with 291 days or 43% of the time that a squadron pilot would not have been able to achieve a kill or fight in combat. That left 383 days to go out and fly to kill. If the squadron was up to full numbers of aircraft and a full complement of pilots, say twelve and twelve, and if the average squadron pilot planned to fly at least three times a week, then the average squadron pilot had roughly 127 opportunities to fly during the available days. Take away individual leave, rest and relaxation, alerts, sickness, administrative duties such as ferrying planes to and from Paris or where ever, and any of the other things that could affect a pilot’s status, and one can see that a Lafayette pilot really did not have that many opportunities to fly. Ergo, if he wanted to capitalize on the chance to become an ace, then he better fly as much as he could.

Men like Lufbery did. Some others in the Escadrille fell far short. For the men who flew passionately, almost obsessively, like Lufbery, the kills were sure to come as long as luck and some skill played on that man’s part. But there are a variety of reasons for the other men who did not fly quite as much; some of them were legitimate, some of them were not. The air war was very stressful; no one questions that the flying, especially during this era, was still a novelty. Man was still not quite sure how flying affected him physically, psychologically, etc. Many of the men had sought the glory and the fame that the skies promised, but the harsh reality was that flying was hard and strenuous work, especially when someone was trying to kill you. The average life expectancy for new pilots was something around two to three weeks. ²³ And some men realized that it wasn’t a matter of if they would be shot down, but really just when. The men of the Lafayette Escadrille had also buried a lot of their squadron mates; a few funerals dampened even the hardiest of the men’s spirits. Losses to the Escadrille of great, young men like Kiffin Rockwell and Norman Prince were unsettling and painfully real. Nonetheless, there were a few men of the Lafayette Escadrille who did not fly much at all. Some of the men’s names are surprising; some of them were expected. But altogether these men who did not fly often detracted from the Escadrille’s success and made a few bear the brunt of the workload for all. There was only so much Lufbery and a few others could do.

The author now turns to the examination of the men’s flight records. During the snapshot in time from August 24, 1916, to August 24, 1917, there were 205 of 365 available flying days due to weather, transfers, etc. The wide disparity in flight time recorded by the author between the pilots of the Escadrille during this period is startling and in some cases, vastly different. For example, of the pilots who were present the full 205 days – that is, the majority of the some of the original squadron members like Lufbery, Thaw, Johnson, Hill, and Thenault; Lufbery lead the group with 155 flights in 205 days, or a record of flying 76% of the available flying time. Thaw had 109 flights or 53%. Johnson, one of the less courageous members of the Escadrille had only 50 flights in 205 days, or just 24%. Hill had 62 flights in 205 days, for a low 30%; and Captain Thenault, the squadron commander, only 32 flights in 205 days, a very low 16%. Some of the men flew several flights in one day, so the exact number of flights do not equal days flown, but nevertheless this method gives a rough idea of how men maximized the time available to fly. Some might have had excuses; a man like Thenault might have been tied to his administrative duties in running the squadron, and he was also sick for a month during the year and therefore could not fly as often. But these numbers demonstrate one thing for sure: If a pilot is not flying, he is not fighting, and therefore, he is not downing enemy aircraft. Lufbery had more than half of his kills during this period. Thaw one of his two while with the Escadrille, Johnson one, Hill one and Thenault, zero.

A breakdown of all of the pilots of the Escadrille using this method is presented below; the pilots who were killed in action, transferred from the unit, or who joined the unit too late in 1917 to be effectively counted, are excluded.

Dates: August 24, 1916, to August 24, 1917 (205 flying days during this year period)

Name Number of flights/days available to fly Percentage Kills

Lufbery 155/205 76% 10

Thaw, W. 109/205 53% 1

Johnson, C. 50/205 24% 1

Hill, D. 62/205 30% 0

Thenault, G. 32/205 16% 0

Soubiran, R. 63/173 36% 0

Haviland, W. 61/173 35% 1

Parsons, E . 92/151 61% 1

Bigelow, S. 62/146 42% 0

Willis, H. 103/135 76% 0

Lovell, W. 58/133 44% 1

Dugan, J. 50/114 44% 0

Marr, K. 62/113 55% 1

Campbell, A. 65/104 63% 0

Rockwell, R. 80/174 46% 0

Hewitt, T. 60/113 55% 0

Jones, C. 49/81 60% 1

Bridgman, R. 54/91 54% 0

* * *

Lufbery’s success would seem to assure the unit’s glory? But he was killed in action on May 19, 1918, while he was flying for the 94^th APS. In addition, he was a very private man and did not seek the limelight. He was a man dedicated to flying and killing to revenge the only true friend and family he had ever known, Marc Poupre, a famous French aviator. Lufbery did not glamorize his kills nor did he seek publicity. When he did give interviews, he recounted his exploits without embellishment and without fanfare. Many in the Lafayette Escadrille did not understand him and could not figure him out. It was rare when he opened up and it was probably not bizarre that his best friend in the unit was the lion mascot, Whiskey, who had a special relationship with Lufbery and favored him above all other pilots.

Lufbery did not take naturally to flying, despite evidence to the contrary. He had flown as an observer for a while before becoming a pilot. He was deemed average in flight training. It was only his tenacity and drive that earned him a slot in the escadrilles de chasse. When he arrived he kept quiet and avoided squadron politics and fanfare, preferring to keep about his own business. He meticulously inspected his aircraft, going so far as to individually load every single round in the belt of the machine gun, so that it would not jam in flight – a notorious problem with the “Lewis” guns. He also knew his plane inside out and would work with the mechanics on the planes learning more. This approach paid off, as he soon started to kill enemy aircraft faster and more often than any other pilot in the Escadrille. He demonstrated the ability to stalk his prey patiently and ruthlessly, taking advantage of his experience and technique. During World War I, four percent of the pilots would account for 50% of the kills for the French. ²⁴ Lufbery accounted for 42.5% of the kills of the Lafayette Escadrille.

Had Lufbery lived, the Lafayette Escadrille might have had the perfect emissary to shoulder the unit history. The truth will never be known.

Lufbery’s record in death, however, was not enough to carry his legend far since there would be many who would eclipse his record, racking up more kills then he could have even imagined. But even though his record practically doubled the number of kills that the squadron had, so too would others’ records dwarf his own. For instance, Billy Bishop shot down 25 airplanes in one twelve-day stretch! Renee Fonck, France’s all-time leading ace, had 75 victories. Seventeen French aces and two American aces killed more aircraft than Lufbery. ²⁵

The Lafayette Flying Corps

The 209 men of the Lafayette Flying Corps, including the men of the Lafayette Escadrille, some of whom went on to fight for the French afterwards, ended up achieving a total of 199 victories for the duration of the war. These kills were of course added to the French totals since the men flew with French Escadrilles. Of this 209, only 180 men actually made it to the Front. Thirteen would become aces. Comparisons with these 180 are problematic since they were spread out over many French escadrilles. Suffice it to say that these American men’s efforts were measured in far greater terms of intangibility than in actual palpable results. ²⁶

A Forgotten Combat Record

The Lafayette Escadrille earned wide publicity when the squadron was organized, and it garnered worldwide attention as long as it existed as the sole American flying unit in the war. But as has been shown, the efforts of these 38 American men were but a very small part of a horrible and long war. And the results of the Lafayette Escadrille, although appreciated, did not make them anymore special than any other of the units on the front lines or the ones flying over them. Other units would achieve more kills, more fame, and more glory.

The author understands that the Escadrille’s results were not the only impact the unit had on the war, but he believes that it is one reason why the unit, though once very popular, has faded over time. Had the unit truly been elite, and had it contained a cast of characters that were as colorful as Eddie Rickenbacker or Billy Mitchell, then perhaps it would have stood the test of time in a better fashion.

* * *

An example of this type of unit exists in the 20^th century, and it is a unit that Americans associate with and know very well. The unit is the American Volunteer Group (AVG), or the “Flying Tigers” of China/Burma fame, and the one, incidentally, that was the most universally recognized in the survey.

Comparisons between the two units is problematic since the comparisons concern different times, circumstances, conditions, foes, equipment, and support, of which the AVG had the tacit approval of the American government.

Nonetheless, the results were spectacular and would bring the unit everlasting fame. In seven months it destroyed a confirmed 297 Japanese planes, and probably destroyed another 153. Although 22 pilots lost their lives, they executed a much higher kill-ratio in a shorter period of time than did the Lafayette Escadrille. Their leaders included the colorful “Pappy” Boyington, a Marine fighter pilot who would go on to command a famous squadron, “the Black Sheep” in World War II, and the AVG Commander General Claire Chennault. Their skill, daring, and notoriety assured the unit of everlasting fame. The unit’s name was also preserved through history; becoming part of the 4^th Air Force in World War II, and through a private transport company that used its name. Also, the squadron insignia, the Tiger’s Teeth painted on the unit’s plane cowlings, instilled an immediate recognition factor, one that the Screaming Sioux warrior of the Lafayette Escadrille has failed to engender in the United States. ²⁷

* * *

It is unfortunate, but the Lafayette Escadrille’s average record has done nothing to enhance any everlasting fame.

Flammer, Philip M., Primus Inter Pares (Mémoire, Yale, 1963), p. iv.
Ibid.
Thenault, Georges, L’Escadrille Lafayette (Paris, Librarie Hachette), p. 32.
Whitehouse, Arch, Legion of the Lafayette (NY, Doubleday, 1962), p. 88.
Parsons, Edwin C., I Flew with the Lafayette Escadrille (NY, Doubleday and Doran, 1937), p. 112.
Gordon, Pilot Biographies, p. 27.
Thenault, L’Escadrille Lafayette, p. 93.
Parsons, I flew with the Lafayette Escadrille, p. 145.
Mason, Herbert M., The Lafayette Escadrille (NY, Random House, 1964), p. 88.
Ibid.
Genet, Edmond C., An American for Lafayette (The University of Virginia Press, 1981), p. 170.
Kennett, Lee, The First Air War (NY, The Free Press, 1981), p. 83.
Ibid., p. 84.
Ibid.
Ibid., p. 85 et 217.
Kennett, The First Air War, p. 164.
Bailey, The French Air Service War Chronology. Les chiffres cité viennent de ce livre.
Ibid.
Mason, The Lafayette Escadrille, p. 88.
103^rd Aero Pursuit Squadron Logbook, AFHRA, Maxwell AFB, Alabama.
Journal: Escadrille N° 124.
The U.S. Air Service in World War I, Vol. I (Washington, D. C.: Office of Air Force History, 1978), p. 17.
Mason, The Lafayette Escadrille, p. 295.
Parsons, I Flew with the Lafayette Escadrille, p. 216.
Ibid., p. 220.
Kennett, The First Air War, p. 169.
Ibid.
Gordon, Dennis, The Lafayette Flying Corps (Penn., Schiffer Military Historical Press, 2000).
Ford, Daniel, Flying Tigers (Washington, D. C., Smithsonian Institute Press, 1991).

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Chapter Three. A Short History of the Lafayette Escadrille

Publié le 2 janvier 2023 par WebmestreAgile

A short history of the Lafayette Escadrille and the Lafayette Flying Corps will be provided here to refresh the reader of its origins, its accomplishments, and its contributions to the war effort. This history will not be extensive, and will only provide a brief synopsis of the unit. The purpose is not to recreate the history of the Lafayette Escadrille — that can be found elsewhere.

The Origins of the Lafayette Escadrille

As the armies of Europe clashed in August of 1914, America decided to remain neutral. This did not sit well with some of its citizens who believed that America should choose to side with one or the other belligerents. American citizens for a variety of reasons rushed to join both sides of the fighting. Some of the American men, whether finding themselves in Europe at the start of the war or after reaching Europe in a variety of other ways, sought a way to aid in the fight. Some felt the call due to a strong sense of right and liberty; some were adventurous and sought their fame and fortune; and still others were just idle, young men — but whatever the case, they came in order to fight or to volunteer their services.

The question of neutrality was an issue for these Americans, and preserving their citizenship was another one. President Woodrow Wilson of the United States had declared,

“No person within the territory and jurisdiction of the US shall take part, directly or indirectly, in the war, but shall maintain strict and impartial neutrality.” ¹

Articles 6, Chapter 1, Convention V of the 1907 Hague Convention, had expressly addressed the issue of foreign nationals fighting for other countries; persons were permitted to offer their services to one of the belligerents without penalty. However, Article 4 of the same Convention, disallowed countries from recruiting corps of candidates from neutral countries. Furthermore, an American law passed in 1907 declared that any American that enlisted in or took an oath to a foreign service “shall be deemed to have expatriated himself.” ²

The French, in order to skirt the citizenship issue, agreed that joining the French Foreign Legion one did not forfeit one’s citizenship since the oath of allegiance was not made to another country, just to the fighting unit itself. A few hardy Americans found their entrance into the French forces in this fashion. ³

Early in the conflict, a few Americans fighting in the Foreign Legion came up with an idea to start a unit of volunteer American aviators. The origins of this idea are generally credited to Legionnaire William Thaw, who had been a pilot before the war. At the same time, a young man named Norman Prince was also independently toying with the idea. Prince had lived on and off in France for most of his young life and his father held land in Pau in the south of France. His idea was to form an American squadron in the French Aeronautic Service, using as a nucleus several other fellows that were akin to the idea, including the volunteer legionnaires that he had encountered upon his arrival to France, men such as William Thaw, Elliot Cowdin, Frazier Curtis, Bert Hall and Didier Masson. ⁴

Prince had to come to France in early 1915 and due to his father’s influence and wealth, set about trying to act upon his idea for an aviation unit. His efforts were at first rebuffed since the neutrality of the Americans was an issue and since the nascent aviation service of France had more than enough pilots of its own. Eventually Prince met a Mr. Jarousse de Sillac who became enamored with the young man’s idea. Mr. de Sillac, who was the Under-Secretary of the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs, was in a position to make this idea known, and in February of 1915 persuaded the Ministry of War to allow Americans to enlist in French Aviation. At the end of March 1915, pilots Thaw, Hall, Cowdin, Curtis, Prince, and James Bach were assigned to French aviation schools while details of the unit to be were worked out. ⁵

Concurrently, and independent of Prince’s and the others’ efforts, another Paris-based American named Dr. Edmund Gros, one of the men in charge of the American Ambulance Corps, had had a similar idea of organizing an American flying unit. He had thought that many of the volunteers he had met in the ambulance corps would be excellent candidates for pilots, and so he set about using his contacts and prestige in Paris to formulate a flying unit. ⁶

Dr. Gros had met Curtis and some of the other fledgling aviators, and through them, Mr. de Sillac. Mr. de Sillac and Gros began fomenting the enthusiasm and support necessary to realize their idea. Finally on July 8, 1915, General Hirschauer, Chief of French Military Aeronautics, met with Dr. Gros and Mr. De Sillac. Although at first completely opposed to the idea of a group of American flyers at the front due to diplomatic reasons, he saw the benefits of having such a unit. He agreed to the formation of an American squadron, to be known as the “Escadrille Americaine.” ⁷

It was not until April 1916, that the unit was actually stood up and designated as “Nieuport 124” or “N-124,” an “escadrille de chasse” or pursuit squadron. On March 21, 1916, official orders were received from the Department of Aeronautics, stating that the Commander in Chief had finally approved the formation of N-124, but it would take a while to assemble the American pilots. The pilots who would form the nucleus of the new unit were scattered throughout schools in France at Buc, Pau, and Avord, and some of them like Thaw had already been flying with French units at the front. The candidates were assembled at Plessis Belleville. Captain Georges Thenault would command the squadron; his second in command was Lieutenant deLaage de Meux. These seven men are the original pilots of the Lafayette Escadrille: William Thaw, Elliot Cowdin, Kiffin Rockwell, Norman Prince, Bert Hall, Victor Chapman and James Rogers McConnell. Eugene Curtis, slated to join the unit, was injured in a training accident and unable to fly anymore; and James Bach crashed and became a prisoner of war. ⁸

To support the unit which had begun to attract a great deal of attention, Dr. Gros and Mr. de Sillac founded the “Franco-American Committee” (later to become the “Franco-American Flying Corps”), a committee designed to handle the finances and business of the Americans since they would need support in addition to what the French gave them for uniforms, expenses, and sundries. It was composed of Dr. Gros, Mr. de Sillac, and various wealthy benefactors and American businessmen of high standing like William K. Vanderbilt and J. Pierpont Morgan; these men would fund, outfit, and provide for the well being of the Escadrille Americaine pilots. ⁹

The Franco-American Flying Corps also facilitated the way for potential American flying candidates. A special form of enlistment was adopted by the French which allowed the candidate to enlist but which also unequivocally gave him the right to return to the United States without penalty or cost should he turn out to be inept as a flyer. As to the question of citizenship, the candidate was also allowed to forego swearing allegiance to the French, although he had to promise to obey orders and to submit to discipline — ensuring his American nationality. ¹⁰

The Germans protested the move based on America’s neutrality and demanded that the reference to America in the Escadrille Americaine be dropped. The French shortly thereafter changed the name to the “Escadrille de volontaires.” But since the American men hated that title, they were allowed to change its name to the diplomatic, yet still very symbolic, “Lafayette Escadrille.” It was officially accepted. ¹¹

The Squadron in Combat

The Lafayette Escadrille would ultimately be transferred eleven times and serve in nine different locations in its approximate twenty-three months of service at the front in order to be near the majority of the fighting. Consequently, it would fly over every sector of the Western Front. See Maps One and Two. ¹²

The unit was originally stationed at Luxeuil-les-Bains, an ancient spa town at the foot of the Vosges Mountains near the Swiss border from April 20 to May 19, 1916. The squadron shared the airfield with British aviators of the Royal Naval Air Service and the units were assigned to protect Captain Felix Happe’s Farnam and Bequet bombers on raids. The squadron flew its first official patrol on May 13 and scored its first victory by Kiffin Yates Rockwell on May 18 when he shot down a reconnaissance plane. ¹³

The unit moved to Bar-le-Duc, Verdun Sector from May 19 to September 14, 1916, in order to take part in the Verdun Battle where it became part of Groupe de Combat 12. Raoul Lufbury, Clyde Balsley, Chouteau Johnson, Lawrence Rumsey, Dudley Hill, Didier Masson, and Paul Pavelka joined the squadron at Bar-le-Duc, increasing the total to 16 pilots. On May 22 Bert Hall achieved the squadron’s second victory, and on May 24, William Thaw scored the third. On June 17 Victor Chapman scored his first kill, but was killed above Haumont on June 23, the squadron’s first loss. Two days later Elliot Cowdin transferred out of the unit due to “health reasons.” On July 23 Bert Hall scored a second kill; deLaage downed another on July 27. On July 30 and 31, Raoul Lufbery shot down the first two of what would become a long string of kills. Lufbery would achieve two more kills, Norman Prince one, and Bert Hall his third, during the month of August. Norman Prince and Kiffin Rockwell combined to shoot down planes on September 9. During Verdun, the unit had fought in 146 combats, with 13 confirmed victories, and had one pilot killed and three wounded. The squadron also turned over its old Nieuport-11’s to another escadrille and adopted the new Nieuport-17’s. ¹⁴

From September 14 to October 18, 1916, the N-124 was transferred back to Luxeuil, Vosges Sector. Robert Rockwell, Kiffin Rockwell’s distant cousin, arrived to the unit on a squadron stopover in Paris, and the unit returned to Luxeuil on September 19, 1916. The unit was assigned once again to protect British and French bombers. On September 23, Kiffin Rockwell, one of the most popular members of the Escadrille, was killed in combat near Rodern; and on October 12, Norman Prince, another well-known member of the Escadrille, was mortally injured in a crash landing upon his return from a combat mission after having downed an enemy aircraft earlier in the mission. Lufbery became an ace with his fifth kill on that very same mission with Prince. From Luxeuil the unit was ordered to Cachy. ¹⁵

The unit received replacements William Haviland, Frederick Prince (Norman Prince’s brother) and Robert Soubiran en route to Cachy, the Somme Sector, where it was stationed from October 18, 1916, to January 26, 1917. It was assigned to Groupe de Combat 13 and would remain part of this organization for the remainder of its existence during the war. From mid-November to mid-January, only twelve days would be fit for flying due to weather. Bert Hall was asked to leave the unit by his fellow squadron mates on November 1 due to personality conflicts and other issues. On November 16, as aforementioned, the squadron was forced to change its name to the Escadrille de Volontaires due to diplomatic pressure. On 6 December it was renamed the Escadrille Lafayette upon the suggestion of its members and it was officially recognized as such after this. Lawrence Rumsey was forced to leave the unit after it transferred to Cachy, and Paul Pavelka left the unit of his own accord to be transferred to a flying unit on the Eastern Front in the Balkans. Replacements Russell Hoskier, Edward Genet, and Edward Parsons joined the unit during this period as well. Lufbery achieved the only kills during this period, shooting down aircraft on December 27 and January 24. ¹⁶

The squadron was transferred to the Oises and Aisne Sector to Saint-Juste (Ravenel) from January 26 to April 7, 1917. Edward Hinkle, Stephen Bigelow, Walter Lovell, Harold Willis, Kenneth Marr, William Dugan, and Thomas Hewitt all joined the squadron while at Ravenel, while Didier Masson and Frederick Prince left to become flight instructors. On March 19, 1917, James Rogers McConnell was killed in combat. The enemy during this period was in a general rearward movement to the Hindenburg Line and the Neville Offensive would take place with disastrous results. But soon Ravenel proved too far from the front and the unit was transferred again to Ham. ¹⁷

The unit’s transfer to Ham in the Somme Sector lasted from April 7 to June 3, 1917. On April 16, on the squadron’s one-year anniversary, Edmond Genet was killed by anti-aircraft fire. On April 23, Ronald Hoskier was killed. On May 23, the squadron’s second-in-command, Alfred de Laage, was killed while performing a stunt over the Ham airfield on takeoff in his new Spad VII fighter. Andrew Courtney Campbell, Ray Bridgman, Carl Dolan, John Drexel, and Henry Jones joined the Lafayette Escadrille while at Ham. The unit fought 66 air battles during this two-month period, officially killing seven enemy aircraft. Lufbery killed three aircraft during this period while William Thaw, Chouteau Johnson, and Willis Haviland contributed the others. ¹⁸

After Ham, the Lafayette Escadrille was sent to Chaudun, the Aisne Sector from June 3 to July 17, 1917. During this period only Lufbery scored a kill. James Norman Hall, Douglas MacMonagle, David Peterson, and James Ralph Doolittle joined the unit while at Chaudun. Didier Masson returned to the unit from flight school instructor duty as well. ¹⁹

The unit was ordered to Dunkerque (St. Pol sur Mer) in the Flanders Sector from July 17 to August 11, 1917. The Flanders Offensive was launched on July 31,1917, but the squadron’s participation was kept to a minimum due to bad weather in the sector and no kills were achieved. James Doolittle was wounded severely and invalided from the unit during this period. ²⁰

The unit returned to the Verdun Sector to support the Verdun Offensive from August 11 to September 28, 1917. The squadron would fight 150 combats over Verdun, and Douglas MacMonagle and Victor Campbell would be killed in combat. Harold Willis was shot down by the enemy and made a prisoner of war, and Stephen Bigelow was wounded severely and left the unit. The unit would rack up seven more kills during this period. ²¹

From September 29 to December 3, 1917, the unit returned to the Aisne Sector to take part in the Malmaison Offensive. Raoul Lufbury downed six enemy aircraft during this period, getting four aircraft in one day. Kenneth Marr, Walter Lovell, and Chouteau Johnson left the unit during this period, and Christopher Ford showed up as a new pilot on November 8, as the unit’s last replacement. ²²

The squadron was transferred one more time to Chalons and La Ferme la Noblette in the Champagne Sector from December 3, 1917, to February 18, 1918, its official last day of existence. Only James Norman Hall would get one kill during this period, downing an aircraft on January 1, 1918. Upon their arrival to Chalons, the American pilots were released from the French Service Aeronautique in order to receive US commissions. All pilots were released except for Edward Parsons who was home on leave in the United States. From December 1, 1917, until their paperwork would go through, the American pilots would fly as civilians. On January 16, Captain Georges Thenault left the unit and William Thaw took over command. By February 18, 1918, all of the commissions had come through. On that date, the Lafayette Escadrille passed over to U. S. jurisdiction and became the U. S. 103^rd Aero Pursuit Squadron. ²³

The Lafayette Escadrille’s Accomplishments

The accomplishments of the Lafayette Escadrille during one year, ten months, and 28 days of action were not prodigious, but would contribute to the war effort. During this time the 42 pilots of the Escadrille flew over 3,000 combat sorties, and achieved 40 official kills. Nine men were killed in action; one was killed in an accident, while five were wounded, causing two of them to be invalided. Three became prisoners of war. American pilots made thirty-five of these 40 kills, and the French officers made the remaining five. The famous Charles Nungesser, as a visiting pilot who flew only one flight with the Lafayette Escadrille, made one of these kills. Raoul Lufbery made seventeen of the 40 kills. ²⁴

The total number of aircraft shot down by the Lafayette Escadrille probably exceeds 40, and the estimates of “probables” run as high as 100 aircraft total. But the French Air Service was very strict with its confirmation policy; therefore, a lot of possible additional kills by the unit could not be claimed. According to the rules, in order for an airplane, a dirigible, or an observation balloon to be counted as a kill, it had to fall within French lines and its destruction had to be witnessed either from the air or from the ground by someone other than the pilot himself or his squadron mates.

The Lafayette Escadrille saw action in every sector and it took part in most of the major offensives from 1916 to early 1918.

The greatest contribution that the Lafayette Escadrille offered was by its mere participation, an immeasurable quality. The squadron’s presence, representing the Americans, gave those who fought a glimmer of hope that their cause was just, and the hope that one day America would join the fighting.

The Lafayette Escadrille versus the Lafayette Flying Corps

There has been a great deal of confusion over the years attributed to the two names the Lafayette Escadrille and the Lafayette Flying Corps. The Lafayette Escadrille is the unit itself, originally established on April 16, 1916, and disestablished on February 18, 1918. Its members are made up solely of the 38 Americans and the 4 French who flew with the Escadrille during this period. The Escadrille was disbanded and reestablished as the U. S. 103^rd Aero Pursuit Squadron.

The Lafayette Flying Corps (also known as the Franco-American Flying Corps) was never a unit per se, instead it is a name used to describe all of the American pilots, to include the Lafayette Escadrille pilots, who flew for the French during World War I. The exact number of actual pilots who flew for the French is open to question and many different numbers exist depending on who is counting. The numbers range from as low as 180 to over 300. The generally accepted, most oft-quoted number of men who were recognized as having successfully completed French flight training or received their “brevets,” is 209. Of this 209, 180 would actually serve at the Front in combat. With this number in mind then, 180 American pilots flew in 66 French pursuit escadrilles and 27 bomber/observer escadrilles.

The reasons that the Americans flew with the French instead of the USAS after America’s entrance into the war are as varied as the pilots themselves. Some, like Lafayette Escadrille pilot Edward Parsons, preferred to remain with the French instead of pursuing an American commission. There are some who were rejected by the USAS in the United States for various reasons and found it easier to join the French ranks. There are also those who had fought with the French in the Foreign Legion or on the ground, and who found it easier to just remain in the French system as opposed to returning all the way to America.

As a whole, the Lafayette Flying Corps achieved 199 confirmed victories. Thirteen men would become aces. Fifty-nine would die in combat and six from training accidents. Nineteen would be wounded and fifteen became prisoners of war. ²⁵

* * *

For the purpose of this dissertation, when the author mentions the Lafayette Escadrille, he is specifically referring to the original unit and the 42 men who flew for it during the period April 16, 1916, to February 18, 1918. This is important because a large majority of the discussion will focus on the Lafayette Escadrille. When the author speaks of the Lafayette Flying Corps, he is specifically referring to all of the Americans who flew for the French during the war. If the author refers to the two names in the same sentence, than his purpose is to address both Lafayette Escadrille and the Lafayette Flying Corps for a specific reason or intent.

The Appendices One and Two, listing the rosters of the Lafayette Escadrille and the Lafayette Flying Corps are provided for those who are interested.

Link, Arthur S., The Papers of Woodrow Wilson, 1856-1924, Volumes 40 (Princeton University Press, 1982), p. vi.
Flammer, Philip M., The Vivid Air (University of Georgia Press, 1981), p. 13, et Robins, Benjamin S., American Angels (University of Nebraska, 2000), p. 2.
Hall, Bert W., One Man’s War (The New Library, NY, 1980), p. 24.
Gros, Dr. Edmund, A Brief History of the Lafayette Escadrille (Unpublished manuscript, National Archives II, Maryland), p. 2.
Ibid., p. 3.
Ibid., p. 3.
Ibid., p. 4.
Ibid., p. 4 et 5.
Ibid., p. 6.
Ibid., p. 7.
Ibid., p. 9.
Gordon, Pilot Biographies, p. 27.
Ibid., p. 27 ; et Journal des Marches et Opérations : Escadrille N° 124 (National Air and Space Museum Archives (NASMA), Washington, D. C.) ; et Bailey, Frank W. et Christophe Cony, The French Air Service War Chronology (London, Grub Street Press, 2002). L’auteur a fait la comparaison entre les trois sources pour vérifié les faits.
Ibid.
Ibid.
Ibid., p. 28 ; et Journal : Escadrille N° 124 ; et The French Air Service War Chronology.
Ibid., p. 29 ; et Journal : Escadrille N° 124 ; et The French Air Service War Chronology.
Ibid.
Gordon, Pilot Biographies, p. 30.
Ibid., et Journal: Escadrille N° 124 ; et The French Air Service War Chronology.
Ibid.
Ibid.
Ibid.
Gordon, Pilot Biographies, p. 52.
Hudson, James J., Hostile Skies (Syracuse University Press, 1968), p. 236.

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Chapter Two

Publié le 2 janvier 2023 par WebmestreAgile

Has America forgotten the men of the Lafayette Escadrille and Lafayette Flying Corps? Some aviation historians would not agree. They would perhaps point to the variety of books written by them and about them. They would also cite Raoul Lufbery, the Lafayette Escadrille’s greatest hero, and point to the Memorial dedicated in their honor. However, the truth is that Lafayette aviators have faded from the American historical landscape.

America’s History of Volunteer Unit

America has a long, rich tradition of volunteer fighting units. The notion of the “citizen soldier” has been an important part of American military history since the American Revolution when a group of colonies fought for its freedom from the British. Afterwards, the newborn states did not want large standing armies and so volunteers remained an important part of the American armed forces in its early history. This tradition would continue, with Americans volunteering as necessary to fight its country’s wars and assist others in defense of freedom. The volunteer spirit has proven to be a huge influence throughout American history.

From the turn of the century to the beginning of World War II, many Americans volunteered to fight abroad; indeed, this period may be considered the heyday of the American volunteer fighting unit. Special volunteer units were created to fight the Spanish in Cuba during the Spanish-American War. Many left neutral America in droves to drive ambulances as volunteers or to fight under the flags of other countries in 1914, 1915, and 1916, before it would officially enter the Great War in 1917. American men flew for the Polish in 1919 against the Russians. They went off to fight in Spain in the 1930’s against the Fascists during that country’s civil war. American men flew and fought against the Japanese long before Pearl Harbor. They flew for the Royal Air Force against the Germans during the Battle of Britain. And of course, the men of the Lafayette Escadrille flew and fought for the French a full year before America entered World War I.

Many of these volunteer units have a glorified tradition in America. The 1^st Volunteer Cavalry Unit, also known as the “Rough Riders,” led by the future President of the United States, Theodore Roosevelt, attacked San Juan Hill in Cuba in one of the most famous charges in American history. The American Volunteer Motor Corps founded by Richard Norton, and its World War I sister units, the American Field Service and the American Ambulance Corps, included famous American volunteers like Earnest Hemingway, Ford Maddox Ford, and other soon-to-be famous authors. The American Volunteer Group, also known as the Flying Tigers, enchanted America with its exploits against the Japanese, and General Chennault and fighter ace “Pappy” Boyington, became household names. The Abraham Lincoln Brigade, which fought in the Spanish Civil War, would be made famous by Earnest Hemingway and other writers who reported what they saw to the world.

The Lafayette Escadrille has never captured the American imagination and spirit as has its cohorts. Why has the story of the Lafayette Escadrille not held up over time? Why are they not as formidable a part of America’s volunteer tradition and memory? What has been lost in the translation of the story of these noble men’s lives? Why are they not as well known as the other volunteer units from the 20^th Century? — units that in some cases achieved no more or less than the Lafayette Escadrille? Why has America failed to keep its promise to remember these men and their noble contributions? Why has their Memorial been allowed to decline into such a state of neglect?

One in Five

Are the Lafayette aviators being forgotten? To test the legitimacy of this premise, the author approached the question through a simple survey.

Three groups totaling 500 Americans were chosen as a target audience. The majority of the 500 people were military and had a college education or higher. The purpose was to prove that even with a predominantly educated and military background, the results would show that the Lafayette Escadrille and Lafayette Flying Corps are noticeably less well known than other volunteer organizations.

All attempts were made to maintain the utmost impartiality and to remain completely faithful to proper survey taking techniques. The first group of surveyed personnel had no direct contact with the surveyor. People chosen from a general population received surveys in the mail, which were to be immediately completed and promptly returned to the author. The other two groups surveyed consisted of military cadets. These groups were surveyed by military officers using a similar process; the author is confident that the same fidelity was used.

The survey itself was composed of five “YES or NO”-type questions; either the survey taker would know or not know the answer, and he or she was to reflect that accordingly. Five American volunteer units of various acclaim and historical significance were chosen as subjects for the survey. The Lafayette Escadrille was of course one of them; the 1^st Volunteer Cavalry Regiment of Spanish American War fame, the American Field Service and the American Ambulance Corps of World War I fame, the Abraham Lincoln Brigade from the Spanish Civil War, and the American Volunteer Group of pre-World War II fame were chosen as additional volunteer units. The survey simply asked whether the surveyed person had ever heard of the volunteer unit – a simple “Yes” or “No” was all that was needed to successfully answer the question. The survey is presented below in Figure 1.

Survey/Questionnaire on U.S. Volunteer Organizations

Please answer the following questions by simply circling ‘Yes’ or ‘No’. It is important to the research being conducted that you answer as honestly as possible, so please mark ‘Yes’ only on those that you really know.

Have you ever heard of the 1^st U.S. Volunteer Regiment, “The Rough Riders,” which participated in the Spanish-American War? Yes No
Have you ever heard of the American Field Service of the American Ambulance Corps, which participated in World War I? Yes No
Have you ever heard of the Lafayette Escadrille or the Lafayette Flying Corps, which participated in World War I? Yes No
Have you ever heard of the Abraham Lincoln Brigade, which participated in the Spanish Civil War? Yes No
Have you ever heard of the American Volunteer Group, “The Flying Tigers,” which participated in the war against Japan? Yes No

The first group represented the general population; it consisted of 100 people of various backgrounds, sex, race, and education, ranging in age from 17 to 70. This group was surveyed by mailed questionnaire. The second group, composed of 233 cadets from the United States Air Force Academy (USAFA) in Colorado Springs, Colorado, ranging in age from 18 to 22, were surveyed in May of 2002, by an individually appointed testing officer, a lieutenant colonel stationed at the Academy. This group represented a captive military audience geared toward the study of aviation history and USAF tradition. The last group of 167 polled, were cadets from the United States Military Academy (USMA) in West Point, New York. This group also ranged in age from 18 to 22, and represented a captive military audience that is geared toward the study of military history and U. S. Army tradition. The cadets were surveyed by an individually appointed testing officer, a major on the USMA faculty staff. The poll was also conducted in May of 2002. This group was chosen as a counterbalance control group of military personnel, to offset the USAFA group.

Of the overall population of 500 persons polled, only 18% recognized the Lafayette Escadrille or Lafayette Flying Corps name. This compares to 86% who recognized the Rough Riders; 76% who recognized the Flying Tigers; and 43% who recognized the American Field Service or the American Ambulance Corps from World War I. Only the Abraham Lincoln Brigade, a relatively obscure organization in the United States, and unpopular due to its Communist leanings, fared worse, at 15%.

Of the general population group of 100 people that were surveyed, only one in four, or 25 % recognized the name of the Lafayette Escadrille. In this population, 81% recognized the Flying Tigers; 77% recognized the Rough Riders, 47% recognized the name of the ambulance organizations, and 23% recognized the name of the Abraham Lincoln Brigade. Of this population, a couple of additional trends were perceived: of the population that went to the University of Virginia, where two of the members of the Lafayette Escadrille had attended school – James Rogers McConnell and Andrew Courtney Campbell – and who have statues and plaques erected to them on campus — 13 of the 15 personnel polled had never heard of the Lafayette aviators. Of 18 military aviators polled, representing the USAF, the United States Navy and the United States Marine Corps, eight of the 18 personnel polled had not heard of them.

Very surprising results came from the USAFA. Of the 233 cadets polled, 47 had heard of the Lafayette Escadrille, meaning that 186 responded that they had never heard of the Lafayette men — a mere 20 % from the institution that teaches the traditions of the USAF. This compares with 100% who had heard of the Flying Tigers, and 98% having heard of the Rough Riders. Forty-six percent had heard of the ambulance units, and only 11% had heard of the Abraham Lincoln Brigade.

The USMA followed the pattern of the others polled, only this time the Lafayette Escadrille fared the worst. Only 9% had heard of the Lafayette aviators. This compares with 75% of the 167 who had heard of the Rough Riders; 45% of the Flying Tigers; 36% of the ambulance units; and 16% of the Abraham Lincoln Brigade.

The chart below shows the results of the survey.

Name of Organization General Population (100) USAFA(233) USMA(167)

1) 1^st Volunteer Cavalry Regiment 77% 98% 75%

2) WWI Ambulance services 47% 46% 36%

3) Lafayette Escadrille 25% 20% 9%

4) Abraham Lincoln Brigade 23% 11% 16%

5) American Volunteer Group 81% 100% 45%

a) General population: 100 of 187 surveys returned.
b) USAFA: 233 of 300 surveys returned.
c) USMA: 167 of 200 surveys returned.

The author was not able to commission an independent, professional organization to conduct his surveys although he tried; the cost was prohibitive. The author was, however, able to consult an independent source about the validity of the survey. It was estimated by the independent reviewer that the survey contained a 3- to 5-percent error margin. ¹ Nonetheless, it is believed that the data speaks for itself. Three different control groups, constituted of 500 people, reached the same proportional and overall conclusion. The one in five, or 20%, testimony supports the suspicion that the Lafayette Escadrille is being forgotten.

Possible Reasons

No fiction could be written that could top the story of the members of the Lafayette Escadrille. It is the tale of a colorful unit of men, almost alone as Americans on the Western Front, fighting for the French without the consent of its nation. They led the way in a fight against a common foe, all in the name of liberty. These men were fighting in a new arena, the air. The United States Air Service (USAS) did not even technically exist at the time these men were strapping on their machines and taking to the air to fight the enemy. They were truly American pioneers in this new domain.

That the illustrious deeds of a few gallant men in a unique unit be forgotten by a nation is not truly indicative of the grander scheme of things. All nations have units, men, or wars that have been forgotten with the passage of time. Perhaps the Lafayette Escadrille is just one of these units, destined to be forgotten. There are other, more definitive reasons that have made them less memorable.

First, the historical context of the unit must be considered. The Great War was not a popular war; indeed it created a great aversion of all things pertaining unto war for a generation afterwards. The interwar periods would produce some of the greatest anti- war and counter-cultural movements in the 20^th century. The war and its costs were something many people would just as soon forget. And aviation, as glorious a new combat arm as it was, had played a relatively small part in the total conflict. When compared to the massive overall efforts demonstrated on the ground, the aviators were just a tiny percentage of the whole. Strategists would not understand aviation’s role for years to come, and it would continue to be treated as a novelty and a second rate, supporting arms service.

There are more tangible reasons that have influenced the Lafayette men’s historical standing. The original Lafayette Escadrille was small; only 38 men would fly in it during its approximate 23 months of existence. The number slightly increases to 42 if you count the French commanders that flew for the Escadrille as well during this period. Only 209 men would fly for the Lafayette Flying Corps during the entire war. Meanwhile, hundreds of divisions comprising millions of men fought throughout the conflict. What could this small number of men possibly accomplish that would reverberate through history? Unless they were able to single handedly influence the outcome of the war, or achieve a number of kills that no other aviation unit on the Front could match, they were destined to be forgotten. Their combat record was not remarkable.

Some of the unit’s decline in recognition can be attributed to events during the war and after America had entered it. Despite being the first true American combat aviators, the Lafayette Escadrille would suffer an ignominious fate when the United States Air Service (USAS) finally arrived in Europe. The USAS was intent on doing things its own way, as was the American Expeditionary Force (AEF). The Lafayette Escadrille unit would be disbanded, the men integrated into different units, and although the 103^rd Aero Pursuit Squadron (APS) would allegedly carry on its colors, traditions, and history, the Lafayette Escadrille would be lost in the shuffle. It was almost if the Lafayette Escadrille was an oddity, destined to be treated like an unwanted orphan or stepchild by the USAS. This failure by the USAS to honor and integrate the Lafayette Escadrille by including it in its ranks, would cement the unit’s historical fate.

The lack of historical significance rendered to the Lafayette Escadrille would continue long after the war. No unit properly carries on the tradition and colors of the Lafayette Escadrille, nor of its successor, the 103^rd Aero Pursuit Squadron. No collective monument has ever been erected in the United States to honor these men. Only privately funded statues, monuments, and plaques exist, and these are dedicated to individuals and not to the unit. No museum is dedicated to their memory. No central facility or institution tells their story or recounts their exploits. American aviation museums offer little to nothing as a tribute to these men and their legacy. What exists in research institutions is small, incomplete, and often unorganized. Most official USAS and USAF histories and records treat the Lafayette Escadrille as an afterthought, though the USAF’s top personnel often tout it as the pioneer combat American aviation unit. As the results of the USAF Academy surveys might suggest, the USAFA is not even teaching its young officers at its premiere institution about its first pioneers.

And, sadly, the overall legacy of the squadron members is not a happy one. As in all units dissension and discord existed, yet the Lafayette Escadrille had a problem with egos, jealousy, and the sharing of glory that would taint its legacy. The squadron was split into cliques, and the men were petty and distrustful of each other. Some of the men became disenchanted with the Escadrille, and some even hated flying and were considered shirkers that avoided combat. Unfortunately, the bad blood would spill over into the later years and affected the unit’s morale and unity. There was even a row over the construction of the Lafayette Escadrille Memorial and the list of men it was supposed to honor. Many of the members of the original 38 would die young, as recluses or as alcoholics, often in trouble with the law. Those who did succeed to lead normal lives, did not do enough to promote their legacy from detractors and scam artists. When a few of the survivors did come together to save their reputation and name, it was too little and too late.

These factors contributed to the demise of the Lafayette Escadrille’s and the Lafayette Flying Corps’ memory. Alone, any of these factors might not have detracted; but together these problems constituted obstacles too formidable for the aviators to overcome.

A Note about this Dissertation

The researcher’s purpose in this dissertation is by no means to castigate or criticize what he believes to be a truly inspirational unit of men. It is one of the most original and compelling stories in the history of American volunteerism. However, it is important to examine why the Lafayette Escadrille has not captured the same amount of support and admiration from Americans as some of the other volunteer units in her history. Only by understanding what transpired to detract from these men’s glory can one begin to rectify the Lafayette’s history.

It is not the purpose of this dissertation to reach any definite conclusions; it is impossible for the author to speak on behalf of America as a whole. Instead, the author intends to lay out the evidence to those few readers who know the Lafayette Escadrille and the Lafayette Flying Corps, to allow them to understand perhaps why these men have failed to find the place in history they assuredly deserve. Although the material extensively pored over by the researcher has appeared in some places before, this same material, to this author’s knowledge, has never in America or France been scrutinized with such an objective in mind. The author believes he has seen almost all of the primary sources available in museums, archives, and special collections (exceptions include some private collections unavailable to the author). The author, therefore, has attempted to tie the available material from all of these collections to generate a trail for the reader to follow.

A great deal of interest has been expressed in this author’s research from those who have helped him. It is only hoped that he will be able to provide some valuable insight into this perplexing question. It is hoped that all will understand the men of the Lafayette so much the better in the end.

La source indépendante : Le Major Brandi S. Barham USAF, diplomé d’un « Bachelor of Science Degree in Behavioral Sciences » de l’U. S. Air Force Academy, 1992.

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Chapter One. A Forgotten Memorial

Publié le 2 janvier 2023 par WebmestreAgile

The Lafayette Escadrille Memorial is located less than eight miles from downtown Paris. If one starts from the Arc de Triomphe and drives through the Bois de Boulogne, crossing the Seine River at the Suresne or St. Cloud bridges, it is but a short distance through the beautiful, lazy districts of St.Cloud and Garches to the Memorial located at Marnes-la-Coquette. After one passes the Garches train station, which forms part of the Paris-St. Nom-la-Breteche railway, there is but 400 meters to go on the Boulevard Raymond Poincare (formerly Boulevard Michel Brezin). One must keep an eye out on the left for ‘Number 5’ – the entrance to the memorial park; formerly a majestic entrance, and be alert to spot the faded Indian Head insignia – the telltale mark of the Lafayette Escadrille — on the gate’s columns, for it has blended into the lush foliage. (See figures 1 and 2).

After turning in, one must park immediately on the right, since traffic is forbidden in the park except on formal or ceremonial occasions. The few acres of land the park sits on is idyllic, the foliage dense and beautiful, which one can enjoy in the hundred-meter walk to the Memorial. One must cross the bridge that spans Marche Pond and Villeneuve Lake, and then follow the path to the right. As one rounds the corner, a sign in French relays the following :

Passant

Ici reposent cote a cote unis

dans la mort comme ils furent

dans l’action, les plus valeureux pilotes

americaines et leurs chefs francais.

Passant

Respecte leur sommeil, n’entre dans

ces lieux que pour te recueillir,

medites leur exemple et pries.

L’armee de l’air francaise

Then, as one walks past the sign and across the manicured, plush, open lawn that spans the distance to the Memorial, one is struck by the monument’s size and majesty. This Memorial, built to honor the American aviators who flew and fought for France before and after America entered the Great War, stands as a powerful testimony to the spirit and courage of the men of the Lafayette Escadrille and the Lafayette Flying Corps. The Lafayette Escadrille Memorial is surprisingly large, considering that it is so close to major thoroughfares and yet so completely hidden from all passers-by.

The Memorial is of a very characteristic 1920’s style. It sits on an incline and over looks a reflecting pool. It is composed of a triumphal arch flanked to its right and left by colonnaded gantries, which are in turn buttressed by smaller arches. The triumphal, or center arch, which is exactly one half the size of the Arc de Triomphe, dominates the construct, towering over the Memorial’s two bookend arches and gantries. ¹

The dominating center arch dwarfs anyone approaching, allowing one to truly appreciate the grandeur of the monument. The sheer amount of ornate detail, and the great number of inscriptions and engravings that densely cover the monument’s facades is impressive. The triumphal arch has the following large worded inscription on the front and back,

In memory of the men

of the Escadrille Lafayette

who died in defense

or right and liberty

The “Screaming Sioux Warrior Indian Heads” are easily identifiable on each bookend arch and are the largest figures on the Memorial. Another immense Indian Head mosaic is located on the floor of the Memorial directly under the center arch.

All of the battles that the Lafayette aviators flew in are engraved on the Memorial, and run the length of the gantries on both sides and encircle the bookend arches. They read like an encyclopedic reference to World War I. Even those who know nothing of the Lafayette Escadrille and the Lafayette Flying Corps, will certainly recognize, and shudder, at the names that still haunt the world’s collective memory: Dunkerque, Soissons, Reims, St. Mihiel, Arras, Verdun, Noyons, St. Quentin, Flandres, Somme, Aisne, Marne, Vosges, Oise, Alsace, Argonne, Champagne, and Mont Didier. According to this long list of names, one would know that the men had participated in almost every major battle in the Great War after 1915, and that they had served in every sector on the Western Front. This is something only a few men could claim.

As one gazes upward from under the triumphal arch, he will see the names of the 209 men that fought and, in many cases, died for France. Some of the names, like Raoul Lufbery, are hallowed and represent America’s first aces. Some of the names represent America’s elite families, like Rockwell and Prince. Some of the names are very American: Hall, Johnson, Jones; in other cases, names like Genet and Masson are as French as these aviators’ ancestors were. And still other names, like Hoskier, Soubiran, and Pavelka, reflect the melting pot that is America.

From underneath this same central arch, as one looks to the right and left, he will see the descending steps covered by the colonnaded gantries that lead downward to the entrances of the crypt. This monument also houses a large subterranean burial vault, home to 68 sarcophagi honoring the members of the Lafayette Escadrille and the Lafayette Flying Corps. Above the descending steps the following biblical verse is engraved:

Ils n’ont pas ete separes dans la mort,

Ils etaient plus legers que les aigles,

Plus forts que les lions.

II Samuel 1.23

Descend either set of steps and one arrives at the entrances to the crypt. The plaques at the entrances read,

Aux morts de

L’Escadrille Lafayette

cette crypte est consacree

Ils allerent au trepas de leur plein gre

pour la cause qu’ils

avaient embrassee

Ils reposent dans le sol

qu’ils ont defendu.

Inside the crypt, it is rather stark and subdued, a contrast to the ornate decorations that are characteristic of the Memorial above. The coffins are placed side-by-side in groups of four, the American aviators and their French commanders lying together in death as close as they once were in life. The coffins are marked with a simple plaque. The lighting on a sunny day is beautiful and very soothing since on the opposite wall of the crypt, away from the sarcophagi, are thirteen, small, rectangular, wonderfully crafted, stained-glass windows. Each window recreates a battle scene of which the Lafayette Escadrille participated in, detailed with aircraft and signature landmarks from each particular battle region. The light from the stained-glass windows highlight in resplendent color the names of the aviators honored there. Only 49 men are actually entombed in the 68 sarcophagi, but the ones that repose there are some of the most famous: Raoul Lufbery, Douglas MacMonagle, Victor Chapman, Edmond Genet, James Rogers McConnell, Paul Pavelka, Andrew Courtney Campbell, and the French commanding officer, Georges Thenault.

If one climbs back up the steps and stands back from the Memorial on a beautiful day, one can take in the full aesthetic beauty of the monument. The Lafayette Escadrille Memorial’s size and design are breathtaking. It is definitely impressive in its grandeur, nestled majestically in this serene, peaceful park.

All is not Right

However, all is not right with the Memorial to these valiant men. The monument’s condition is a disgrace; it is falling apart. Its exterior and interior are not only both suffering from the ravages of time, but are succumbing to water damage, neglect, and pollution.

The once pristine ‘Euville’ and ‘Rocheret’ white granite surfaces that form the face of the monument have been blackened by air pollution (An apt comparison would be to consider the once blackened Notre Dame Cathedral before it was recently restored in 2000). The Memorial is unfortunately encircled and bordered by two roads — Boulevard Raymond Poincare and State Road 407; a major highway – Autoroute13; and a dual-bed railroad track that marks the Paris-St. Nom-la-Breteche line. The traffic on these heavily traveled roads has generated a thick, black grime that has obscured the majority of the white granite on the surfaces of the Memorial, even though it is surrounded by the park’s natural, lush vegetation.

A close inspection of the Memorial reveals that it is in a very poor state. The steps that lead up to the Memorial are cracked, and the masonry is crumbling. Floor tiles on the back terrace of the Memorial are broken in numerous places, leaving gaping holes that are unsightly. The Memorial’s huge blocks of granite are not only black from pollution, but also have severe cracks that run their length. Fungi and growth also nastily scar the huge blocks of granite, which have a barnacle-like appearance. This further mars the aesthetic beauty of the already damaged granite. The interior of the arches and the gantries have remained white, but the ceilings are chipped; bits and pieces have fallen from them leaving the reinforcing, rusty structural iron showing through; which has in turn discolored the surrounding surfaces.

The crypt is a disaster. There are no words to accurately describe how the damage robs the sanctity of the resting place of these heroes. The entrances to the crypt are rife with cracks. The crypt ceiling is literally a hazard to visitors. The whitewashed arches that form the interior of the crypt have huge sections that have sloughed away like a cancerous skin, revealing the bricks and unsightly mortar-work used as foundation material. Large puddles of water, even on a dry day, accumulate on the crypt floor, and the impression is that one is standing in a large subterranean sewer system or water conduit. The sarcophagi are endangered by the water damage; efforts have been made to shore up the damage and to arrest the seepage, but the attempts are slapdash and unprofessional. The rich mosaic flooring of the crypt, a priceless artwork, has been ruined by the drainage; the damage is irreversible. To add to the crypt’s woes, the alcoves that were ostensibly designed to house chapels and reflecting sanctuaries stand empty since water would damage anything placed in their recesses.

The wonderful stained-glass windows are cobwebbed and filthy. An attempt in the past was made to recolor them but the job was done unprofessionally and the panes appear worse for the effort. The original stunning beauty has been muted by the slipshod job.

On the outside of the monument, in the back, where the crypt has an exterior moat designed to catch and funnel water away, the moat is an ugly eyesore and an architectural nightmare, and it will be a major undertaking to alleviate the deleterious effect it has on the monument.

The Lafayette Escadrille Memorial’s condition is a disgrace. The park is empty year round, the number of visitors totals less than a hundred or so. ²The Memorial has been forgotten.

The Suresne Memorial: A Brief Comparison

A little closer to Paris, but still in the same region as the Lafayette Escadrille Memorial, is the American Cemetery of Suresne, located in the Paris suburb of the same name (see figure 1). This 7.5-acre cemetery is also across the Seine from Paris, set distinctly on a dominating hill that overlooks the city. This cemetery contains the graves of 1,541 Americans who died in World War I and twenty-four unknown American war dead from World War II. Bronze tablets on the walls of the chapel record the names of the 974 missing, lost or buried at sea from both wars. This cemetery is also surrounded by roads and is exposed to the elements, lacking the dense vegetation that hides the Lafayette Escadrille Memorial. ³

Yet this cemetery is pristine. The tombstones are chalk white and look as if they were erected not long ago. The rows of graves repose in finely manicured lawns, very militaristic in their exact rows and columns. The memorial and the chapel are in similarly pristine conditions. The ravages of time and the elements are held at bay here, and only under the closest scrutiny would one know whether time has done any damage to the grounds and its contents.

The Suresne Cemetery site stands in stark contrast to the Lafayette Escadrille Memorial at Marnes-La-Coquette, and it is the most direct and telling example that something is amiss or forgotten at the Memorial for the gallant aviators of the Escadrille.

The Lafayette Escadrille Memorial Foundation

The dedication of the Lafayette Escadrille Memorial, designed by Mr. Alexandre Marcel, Chief Architect of the French Government, took place on July 4, 1928. The “Lafayette Escadrille Memorial Foundation” was established shortly thereafter in 1930 by William Nelson Cromwell, a distinguished, Paris-based, New York attorney, as “Fondateur”, and has for its mission:

To assure the retention and permanent upkeep of the monument erected by the Lafayette Escadrille Memorial Association in the park of St. Cloud on the land granted by the French Government to the same association, for the purpose of keeping alive in the hearts of men the spirit which inspired the members of the Lafayette Escadrille and the Lafayette Flying Corps, all Americans, all volunteers for the universal cause of liberty under the flag of France before their country’s entrance into the Great War.
To provide for suitable and appropriate religious observance in this place.
To educate the youth of France, of America and other nations in the history of their respective countries and of each other’s country, by means of public addresses, publications, and otherwise. ⁴

The initial idea for a monument to the Lafayette Flying Corps was brought about by one of its former members, pilot Edgar Guerard Hamilton, who had aided in the search of his fallen Lafayette Flying Corps brethren’s bodies after the armistice. This painstaking search for bodies that were buried all over the French front, and in some cases behind former enemy lines, gave him an idea. He wanted to bring together the bodies of this unique group of men in a single, unified resting place, and to this end he enlisted the help of important American and French officials. In March of 1923 an association called the “Lafayette Escadrille Memorial Association” was founded to bring this idea to life. ⁵

The monument was constructed during the years 1927 and 1928. The French Government had donated the 4-hectare park, and funds for the construction were raised by public subscription in France and the United States. William Nelson Cromwell donated most of the funds for construction. After his death he left an additional trust fund of 1.5 million dollars for maintenance of the monument to the “Lafayette Escadrille Memorial Foundation” that he had founded. ⁶

The Memorial is still administered by the very same Foundation, which has a tax-free status, and its French counterpart, “La Fondation du Memorial de L’Escadrille Lafayette,” is a tax-free association as well. The boards of the foundations are entirely the same and are comprised of French and American trustees. The Foundation employs a gardener and a caretaker, who lives on the property for below market-value rent and manages the grounds. Routine maintenance of the park and the Memorial costs about $50,000 per year in 2002 dollars. ⁷

The capital in the original trust fund set up by Cromwell has steadily dwindled over the years. As reported by an American Battle Monuments Commission (ABMC) study, the major repairs to stop the infiltration of water into the crypt; the repairs already effected over the years to the structure; some disappointing investments; and the rising cost of basic maintenance, have caused the funds to completely dry up. The original construction was 3 million dollars over budget, so various economies were made at the time to cut back in expenditures; in the long run this has cost the Memorial structurally. Almost immediately after its dedication, rework had to be done from 1928 to 1936, to restore and upgrade imperfections and the beginnings of water damage. Restorations were again made in 1980 and 1986, and a few of the original design features had to be altered. ⁸

Without the proper funds, the Lafayette Escadrille Memorial has been allowed to slowly crumble and wear away.

The Difference at Suresne: The American Battle Monuments Commission

The American Battle Monuments Commission (ABMC) is a small, independent agency of the Executive Branch of the Federal United States (U.S.) Government. This commission is charged with the upkeep and maintenance of American cemeteries, monuments, memorials, and plaques that span the globe. The Commission fulfills its mission by:

Designing, constructing, operating and maintaining permanent American military burial grounds in foreign countries.
Establishing monuments within the U.S. when directed by public law, and outside the US where American armed forces have served since 1917.
Controlling the construction and changes on foreign soil of U.S. military memorials, monuments and markers by other U.S. citizens and organizations, both public and private.
Encouraging sponsors to properly maintain their memorials, monuments, and markers. ⁹

The European Region of the ABMC has its main office near Paris in Garches, just outside of Paris. It is responsible for seventeen cemeteries and fifteen memorials, monuments, and markers from Normandy to Tunisia. Included are the World War I cemeteries at Aisne-Marne, Ardennes, Oise-Aisne, the Somme, St. Mihiel, Suresne, and the Meuse-Argonne, which also have impressive monuments, and in total, house over 44,331 war dead. The number of visitors to these cemeteries exceeded 207,000 in 2000, nearly 30,000 a year per site. (Suresne had 14,662 visitors in 2002). ¹⁰

These cemeteries and the other monuments that make up the European Region of the ABMC are not problem-free however. These sites suffer from extreme exposure and corrosive problems, but as evidenced in the “Operations and Facilities Management” section of the “ABMC 2000 Annual Report,” they are aggressively addressed. The state of disrepair never approaches that of the Lafayette Escadrille Memorial. Supported by the U.S. Government, these installations on French soil are not allowed to become forgotten.

This is impressive considering the distances involved from the United States. ABMC operates and maintains twenty-four permanent U.S. military cemeteries and twenty-seven memorials, monuments, and markers in fifteen countries around the world that hosted 3,998,312 visitors in 2000 with a budget of 128,323,000 dollars. This is a considerable feat since just 369 employees worldwide handle all of this responsibility. ¹¹

* * *

So, how can it be that the Lafayette Escadrille Memorial stands in such a state of disrepair compared to the cemetery at Suresne and the other U.S. cemeteries and monuments in France? The fundamental difference is that the memorial, though dedicated to Americans, is run privately by a Foundation that has no more funds.

An Analogy: A Forgotten Monument and the Forgotten Lafayette Escadrille

That the Memorial has been neglected is a fact. What is much more compelling and disturbing, is that the fate of the Memorial is an apt analogy of the fate of the Lafayette Escadrille and the Lafayette Flying Corps men, their history and legacy. It is true that the Lafayette Escadrille Foundation has no funds, but this is in turn due to an American public and government that have lost interest in the Lafayette aviator’s history. The memory of the Lafayette men, like the Memorial, is all but forgotten and neglected in the United States.

Etude préalable à la restauration générale du Mémorial de l’Escadrille Lafayette, p. 6.
Le chiffre de visiteurs cité par Secrétaire de la Fondation du Mémorial, 3 septembre 2002.
Visite d’auteur, et l’ABMC Visitor’s Guidebook. (American Battlefields Monuments Commission ou Commission Américain des Monuments de Batailles en francais)
Brochure de la Fondation du Mémorial de l’Escadrille Lafayette.
Gordon, Dennis, Lafayette Escadrille Pilot Biographies (Missoula, Montana, 1991), p. 140.
« ABMC Talking Paper » par Mme. Lillian Fluke.
Ibid.
Etude préalable, p. 28.
ABMC Mission and Organization Statement, ABMC 2000 Annual Report.
Les chiffres viennent d’ABMC 2000 Annual Report.
Ibid.

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Declaration of War

The Transfer of the Lafayette Escadrille

Aftermath of the Transfer

The Lafayette Men, Failed by the USAS

The Lafayette Escadrille Combat Record

Lafayette Escadrille in Comparison with the Overall World War I Aviation Effort

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February 131 0

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The Lafayette Escadrille’s Accomplishments

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America’s History of Volunteer Unit

One in Five

Survey/Questionnaire on U.S. Volunteer Organizations

Possible Reasons

A Note about this Dissertation

All is not Right

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